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1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
This dissertation was developed within the realm of the Interdisciplinary Research Group on Cultural 
Property at the University of Göttingen. In particular, the subproject “The Law and Economics of 
Cultural Property: an Economic Analysis of the Institutions of Rule-Making”1 was devoted to the 
analysis of under what circumstances additional property rights should be granted for cultural goods. 
On this basis, the aim was to derive policy recommendations on how cultural property rights can be 
optimally structured and designed. In this respect, culture is defined “as a phenomenon consisting of 
different cultural goods” that are assumed to comprise tangible and intangible elements of cultural 
significance (Cheng 2006, p. 264). One of the outstanding characteristics of cultural goods 
distinguishing them from mere commodities or consumer goods is that they provide identity to 
individuals (UNESCO November 2001, Art. 8) and influence their actions. It is this very feature of 
cultural goods that this dissertation focusses on.  
On the one hand, the first part of the dissertation analyses how the notion of social identity affects 
the respective demand for protection of cultural goods independent of its tangible or intangible 
nature (see Chapter II). In addition, since the implementation of property rights over tangible cultural 
goods (buildings, monuments, etc.) is less problematic and is already very advanced (e.g. cultural 
heritage management), this dissertation pays particular attention to intangible cultural goods. 
Typically, the protection of intellectual property is covered by classic intellectual property rights such 
as patents or copyright. Yet, many cultural goods such as traditional knowledge or traditional cultural 
expressions lack novelty and clear authorship since they have been transmitted from generation to 
generation. Accordingly, they require specific institutions of protection. In this respect, sui generis 
rights of geographical indications constitute a possible protection regime for traditional knowledge 
embodied in marketed culinary specialties. This dissertation thus critically reviews to what extent 
geographical indications are a suitable means for protecting such traditional knowledge (see Chapter 
III) and whether the provision of such rights can be justified from an information economics 
perspective (see Chapter IV).  
On the other hand, many cultural goods bear the character of public goods. They are provided by 
members of a particular culture and their existence benefits all members of this society equally. This 
specific environment creates, however, a social dilemma situation. Since nobody can be excluded 
from the benefit the public good provides, purely rationally acting subjects will not contribute to the 
public good but rather free-ride on the group members´ contributions. Thus, following only self-
interest bears the consequence of under-provision of public goods and thus a loss of welfare. To gain 
finer grained insights into the provision of cultural goods, the second part of the dissertation 
examines the influence of social identity. Four chapters (Chapter V, VI, VII, and VIII) test how social 
identity affects their provision dependent on whether subjects are interacting in identity-
homogeneous (in-) or identity-heterogeneous (out-) groups. This takes place in a laboratory 
environment in the context of public goods experiments. The aim is to shed light on governance 
mechanisms that groups apply internally in order to secure their group members’ cooperation.  
                                                          
1 The project was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG Research Unit 772). 
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The following two sections briefly outline this dissertation´s key results concerning the role of social 
identity in the provision and protection of cultural goods and derive policy recommendations.  
2 SOCIAL IDENTITY AND THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL GOODS 
The international debate on how to protect cultural goods resulted in two different approaches. On 
the one hand, industrialized countries either seek to protect cultural goods with existing intellectual 
property rights or to leave them within the public domain. Other countries, mostly those of the 
global south, advocate the introduction of special sui generis property rights that address the 
insufficiencies of existing intellectual property rights (Bizer et al. 2011). So far, however, the political 
debate lacks clear normative arguments for protection. To this purpose, Chapter II “Protection of 
cultural goods - an economic approach”2 develops an economic perspective that details in which 
cases cultural goods require further protection if the social identity of their providers (carriers) is 
affected. To do so, the article incorporates identity as an economic variable that enters an 
individual’s utility function (cf. Akerlof and Kranton 2000). On this basis, it assesses how consumption 
and production of cultural goods affect the utility of the three most relevant actors. These are, firstly, 
the culture carriers or insiders, i.e. the groups or individuals from whom the specific cultural good 
originates. Then, there are the consumers and reproducers of cultural goods. Both are entirely 
disconnected from the goods’ emergence and thus are referred to as outsiders. Importantly, insiders 
and outsiders draw direct and indirect utility from the cultural good, and both groups value the good 
positively. The direct part of the utility includes monetary benefits from marketing the cultural good 
and according forgone benefits, which hinder to recover the costs invested in the production of a 
cultural good. Indirect utility comprises for instance a cultural good’s option, existence or bequest 
value, which in sum provide identity for culture carriers. Evidently, cultural goods provide indirect 
utility to outsiders, as well. Nevertheless, such utility cannot be assumed to be as determinant as 
influencing the (fundamental) identity of outsiders. Accordingly, the article establishes that if only 
direct utility effects exist, total gains and losses should be weighed against each other. Considering 
the utility of all stakeholders to a cultural good, protection should only be implemented if it results in 
a net utility gain compared to a situation with no protection. Such an evaluation, however, requires a 
case by case examination. In case of indirect utility effects, their impact on the culture carriers’ 
identity is of importance. If identity is affected, it must be determined whether it seriously impairs 
their fundamental identity or dignity. Only these cases require protection to exclude outsiders from 
consumption and restrict the commodification of these particular cultural goods. This could be 
achieved by international norms for cultural protection in the form of sui generis property rights. In 
sum, Chapter II thus provides insights into the regulatory choice problem faced by national legislators 
as well as the international community, who intend to identify how much protection of cultural 
goods should be targeted.  
Regarding specific institutions to protect cultural goods, both Chapter III and IV pay attention to the 
sui generis rights of geographical indications (GIs). Generally, GIs aim at restricting the usage of 
names associated with culinary specialties of a particular demarcated geographical region. Thus, 
Chapter III on “Reform Proposals on the Geographical Indications of the European Union for the 
                                                          
2 The contribution of the author to this article is approximately 65 percent. 
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Protection of Traditional Knowledge”3 critically analyses to what extent the current regulation on GIs 
promoted by the European Union4 is a suitable tool for protecting traditional knowledge about 
distinctive features of local food culture. Specifically, based on an information- and cultural 
economics perspective, it investigates how transparency between the GI instruments can be 
maintained and how the promotion of traditional knowledge attributed to a specific region can be 
better addressed. Overall, this chapter criticizes that the two current GI instruments, namely 
protected designation of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indication (PGI), constitute 
different grades of regional and thus cultural embeddedness. While PDO products must be entirely 
produced, processed and prepared within the region, which the indication stands for, in case of PGI 
only one step of the production is required to take place within the defined region. Yet, although 
they grant the same level of protection, differences between the instruments are hardly sufficiently 
indicated and communicated to consumers. Consequently, this article advocates modifying the 
existing regulations drastically and suggests keeping only one instrument, namely the PDO. This 
should draw on a definite geographical, but also a stricter cultural connection between the product 
and the region, thus strengthening the regional identity of all stakeholders. Additionally, the article is 
in favor of abolishing the label of Traditional Specialities Guaranteed (TSG).5 Apart from the fact that 
technically TSGs are no GIs, from the consumer perspective they are not clearly distinguishable from 
PDOs or PGIs. Abolishing them thus serves the purpose of increasing consumer transparency of the 
GI system. 
According to Chapter III´s hypothesis, the differences between PDO and PGI instruments are not 
sufficiently clear to consumers to warrant to different GI instruments (labels). Thus, the risk of 
confusing consumers is high. Therefore, Chapter IV “Are Protected Designation of Origin and 
Geographical Indication distinguished by Consumers? An Overview and Synthesis of Empirical 
Evidence”6 investigates whether consumers are able to clearly distinguish the grade of regional 
embeddedness of PDO and PGI protected products. From an information economics perspective this 
is of high importance since the basic economic rationale of protecting GIs is to dissolve the 
information asymmetry between producers and consumers as to the true origin of the products. On 
the basis of a qualitative literature review, the article approaches this question by overviewing and 
synthesizing the empirical evidence on consumers´ awareness of and willingness to pay for PDO and 
PGI. The article shows that PDO and PGI are more or less similarly recognized among consumers. 
Nevertheless, due to serious analytical shortcomings of the current empirical literature, it concludes 
that the research question may not be satisfactorily answered. Consequently, the effectiveness of GIs 
in terms of solving information asymmetries remains hidden. Further extensive research is required, 
for which this article highlights some aspects.  
                                                          
3 The contribution of the author to this article is approximately 55 percent. 
4 The regulations considered: (1) Council Regulation 510/2006 of March 20, 2006 on the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (Regulation 510/2006) OJ L93/12 and (2) 
European Commission, Final Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on agricultural 
product quality schemes (Regulation Proposal), December 10, 2010, COM(2010)733. 
5 Council Regulation 509/2006. 
6 This contribution was entirely elaborated by the author. 
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3 SOCIAL IDENTITY AND THE PROVISION OF CULTURAL GOODS 
Part II of the dissertation is dedicated to the better understanding of the influence of social identity 
in the provision of cultural goods. Due to their similarities with public goods this part applies 
laboratory experiments using public good games. As already briefly introduced, the provision of 
public goods constitutes a social dilemma situation in which individual interest is at odds with social 
interest. Evidently, the social optimum is reached if all group members contribute to the public good. 
However, from an individual perspective there are strong incentives for free-riding since irrespective 
of the level of contributions no one can be excluded from the public goods’ benefits. Yet, despite the 
dominant strategy of free-riding, previous research has already established that individuals have 
diverging cooperation preferences. A considerable proportion of individuals do not aim at 
maximizing their own utility but are rather conditionally cooperative. Thus, they do contribute to the 
public good if their group members do so, as well (see Fischbacher et al. 2001, and Chaudhuri 2011 
for an overview). Very importantly, it has been established that social identity – commonly defined as 
“the individual's self‐concept derived from perceived membership in social groups” (Charness et al. 
2007, p. 1342) – fosters the provision of public goods. In particular, when subjects are interacting in 
identity-homogeneous (in-) groups, they typically reveal an in‐group bias by favoring their in‐group 
and discriminating against out‐group members (cf. Tajfel and Turner 1979, Hoff and Pandey 2006). 
Specifically, subjects are willing to cooperate more with individuals who share the same identity than 
with individuals of different identities (see e.g., Solow and Kirkwood 2002, Wit and Wilke 1992, Chen 
and Li 2009). Additionally, subjects in in-groups are more likely to make social welfare maximizing 
choices as opposed to out-groups (Chen and Li 2009). Interestingly, the question to what extent this 
is due to differences in subjects’ cooperation preferences has not been analyzed in a public good 
context, yet. Consequently, Chapter V asks whether the social environment influences subjects´ 
preference for conditional cooperation, i.e. the extent to which they reciprocate their team 
members’ contributions by an own contribution. 
Next to social identity peer-punishment has also been identified as a successful institution to 
maintain cooperation in the provision of common resources (cf. Fehr and Gächter 2000, and Masclet 
et al. 2003). Specifically, the threat of costly peer-punishment induces subjects to increase their 
contributions. Until now, however, there is still no precise evidence in the public good context on 
how social identity and peer-punishment affects cooperation simultaneously. Thus, Chapter VI aims 
at closing this gap by analyzing how the institution of peer-punishment affects subjects’ 
cooperativeness dependent on the social environment. Nevertheless, it must be also taken into 
account that peer-punishment may have important welfare consequences. The application of peer-
punishment per se is costly for the punished and the punisher, as well. Due to its disciplining effect, 
investment in punishment thus constitutes a second order public good, whose provision might also 
be dependent on social identity. Since this link has received no particular academic attention, yet, 
Chapter VII picks up on this and examines in how far subjects - dependent on whether they are 
interacting in in- or out-groups - are willing to reciprocate the uncooperative behavior of their group 
members by investing in punishment (negative reciprocity). What is more, as emotions tend to play a 
decisive role in motivating behaviour (see Hopfensitz and Reuben 2009, Loewenstein 2000, Elster 
1998), this chapter scrutinizes how emotions impact on punishment. Furthermore, to deepen the 
understanding of the impact of emotions on economic decisions, the last chapter (Chapter VIII) of the 
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dissertation aims at analyzing the effect of emotions, not on triggering punishment, but rather on 
subjects´ subsequent contributions when they have been punished. Peer-punishment is, however, 
divided into a monetary and a non-monetary component. The novelty of this split is that it allows – 
dependent on the social environment – for disentangling the continuum along which groups apply 
social disapproval with or without monetary consequences or a mix of both for sustaining their 
members’ cooperativeness. This is of high relevance since the groups’ choice of governance bears 
serious consequences for the level of social welfare attained.  
Summing up, the second part of the dissertation addresses the question of to what extent social 
identity influences subjects´ economically relevant decision-making in the context of cultural goods 
provision. Methodologically, each chapter employs controlled laboratory public good experiments, 
which were conducted in the Göttingen Laboratory of Experimental Economics (GLOBE) at the 
University of Göttingen. In the basic decision situation of the public good game, after receiving 20 
points, subjects have to make an unconditional decision on how much they want to contribute to the 
public good (framed as a project) and how much they want to keep on their private account. The 
payoff function is set so that each point invested into the public good returns only 0.4 points for each 
group member. Thus, for every individual it is more beneficial to contribute nothing to the public 
good leaving the entire endowment on their private account and to free-ride on the others´ 
contributions. In addition, in Chapter V, VI and VII a conditional contribution decision is also 
requested (see Table 1). In particular, subjects are asked to make 21 entries in a contribution table 
stating how much they would contribute to the project if their group members invested on average 
0-20 points. Due to the hypothetical nature of this question, this method is commonly referred to as 
the strategy method in public goods games (see Fischbacher et al. 2001). This provides, first of all, a 
possible measure for cooperativeness. Secondly, it helps to classify subjects into different 
cooperation types thereby widening our understanding of subjects´ behavior. These public good 
games are complemented in Chapter VI, VII and VIII with a peer-punishment institution. Particularly, 
subjects are given the opportunity to express their disapproval about their group members’ (mis-) 
behavior in terms of their cooperativeness.  





In order to control whether social identity is a causal element in these decision situations, each 
experiment follows a design that entails three matching protocols. In in-group matching subjects are 
interacting with their own identities, in out-group matching groups comprise individuals of different 
identities. Lastly, a random group assignment without any labeling serves as a control treatment. 
Instead of priming subjects’ natural identity, each chapter builds up on an artificially induced identity, 
which is triggered by a simple group task that subjects solve jointly. This method has the advantage 
of better controlling subjects´ identity (Li et al. 2011), which is naturally a blend of different identities 
(Pecchenino 2009). Evidently, priming would make one dimension of a natural identity salient (Li et 
al. 2011). Yet, possible existing attitudes and connotations towards it may influence subjects´ 
behavior, which cannot be controlled. Consequently, based on insights of Eckel and Grossman (2005) 
and Chen and Li (2009), each chapter uses a design pioneered by Ibañez and Schaffland (2012). 
Particularly, subjects are randomly assigned to groups, which are labeled by a particular color 
indicated by a group flag. Group members then work together on finding hidden objects in a picture 
and have the possibility to discuss their location anonymously with each other via a chat tool. To 
increase the interaction of group members, answers are counted as correct only if each group 
member enters them correctly. All of these game rules follow the purpose of creating a positive 
group experience (Eckel and Grossman 2005) and of triggering feelings of group attachment and thus 
group identity.  
After having demonstrated the economic relevance of each chapter of the second part of this 
dissertation and their methodological commonalities, the next sections briefly state their research 
question, unique experimental features and summarize their core results.  
To begin with, Chapter V “Cooperation Preferences in the Provision of Public Goods – An 
Experimental Study on the Effects of Social Identity”7 analyzes the driving forces of higher 
contributions to common pool resources when social identity is present. To do so, the experiment 
follows a within‐subject design based on one‐shot public goods game in strategy method. The 
experimental design entails four stages. Stage 1 serves the purpose of classifying subjects as free-
riders (those who always defect) and conditional cooperators (those who cooperate only if the 
others cooperate, as well) in a random group assignment that is unaffected from any influence of 
social identity. Subjects who cannot be so classified are called “others”. Stage 2 proceeds with the 
induction of social identity. Subsequently, in Stage 3 and 4 subjects either interact firstly in in-group 
then in out-group matching or in a reverse order to control for treatment-order effects. Firstly, the 
article tests whether subjects in in-groups reveal a preference for higher levels of conditional 
cooperation than in out-group matching. Secondly, it asks whether subjects in in-groups show a 
higher propensity to be conditional cooperators and a lower propensity to be free-riders than in out-
group matching. The results reaffirm previous findings obtained outside the public good context (cf. 
Chen and Li 2009), namely that social identity affects subjects' degree of positive reciprocity. 
Especially, subjects in in-groups exhibit significantly higher levels of conditional cooperation at all 
levels of others’ average contribution and thus less self-serving bias than subjects of out-groups. 
What is more, while the propensity to be a conditional cooperator is stable, the data reveals a slightly 
                                                          
7 The author's contribution to this article constitutes approximately 25 percent.   
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higher propensity for subjects to be free-riders when interacting with different identities than with 
common identities. In sum, these results advocate devising policy institutions, which stress the 
belonging to a particular group in order to elevate subjects' conditional cooperativeness and thus the 
overall level of social welfare. 
Chapter VI “How Peer-Punishment Affects Cooperativeness in Homogeneous and Heterogeneous 
Groups – A Public Good Experiment with Social Identity”8 investigates subjects´ cooperativeness 
measured by their conditional contributions under the threat of peer-punishment. The experiment 
follows a between-subject design and is based on one-shot public good games in strategy method. It 
contains Punishment (P) and No-Punishment (NP) treatments, both of which include three stages. 
Firstly, in each treatment subjects randomly assigned to a group play a one-shot public good game in 
strategy method following the same logic as outlined for Chapter V above (Stage A). After social 
identity is induced in Stage B, subjects are assigned either to in-, out- or random groups (Stage C). 
Then, in the NP-treatments subjects play a one-shot public good game similar to Stage A. In the P-
treatments, this game is extended with the possibility of distributing punishment points that subjects 
can assign to each of their group-members after being informed about their contributions. Not only 
being punished but also the infliction of punishment is costly, which ensures that purely selfish 
subjects will never punish. The results highlight, first of all, that the social environment is a 
determinant of how the threat of peer-punishment influences cooperation. Especially, subjects in 
identity-heterogeneous groups increase their contributions the most. In particular, free-riders, 
presumably anticipating a comparably strong punishment by out-group members upon 
uncooperative behavior seem to be responsible for that. Secondly, the in-group bias, which is a 
commonly observed characteristic for situations without punishment and equally present in the NP-
treatments, tends to be eroded by peer-punishment. Consequently, it renders out-group members to 
be as cooperative as members of in-groups. Lastly, the results emphasize the complementarity of 
social identity and peer-punishment. Compared to the control treatment, in- and out-group 
members´ cooperativeness is increased. Thus, combining social identity with peer-punishment seems 
to be a useful tool to maintain cooperation thus social welfare as opposed to situations when social 
identity is not salient.   
While the previous two chapters pay particular attention to subjects´ cooperation behavior, Chapter 
VII “Negative Reciprocity and its Relation to Anger-Like Emotions in Homogeneous and 
Heterogeneous Groups”9 rather examines subjects’ punishment behavior and its underlying factors. 
Correspondingly, this article asks whether social identity affects individuals' willingness to sanction 
deviating group members in a public good context. Similar to the previous chapters’ focus on 
cooperativeness, sanctions are equally seen as conditional behavior. They capture individuals´ 
proclivity to punish behavior perceived as unkind even if it does not yield future benefits and is costly 
(cf. Falk and Fischbacher 2006), which bears important welfare consequences. What is more, this 
article uniquely delivers insights into how anger-like emotions (anger, contempt and irritation) 
influence negative reciprocity dependent on the social environment. To that purpose, subjects had to 
                                                          
8 The author's contribution to this article constitutes approximately 45 percent.   
9 The author's contribution to this article constitutes approximately 65 percent.   
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indicate their emotions after being informed on the other group members´ contribution and before 
the infliction of punishment. The results of the experiment provide first evidence that social identity 
does affect negative reciprocity in a public good context. Subjects in in-groups punish much less 
frequently and in smaller amounts than in out-groups when facing contributions smaller than their 
own. Moreover, the probability to inflict punishment is higher in out-groups than in in-groups. Next, 
the data reveals that deviant behavior does not evoke different intensities of anger-like emotions 
dependent on the social context. The article rather highlights that anger-like emotions trigger 
negative reciprocity much stronger in identity-heterogeneous as opposed to identity-homogeneous 
groups. In sum, these insights approve that social identity not only forms subjects´ preferences for 
positive but also for negative reciprocity in a public goods context. Thus, public policy addressing 
one´s social identity might influence social welfare negatively depending on the group composition. 
Lastly, Chapter VIII “Social Environment and Form of Governance – Monetary and Non-Monetary 
Punishment and the Role of Emotions”10 analyses to what extent social identity affects whether 
subjects govern their group by monetary sanctions or non-monetary sanctions. This question is 
addressed within a framework of a 10-period public goods experiment in a between-subject design. 
For this purpose, Stage 1 induces social identity. Then in Stage 2 subjects play the public goods game 
either in in-group, out-group or random group assignment with group composition remaining stable 
during the entire time horizon. In each round, after the total of punishment points assigned to a 
subject is revealed, subjects are required to state their emotions. The results of Chapter VIII show 
that apart from the initial periods, identity-heterogeneous groups tend to contribute more to the 
public good than identity-homogeneous groups. Moreover, the article establishes that subjects in 
identity-heterogeneous groups display their disapproval more frequently and with higher intensity by 
monetary punishment as opposed to identity-homogeneous groups. Conversely, in-groups tend to 
rely more on non-monetary sanctions than out-groups. In total, this differing cooperation and 
punishment behavior bear the consequence that out-groups reach similar welfare as in-groups. Next, 
the results are the first to show that the emotions of anger and guilt have differing impacts on 
subsequent contributions dependent on the social environment. Especially, after being punished the 
presence of anger does not influence subsequent contributions in in-groups. On the contrary, in out- 
and random groups it negatively impacts contributions. Similarly to Chapter VII, this also provides a 
hint that a common group identity leads subjects to control their anger-like emotions mitigating their 
negative consequences on welfare. On the contrary, when subjects were punished, they were more 
likely to increase their contributions if they felt guilty than if they did not. Surprisingly, when 
interacting in identity-heterogeneous groups feeling guilty leads subjects to increase subsequent 
contributions to a higher extent than in identity-homogenous groups. With respect to previous 
findings, the article demonstrates, first of all, that under the possibility of both monetary and non-
monetary punishment, welfare reached is higher than in situations without any punishment 
institutions and it does not decrease over time. Secondly, this institutional setting eliminates the in-
group bias that is characteristic for situations without any punishment possibility. Thus, from a policy 
perspective introducing a peer-punishment institution and splitting it into a monetary and non-
monetary component can be a useful tool of enhancing welfare. 
                                                          
10 The author's contribution to this article constitutes approximately 65 percent.   
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Concluding, the second part of the dissertation reveals that in a public good context social identity 
does play an important role in subjects´ cooperative and punishment behaviour, which has 
determinant consequences on social welfare dependent on the group composition. Very importantly, 
these findings stress that group composition is of high relevance when public policy addresses one’s 
social identity. Overall, these findings show that social identity might be of crucial importance in 
terms of voluntarily maintaining cultural goods within cultural groups, which are assumed to be 
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PROTECTION OF CULTURAL GOODS – ECONOMICS OF IDENTITY 
 





In the Intergovernmental Committee on Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Traditional 
Cultural Expressions of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO-IGC), nations from all 
parts of the world are discussing whether to provide more protection for cultural goods. In the 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, the United 
Nations undertook “to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions, … and to give 
recognition to the distinctive nature of cultural activities, goods and services as vehicles of identity, 
values and meaning.”1
 
Moreover, the protection of culture is part of the international agenda in 
different aspects and constellations. How can this be interpreted from an economic point of view?  
Many cultural expressions, such as sacred rituals or sand paintings, play an important role in the 
identity of certain groups and should be protected from misappropriation and misuse. Such cultural 
practices might require specific protection measures.  
While some countries would like cultural goods to receive more protection, other countries argue 
that cultural goods belong to the public domain. The latter argue that most, if not all, cultural goods 
should be available for everybody as long as standard intellectual property rights are not infringed 
upon. Take, for example, yoga as a meditation practice used around the world despite the fact that it 
originates in India. Should yoga be reserved for the Indian population only? Should everybody else be 
required to apply for a yoga permit or even pay a “yoga dime” for practicing it?2
 
As another example, 
take any language: Should someone willing to learn to speak it pay an additional charge or ask for 
permission because the language “belongs” to another culture?  
Of course, many doubt that cultural expressions should be commodified at all. But in the 
contemporary world temples as well as their rituals, villages, or tribes and their celebrations, dances, 
theatre, or sacred drawings come to the attention of tourists, designers, and other outsiders and in 
practice are turned into commodities. In the process of commodification certain aspects of the 
culture may very well get lost. This loss may form the difference between the original cultural 
expression and the commodified one, and can be relevant for the identity of members of a specific 
group. Such loss can take the form of identity loss and thus serve as a source of justification for 
protecting cultural goods. We use the phrase cultural goods in what follows to direct our attention 
toward goods and services derived from culture in the broadest sense. In order to avoid 
misunderstanding, we do not use the term goods in any other sense.  
In this article we analyze from an economic perspective whether cultural goods require further 
protection if we take effects on identity into account. We develop a framework allowing us to assess 
different effects on three of the most relevant groups affected by cultural goods. We distinguish 
these groups as culture carriers, outsider consumers, and culture reproducers, which are not the 
same as producers of classic goods and services. Such an assessment provides insights into the 
regulatory choice problem faced by national legislators as well as the international community, who 
intend to identify how much protection of cultural goods should be targeted in general. According to 
our analysis of the utility of cultural carriers, only cultural goods that are essential to identity and 
dignity require additional protection. This is due to the fact that culture reproducers and outsider 
consumers negatively affect the identity and thus the dignity of the culture carriers. In these cases, 
rights are required to exclude these actors from consumption and restrict the commodification of 





To investigate this topic, the rest of the article proceeds as follows: The second section discusses 
identity as an economic variable, which is said to determine the valuation of the protection of 
cultural goods. The third section deals with the utility derived from consuming and reproducing 
cultural goods. In the fourth and fifth sections, we address different protection issues regarding 
cultural goods while classifying cultural goods according to their direct and indirect effects. In the 
final section we arrive at several conclusions.  
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL GOODS—LITERATURE REVIEW 
In drawing on the concept of identity to develop an economic argument about the protection of 
cultural goods, we feel it is necessary to analyze identity in an economic context and incorporate 
identity into the economic (utility) function. This is necessary because identity is of high importance 
in a cultural context. To understand the behavior of individuals or groups, the impact of others on 
their identity must be scrutinized more deeply.  
The descriptive literature on identity and its utility relies on the theses of Akerlof and Kranton,3
 
the 
most widely accepted account of the relationship between identity and economic outcomes. These 
authors suggest that identity might be recognized as a determinant factor in utility functions. In their 
model, the utility function (Uj) consists of three variables.4
 
The first, identity or self-image (Ij), is 
determined by social categories such as gender or occupation as well as their features and typical 
characteristics since members of a given social category or group are often expected to exhibit 
specific physical or cultural characteristics and attitudes. The second variable refers to a person’s 
actions (aj) undertaken to maximize the person’s own utility while complying with the prescriptions 
of his social category. The third identifies the actions of others (a−j), which, combined with the 
second variable, have an impact on a person’s consumption of goods and services. It is assumed that 
a particular social category has an impact on a person’s identity, thereby affecting the person’s so-
called identity-related behavior.5
 
Consequently, identity plays an important role in the utility function 
because a person’s own actions affect the person’s utility, which is to some extent based on the ac-
tions’ impact on identity. According to the model of Akerlof and Kranton, identity-based payoffs can 
arise from a person’s own actions as well as from those of others. The result is that the actions of 
others can affect a person’s utility and identity at the same time, a finding that needs further 
investigation.  
In our article, we focus on the changes in utility caused by (other) third parties not belonging to 
the particular social category. According to the literature mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 
“those who try to change social categories and prescriptions may face similar derision because the 
change may devalue others’ identity.”6
 
In the model of Akerlof and Kranton there is the possibility for 
a person to have a limited choice over his or her identity. They argue that without distinctive 
characteristics, it is possible to join other social categories, but also that this possibility is limited with 
respect to physical appearance or accent. We assume that different cultures, as a kind of social 
category not only sharing common characteristics but also constituting a social group,7
 
comprise 
individuals whose common features form a basis for their interaction with one other, and that these 
are fundamentally based on cultural goods. The consumption and production of cultural goods within 
a particular culture are based on the choices and actions of individuals or a group of individuals, 
which induce changes in their utility function and thus in their identity. According to this argument, 
the impact of cultural-goods-related actions by an outsider to the group on another person’s group 
identity deserves further attention. In this context Akerlof and Kranton identify a loss of identity if 
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somebody violates a person’s internalized values (“prescriptions”). Therefore, these actions of others 
produce “externalities,” against which there is no protection. Activities of persons related to cultural 
goods who are not members of the particular culture are the basis of our analysis. In our view, these 
actions may need to be regulated by institutions such as the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO).  
The literature on cultural goods shows a broad scale of approaches mostly based on international 
trade. Francois and van Ypersele8
 
approach the issue of protecting cultural goods and their impact on 
welfare from a different perspective. Their work is based on the different valuation of cultural goods 
by insiders (home country) and outsiders (abroad), produced under economies of scale, and is 
exemplified by trade in movies. In their example, Hollywood films, which can unintentionally disturb 
traditional or indigenous cultures, are valued the same by both sides (local and foreign people). This 
means, for instance, that consumers in both the United States and France are willing to pay for 
consumption of Hollywood films. In contrast, the valuation of domestically produced films is not 
homogeneous between consumers at home and abroad. According to that example, not all French 
consumers prefer French auteur films or are willing to pay a premium for them.9
 
In their two-country 
(United States, France)/ three-cultural-goods (mainstream Hollywood films, French auteur films, U.S. 
auteur films) model, they explore whether protection of cultural goods (in this case, auteur films) 
could increase welfare for all parties and whether it can be Pareto improving for all parties if 
countries introduce a cultural tariff on Hollywood films. If a tariff or quota is introduced, traditional 
film production, in which fixed costs are very high, would not be crowded out by blockbuster 
producers, whose market share takes up most of the world. From the perspective of domestic groups 
in both countries, the restriction would imply that the local auteur cinema would still be available for 
the local population, which values this good highly. Moreover, consuming locally produced goods is 
required in order to keep domestic culture alive. At the same time, export potential is provided, 
which increases the well-being of the population. In this article, great importance is attributed to the 
valuation of cultural goods. This valuation is fundamental to the different social groups and must be 
reflected when investigating the protection of cultural goods.  
Another important contribution to the issue of protecting cultural goods is provided by Janeba,10
 
who analyzes the impact of free trade of cultural goods on cultural identity. In his article, cultural 
goods are defined as goods that interconnect individual consumption decisions and thus contribute 
to the formation of a cultural identity. For example, consuming a cultural good could make 
consumption more attractive for other consumers. Identity is built if all individuals within the society 
consume the same cultural good (a culturally homogeneous good). The identity function could be 
described as a network externality. For instance, Germans drink beer, which is identified as a 
common tradition in Germany. If everybody in the society consumes the same good, the loss in 
identity is zero, but consumption is influenced by the factors of price and social punishment. This 
consumption may change in the case of trade liberalization leading to changes in the homogeneous 
consumption behavior of a specific society, therefore causing a loss of identity. Janeba favors a 
protectionist approach toward cultural goods based on welfare analysis both in closed and open 
economies. Considering one model of international trade and assuming different technologies and 
economies of scale, he deducts inter alia that in the case of cultural homogeneity (homogeneous 
taste and consumption of cultural goods), trade cannot have a Pareto-improving effect on closed 
economies (autarky). In sum, the model demonstrates that while social consumption behavior 
changes due to the imported cultural goods, individuals consuming the exported good lose out on 
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trade liberalization. Janeba argues that consumers of cultural goods produced and consumed locally 
are those that oppose trade liberalization the most. He further concludes that globalization has a 
negative impact on national culture and individual identities. In order to preserve a culture, the 
consumption of locally produced goods must be supported.  
The public debate concerns the preservation of culture and cultural identity through the 
protection of cultural goods. The economic discussion takes this up while seeking the utility-
providing effect of cultural goods. Against this background, we focus on the central question: What 
exactly is it that requires protection? We answer this question by introducing an economic approach 
to cultural goods and their protection. We suggest a set of criteria that help to determine whether a 
cultural good should be protected or not. These criteria include considerations of direct effects as 
well as indirect effects of cultural goods’ consumption. We also distinguish between certain groups 
affected by the consumption and reproduction of cultural goods.  
UTILITY FROM CULTURAL GOODS  
Culture is a phenomenon that is not easy to define. The United Nations define culture as “diverse 
forms across time and space; this diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the 
identities and cultural expressions of the people and societies making up humanity.”11
 
We define 
culture within the scope of this article as a phenomenon consisting of different goods (cultural 
goods) that “are considered to consist of tangible and intangible items of cultural significance.12 The 
specific feature of cultural goods lies above all in the fact that they must be treated as vectors of 
identity and not as mere commodities or consumer goods.13
 
Of course, immaterial cultural goods are 
more problematic, as most material goods are already protected by classic property rights, but both 
intangible and tangible parts of cultural goods are the subjects of our examination.  




For our analysis, we introduce the notions of culture carriers, culture reproducers and outsider 
consumers (consumers others than culture carriers). Culture carriers are defined as the groups or 
individuals from whom the cultural good originates. They could also be called insiders, as they belong 
to the group or society14
 
in which a certain cultural good emerges. As they are the holders and 
custodians of particular cultural goods, they consequently consist of both producers and consumers. 
They produce cultural goods that they sell as a private good and/or provide for the public domain. 
For simplicity of argumentation we refer to these insider actors as “culture carriers.” As part of the 
group of outsiders, the so-called outsider consumers and the culture reproducer (reproducer of 
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cultural goods) are defined as societies, groups, or individuals using the cultural good but who are 
entirely disconnected from its emergence. Both groups, insiders and outsiders (see figure 1), draw 
utility from cultural goods, and both groups value the cultural good in question positively.  
Let us first take a closer look at the utility of culture carriers. To address this we introduce a “cultural 
utility function” of culture carriers who share the same cultural identity based on particular cultural 
goods.  
We assume that cultural goods provide both direct and indirect utility to culture carriers. The 
direct part of the utility includes monetary benefits from cultural goods. These arise when any 
outsider consumer is willing to pay for using a cultural good such as dancing lessons, a copy of a 
traditional pattern, music, or a picture of some historical monument produced by culture carriers. 
This utility can also be described as “direct consumption benefit” or “direct market benefit.”15
 
Arguing in this manner, it is clear that if outsider consumers use a cultural good without paying for it, 
such as illegally uploading copyrighted cultural songs, it has a negative impact on the (direct) utility of 
the culture carrier who intended to sell it. In cases in which no income or revenue is generated, 
culture carriers might face the problem of not being able to recover the costs invested in the 
production of that cultural good. In the long run, this could have a negative effect on the incentives 
to create cultural goods.16
 
As a result, this can imply an overall economic loss. Moreover, if other 
individuals or groups other than culture carriers (defined as reproducers of cultural goods) begin to 
reproduce the same cultural goods without permission and seize benefits from them (copying a 
cultural song and selling it), it reduces the direct part of the utility of the culture carriers even more.17
 
These factors play a role above all when, for instance, immaterial property rights are infringed.  
In our analysis from the regulatory perspective, the utility of outsider consumers and reproducers 
also plays an important role and must be considered within the direct component of the cultural 
utility function.18
 
Thus, if the culture carriers’ direct utility decreases but is in turn overcompensated 
by the utility increase of the outsiders, it can be overall economically reasonable to allow for outside 
consumption. In other words, if the social costs19
 
restricting the outside consumption of the 
particular cultural good are greater than the social benefits, the economic reasoning is the same as in 
the case of monopoly regulation: Even if the monopolist loses his revenues, it makes sense to restrict 
his actions.  
Let us turn our focus to the crucial part of the cultural utility function: the indirect component. 
Indirect utility is constituted of different effects, which, in sum, provide identity for the culture 
carriers.20 These effects include intrinsic values such as option, existence, bequest, prestige and 
education values. These are so-called nonmarket, nonuser benefits.21
 
The utility drawn from identity 
defined in this way enters the cultural utility function of the culture carriers. Identity as part of the 
utility function was already discussed by Akerlof and Kranton22
 
in the labor market context and can 
also be applied to the cultural utility function. However, according to Throsby23
 
it is quite difficult to 
determine the value of identity in monetary terms because identity cannot be exchanged for other 
goods. This part of the cultural utility function is the most complicated one, as it consists of different 
effects. On the one hand, identity affects the consumption decisions of individuals and can therefore 
be seen as a consumption externality, similar to network externalities.24
 
Accordingly, it might simply 
mean the motivation to engage in and perform common practices or consume particular cultural 
goods. Moreover, on the other hand, some cultural goods could fundamentally affect the existential 
identity of a person, his dignity. Thus, destroying or misusing this kind of cultural good would imply a 




identity-providing symbols (like cultural goods), which refer to all objects or customs used as signs or 
representatives of the social (cultural) identity, are validly authentic if maintained by the owners.26
 
The same actions by outsiders, however, are seen as imitations or as misappropriations of 
characteristics and qualities of the owner’s group, which can be interpreted as a depreciation or 
devaluation of the identity. Consequently, the impact of outsiders, both on direct and indirect utility 
of the culture carriers, needs further investigation.  
CLASSIFICATION OF CULTURAL GOODS 
From an economic point of view, cultural goods can be classified according to the extent to which 
outsiders make use of them and in doing so affect the culture carriers’ utility. Once the cultural utility 
functions are clearly stated, the question of protecting cultural goods can now be analyzed with the 
help of these as well as their relationships. Based on the described utility effects of cultural goods in 
section 3, it is possible to divide them into different groups depending on the cultural outsiders’ 
effect on the culture carriers’ utility.  
Thus, first with focus on direct utility, it can increase, decrease or remain unchanged as outsider 
consumers use cultural goods. Speaking of the indirect part of the cultural goods’ utility-providing 
impact, the so-called identity-providing part, we scrutinize the effect of the cultural consumption by 
outsiders on indirect utility. According to that, cultural goods can be divided into three different 
types:  
1.  Cultural consumption by outsiders has a positive effect on the utility of culture carriers: The 
indirect utility of cultural goods rises with the number of other users. This type of cultural goods 
can be identified for example if the group “owning” this cultural good (culture carrier) is willing to 
disseminate it to other individuals, groups, or societies (to outsiders). For example, a language 
spoken by other groups produces network externalities;27
 
the adoption of a religion by another 
community ensures comparable values and norms, and the like. Christianity, which was and is 




2. The utility of cultural goods could also be independent of usage by outsiders. These kinds of 
cultural goods are rarely found. For example, Buddhism as a religion or spiritual philosophy is very 
peaceful. According to the doctrine of Buddhists, it is important to find the middle path in 
themselves and escape from negative feelings. The aim is to attain nirvana, but this path must be 
reached alone. Therefore, the fact that this religion is used by other than insider consumers does 
not have any effect whatsoever on Buddhists’ indirect or direct utility.  
3.  The utility of cultural goods can diminish as outsider consumers use them. For example, if sacred 
rituals are performed by outsiders, they may lose their meaning for the culture carriers. According 
to de Beus,29
 
who investigated the impact of national identity, it can even influence their feeling of 
belonging, dignity, and identity. The question of what kinds of cultural goods have this strong 
identity- or dignity-providing effect cannot be answered without analyzing particular cases. The 
secrecy of cultural goods can serve as an indication for this effect: Culture carriers trying to 
restrict the access of others (outsider consumers, or groups willing to produce the same cultural 
good) to their cultural good (and by no means aiming to sell this good themselves) could be seen 
as evidence in favor of protection.30
 
As “individuals are the best judges of their own welfare,”31
 
the 
effort to keep a cultural good secret indicates that it must have a large influence on their identity. 
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An example for such a kind of cultural good is the turtle as a religious symbol of Ganalbingu 
people. This was misappropriated by an outsider textile producer which negatively affected the 
identity of that group.32
 
Mike Tyson or Robbie Williams wearing a Maori tattoo33
 
(moko) exemplify 
other cases in which outsider consumption of a particular cultural good negatively affects the 
indirect utility of culture carriers since ta moko illustrates identity and serves particular meaning 
such as recognition of difference by the Maori people.34
 
Accordingly, outsider consumption or 
production in the new context change “the meaning and significance” of these goods.  
If we further differentiate between the direct and indirect utility of culture carriers, which can be 
positively or negatively affected by outsider consumption, we arrive at the classification presented in 
figure 2.  
The matrix in figure 2 combines the effects of outsiders’ consumption and reproduction on the 
direct and indirect utility of culture carriers. The effect of cultural consumption or production by 
outsiders on the direct utility of culture carriers is shown on the x-axis, while the effects on indirect 
utility are depicted on the y-axis.  
In the first quadrant (I) there is no need for any regulation, as both direct and indirect utility of 
culture carriers are positively affected by cultural outsider consumption. Additional cultural 
production has the same effect, as it generates additional cultural consumption, which again is 
positive.  
 
FIGURE 2. Utility effects on the culture carriers’ utility caused by outsiders and the protection area 




An example is language as a part of culture. The culture carriers of a certain language could be 
interested in its dissemination and usage, as it facilitates trade between cultures and offers a 
possibility of reducing the costs of engaging third parties.35
 
A common language is necessary for 
international/domestic communication and trade,36
 
and the importance of it grows with time, so the 
effects in the long run as well as in the short run are positive.  
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In the second quadrant (II) the indirect utility is positive, while the direct utility of culture carriers is 
negatively affected by cultural outsider consumption. Therefore, the culture carriers’ direct utility 
should be considered in comparison to the utility of outsider consumers and culture reproducers. 
Furthermore, the long-run welfare effects of consumption and additional production must be 
analyzed. In this part of the analysis, a detailed consideration of the culture carriers’ direct utility, the 
outsider consumers’ utility, and the culture reproducers’ utility is necessary. If the only motivation of 
the culture carriers seeking protection of cultural goods is to maintain their monopolistic position 
regarding the production of cultural goods, it could be rational to allow other culture reproducers to 
enter the market and generate additional benefits for society. However, additional culture 
reproducers may increase the supply of cultural goods and achieve a sustained price reduction or 
may even destroy the good’s cultural content, thus not implying any additional benefits for society in 
the long run. Or, in contrast, additional (re-)production of cultural goods by outsiders may act as a 
marketing tool to advertise and increase the value of the original cultural goods (made by culture 
carriers), thus creating or broadening the market for cultural products in the long run.37
 
 
Another possibility is that if the utility of outsider consumers exists only if culture carriers are the 
producers of a certain cultural good, then there is no need for regulation, as this feature of the utility 
function serves as an entry barrier for additional culture reproducers. However, the distinguishing 
character between an original or authentic (made by culture carriers) and a perfect copy (produced 
by an outsider) of a cultural good is questionable according to Mas-Colell.38
 
He argues that a perfect 
description of the object is infeasible and, accordingly, that the unique characteristics of an original 
are hard to identify. Valuations of the goods are dependent on the intrinsic motivation of both 
culture carriers and outsiders, but he argues that the owners are not always interested in preventing 
the property from being copied because the spreading of copies can still raise the value of the orig-
inal (as already mentioned here).  
In this quadrant, existing legal tools can be useful in solving the problem. For example, the system 
of fair trade ensures that goods from a particular part of the world that were produced according to 
the legality of fair trade cannot be produced and sold by another person who is not involved.39
 
Moral 
rights in, for instance, Australia or the United Kingdom give opportunities to creators to protect their 
integrity right and their work’s underlying knowledge and content from infringement.40
 
This means 
that reproduction and alteration of the work is only allowed under the supervision of the author, 
which arguably prevents misuse and misrepresentation.  
The history of origin of the Quileute in America can provide an example for this quadrant. Due to 
Stephenie Meyer’s vampire chronicles, this group of people has become very well-known and 
famous.41
 
The Twilight story, which is based on the creation saga of the Quileute, has generated 
enormous revenues from books, movies, and other products.42
 
The Quileute have not profited from 
these activities as yet, although the core of these products is based on their cultural property. The 
fame of the Quileute has encouraged other producers (reproducers) to begin to use the name 
Quileute as a symbol for other products such as jewelry or hoodies without the permission of the 
Quileute. The Quileute are ready to share parts of their culture with outsiders with the exception of 
burial grounds and religious ceremonies, according to their tribal law, which are “sacred and not to 
be entered.”43
 
The situation, in which the Quileute wish to make their certain cultural goods publicly 
accessible and commercialize it to earn money, means that the influence of outsiders has no identity 
destroying effect. The interest of these people lies above all in benefiting from the profit earned 
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through their culture. From an identity-economics point of view, additional preventive measures are 
not necessary at this point.  
The third quadrant (III) represents the most complicated cases in the analysis. The consumption 
and production of cultural goods by outsiders have negative effect on both direct and indirect utility 
of culture carriers.  
It is very important to distinguish among different effects on indirect utility, because not every 
attack on identity immediately equals an attack on the dignity of a person. In other words, not every 
kind of cultural consumption and reproduction by outsiders that has a negative impact on indirect 
utility is at the same time a violation of dignity. For this reason, we separate the effects on indirect 
utility into two parts, which are divided by the acceptability-line (see figure 2). This acceptability-line 
varies from nation to nation (or culture to culture) according to their respective constitutional norms 
and the accompanying administration of justice. This line is a flexible concept; the definition of the 
exact position and meaning of this line reflects existing norms in society and could vary in different 
societies. It is therefore subject to discussions and judgments of courts of justice in a particular 
country. In short, “dignity does not depend on personal favours and occasional balances of power, 
but on social openness guaranteed by the rule of law, vigilant public debate, the plurality of 
associations, and social rights.44 
The self-determination of a cultural group’s own identity in accordance with their tradition and 
customs was recognized in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the United 
Nations.45
 
Furthermore, the connection between the culture and the dignity of the culture carriers 
was considered. According to this declaration, these groups “have the right on the dignity and 
diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations.”46
 
Dignity is a person’s fundamental 
right. Other fundamental rights such as privacy or religion are based on the concept of dignity. In the 
case when a cultural good is an inseparable component of a culture and the fundamental identity of 
the culture carriers is thereby influenced, the protection-worthiness of that cultural good would be 
corroborated. The position of the line reflecting these identity-and dignity-essential characteristics of 
the cultural goods is defined by an acceptance of those involved. Therefore, this line will take other 
positions within different cultures and cultural groups. This approach is supported by the following 
UN directive concerning Human Rights: “recognizing, respecting, valuing their customs, rules is 
essential to their identity, dignity.”47
 
This effect becomes disastrous below the acceptability-line on 
the basis of identity in figure 2.  
The gray shaded area below the acceptability-line contains those cultural goods that need 
protection on the basis of identity. Here, the effect of outsiders on the identity and the dignity of the 
culture carriers is so strong that the losses of the culture carriers cannot be tolerated any more. 
Therefore, protection is justified, as in these cases the dignity of a person is endangered.  
Let us exemplify this by the original Hopi or Navajo tradition of sweat lodges, in which a cleansing 
of body and spirit takes place. According to the traditional tribal law, it was forbidden to charge any 
fees for this holy and intimate ceremony.48 The mere fact of outsiders consuming and even 
reproducing this sacral ritual resulted in an outcry by the indigenous people. Because it concerns a 
ritual, the Navajos are offended49
 
and suffer a loss in their identity if an outsider carries out the same 
ritual as a measure of well-being. From the point of view of indigenous leaders, “most hallowed ideas 
and rituals” constitute goods “which cannot diffuse to others without suffering harm.”50
 
Therefore, it 




In cases above the acceptability-line, where the dignity, that is, the fundamental identity of a 
person or group, is not affected, an economic analysis can help to find an optimal solution. 
Therefore, there are three groups relevant to economic consideration51—culture carriers, culture 
reproducers, and outsider consumers. However, in connection with the direct, economic benefit, the 
United Nations stress that the cultural groups should be the beneficiaries of a commercial use of 
their cultural goods.52 
 
The problem could consist in a positive correlation of the outsider consumers’ utility with the 
importance of the cultural goods for the culture carriers, so that cultural goods with potential 
identity-destroying effects could be especially valuable to outsider consumers.53
 
Therefore, it is 
crucial to distinguish these different aspects of the cultural utility function of culture carriers. The 
analysis of our second quadrant applies in cases where there is no indication of cultural consumption 
or additional cultural reproduction by outsiders with an identity-destroying effect (cases above the 
acceptability-line). As an example, take the noble stratum of the Toraja society, marapuan, who are 
identified by owning a tongkonan, a traditional Toraja house. The tongkonan is an impressive and 
complex structure; the creation of such a building requires skill and vast resources.54
 
The noble mara-
puan enjoy the privileges of decorating their houses in a special way (with paintings and carvings) 
and pursuing funeral rituals. The size of the tongkonan and the quality of its decorations, carvings 
and paintings displays rank, honor, and social prestige.55
 
Large-scale emigration in the 1970s and the 
resultant remittances sent home changed the social landscape—Toraja families of low status were 
now able to build large tongkonans and organize expensive, imposing funeral ceremonies (thus 
acting as additional culture reproducers). These in turn attracted a growing number of foreign 
tourists (as outsider consumer). The noble marapuan are critical of this development and would like 
to protect their traditional social position,56
 
which is closely related to the rights to build tongkonans 
and organize imposing funeral rituals. Nevertheless, previous research does not reveal the extent to 
which the nobility seeks protection of its privileges.57
 
The identity-providing effect is in fact clear, but 
seems to be rising with the number of outsider consumers. Thus, there is no clear reason to believe 
that the fundamental part of the group’s identity or dignity is affected. Therefore, the overall 
economic effect for the whole region is higher, if additional culture reproducers enter the market 
and attract more tourists. Its distributional consequences for society and the reinvigorating effect on 
tradition are additional positive effects of no protection.  
In the fourth quadrant (IV) are cases in which outsiders cause positive effects on the direct part of 
utility and at the same time induce losses in indirect utility. Above the acceptability-line as in the 
third quadrant are cases for which the analysis of the second quadrant should be applied. Below the 
line an example could be the case of “selling one’s soul to the devil,”58
 
which in spite of causing 
identity-destroying effects still has some positive effects with respect to payment. In the story of 
Timm Thaler or the Sold Laughter59
 
the youthful protagonist sells his laughter to an impersonation of 
the devil and consequentially wins every bet, but soon discovers the value of his laughter and wants 
to cancel the transaction. At least as long as transactions are completely voluntary and do not exploit 
the situation (the devil entices a youngster to sell his laughter), such cases in the fourth quadrant 
might remain an exception because cultural carriers will weigh the positive direct effects against the 
negative identity effects and can decide for themselves. Further regulation is required only if 
representation within groups is problematic. Apart from that, another example for a good containing 
a strong identity or dignity character attached to its culture carriers is to be considered. For example, 





outsider tourisms would generate revenues for both the culture carriers and the whole region. On 
the other hand, climbers or other persons on the top would destroy the soul and dignity of the 
culture carriers. In such a scenario a protection-worthy good exists and requires additional protection 
measures justified by the negative impacts on the identity and dignity of the culture carriers.  
This classification based on direct and indirect utility effects shows that only cultural goods of the 
third and fourth quadrants need protection. Within these quadrants we have distinguished between 
cultural goods that influence the fundamental identity and thereby dignity of a person or a group, 
consequently requiring protection, and cultural goods for which a cost-benefit analysis can help to 
find an optimal solution (regarding whether consumption or production for outsiders can be 
allowed). In these latter cases additional regulation may be necessary to adequately represent the 
interests of the groups involved.  
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL GOODS 
Within the debate around the protection of cultural goods, the most important arguments are those 
that analyze, primarily, trade with cultural goods and the overall economic effects, not the protection 
worthiness of the cultural goods per se. However, our approach focuses on the characteristic of 
cultural goods to also provide indirect utility based on identity and dignity. Consequently, we as-
certain a protective need first of all only for those cultural goods that are essential to identity and 
dignity. We come to this result because we recognize a connection between the dignity of the person 
and certain cultural goods. Indeed, by no means do all cultural goods have a direct influence on the 
identity and with it the dignity of individuals. Therefore, only few goods are located below the 
acceptability-line of figure 2 for which additional preventive measures are to be introduced.  
Since only a minority of cultural goods requires protection, those affecting the fundamental 
identity and dignity of persons and groups, some questions arise:  
1) How can we determine whether a cultural good possesses a fundamental identity-or dignity-
providing effect, which would justify protection by law?  
As far as different cultural goods belonging to different societies or groups are concerned, no general 
rule can be applied. The decision of whether a cultural good has this characteristic or not can only be 
made in a single case analysis by a court of law, in which the interests of culture carriers should be 
combined with opinions of independent experts and other interested groups.  
The definition of what cultural goods are identity-critical can be determined by the groups 
themselves. According to the United Nations, cultural groups have the right to take part in the 
decision-making processes concerning their rights.61 Basically, this entails that culture carriers or their 
representatives must become the most important actors in the process of assessing and recognizing 
these cultural goods. Culture carriers should have “a legitimate interest in exercising a duty of care or 
‘stewardship’ over resources”62
 
that represents their collective cultural identity or “peoplehood.” The 
sacred goods and spiritual elements, which presumably form the majority of the protection-worthy 
goods below the acceptability-line, should stand in the center of these investigations. Examining 
particular cases for such protection must take central stage within the decision process. To take the 
interest of other parties (outsiders) into account and not to threaten the public domain unnecessarily 
by granting additional protection for all cultural goods, the secrecy and the connected strong values 





some cases tribal customary law clearly identifies “certain resources as critical to the community and 
thereby necessitating human care.” Of course, this is just one possibility for obtaining evidence of the 
need for protection of these particular goods.  
Summing up, as stated by Brown,64
 
there is a need to separate the claims regarding economic 
justice and those regarding respectful treatment of cultural elements. Therefore, in cases where the 
objections of culture carriers against outsider consumption and reproduction of particular goods are 
not of an economic nature, this could serve as evidence for further investigation of protection-
worthiness.  
2) If a cultural good does not have any fundamental identity- or dignity-providing effect, how 
should the market be regulated?  
Cultural goods show quite a few similarities to intellectual property, mostly because of their 
immaterial character. However, protecting cultural goods with the same instruments as intellectual 
property rights cannot be a suitable mechanism, as criteria of novelty (patents) or individual 
authorship (copyright) are not met. Some cultural goods like paintings, sculptures, buildings or 
monuments are safeguarded by the instrument of the UNESCO World Heritage Site. However, while 
this does not always imply optimal protection, it rather offers commercialization opportunities.65
 
In 
cases of the first and second quadrants, and above the acceptability-line of the third and fourth 
quadrants for immaterial cultural goods, where the privacy of the culture carriers is not at stake, the 
UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage66
 
provides an adequate 
instrument. On the international level, it aims “at ensuring the viability of the intangible cultural 
heritage” and “to ensure recognition of, respect for, and enhancement of the intangible cultural 
heritage … of the communities groups or individuals concerned.” However, these legislations are not 
sufficient for cases located below the acceptability-line.  
3) What role does the international community play within the regulation process for cultural 
goods under the acceptability-line?  
The international community should feel responsible for creating a legal environment, in which 
particular cases can be scrutinized and enforced. This in turn would facilitate communicating the 
importance and the role of culture and cultural goods in the respective societies.  
Additionally, the market for cultural goods is not limited to a specific country. The actors such as 
consumers and producers can be situated abroad, thus making multilateral and bilateral 
international consultations necessary. Brown67
 
argues that a global market also requires a global 
controlling regime going beyond mere bilateral solutions.  
Another challenge consists in the fact that not all societies or indigenous groups are recognized by 
their own country. The international level could provide a venue for particular cases which require 
mediation. Particular societies should take the initiative (as a private initiative) in the case of 
disagreement with their own government. Otherwise, the state level is entitled to solve the problem. 
The Indigenous Caucus of the WIPO provides a stage with which international attention can be at-
tracted, in which NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) and indigenous groups from the whole 
world point to the problem of insufficient protection of cultural goods.  




Speaking only about cultural goods under the acceptability-line, negative effects on identity and 
dignity need to be avoided. For this, culture carriers are required to be able to control and supervise 
the consumption of their cultural goods by outsiders and restrict access to their holy or spiritual 
cultural goods, which are strongly connected to their identity or dignity. Because of the special 
nature of these cultural goods, general property rights are not a sufficient tool to prevent the 
commercialization of cultural goods. However, property rights are required to exclude others from 
consuming and producing these cultural goods. Thus, to some extent, searching for such “defensive” 
legal instruments as sui generis rights seems to support these goals. The international regime has 
already turned its focus on these special property rights granting moral rights to culture carriers 
while recognizing group ownership and ensuring protection lasting in perpetuity.68
 
Under the 
auspices of WIPO, the elaboration of a draft proposal for sui generis rights for the protection of 
traditional cultural expressions (TCEs)69
 
(defined as of material or immaterial nature, or a 
combination of these) is currently on the agenda. Article 3 (alternative 3) of this preliminary version 
addresses to some extent the mentioned cultural goods proposing a provision of “adequate and 
effective [legal or practical] measures … to prevent the [unauthorized fixation, disclosure, use or 
other exploitation] disclosure of secret traditional cultural expressions,” while as overall objectives 
recognizing that these “cultural communities consider their cultural heritage to have intrinsic value, 
including social, cultural, spiritual … values” and promoting “respect … for the dignity, cultural 
integrity” of these traditional cultures and communities.70
 
Rights to and authority over cultural goods 
providing identity and dignity (such as secret and sacred cultural goods) is a necessary requirement 
to keep outsiders out, which thus avoids a consumption and commercialization of these cultural 
goods by the latter. Granting perpetual rights, as sui generis model laws do, however, is not a 
preferable solution given the dynamical nature of culture. It requires that people will always ascribe 
sacredness to certain cultural goods or declare cultural goods as providing identity and dignity. 
However, culture carriers and their identity are dynamic as well. Some cultural goods lose their 
meaning to culture carriers over time and the group of culture carriers who value a particular culture 
good need not be stable. These time limits and community limits (the changing character of groups 
valuing such goods) are important and should be incorporated in the legislation to avoid the 
additional social costs caused by unnecessary curtailing of the public domain.  
CONCLUSION 
The international debate on the protection of cultural goods is in need of an answer to the question 
of what exactly is required to provide specific protection in addition to existing property rights. The 
international debate focuses on so-called sui generis property rights.71
 
However, in this article we 
suggest an a priori distinction between direct and indirect effects of cultural goods. Direct effects can 
be quantified as the monetary value arising from marketing a cultural good. Even though in many 
cases it is not easy to determine such values, there is a broad literature on values of cultural goods.72
 
Indirect effects occur as negative or positive effects on identity. Indirect effects also include option 
values, prestige values, and so forth,73
 
which are much more difficult to express in monetary terms.  
If only direct effects exist, positive and negative effects should be weighed against each other. 
Protection should be implemented if net benefits outweigh net costs and if this net gain is higher 
than in a situation with no protection of cultural goods including the consideration of the utility of all 
stakeholders. Such an evaluation of net benefits must take place on a case by case basis and cannot 
be solved by introducing international standards.  
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If indirect effects do exist, the priority is to check their impact on identity. If identity is affected, it 
is crucial to determine whether the impacts on identity go as far as seriously impairing the personal 
fundamental identity or dignity of culture carriers. If and only if this is the case, international norms 
for cultural protection should be implemented in the form of sui generis rights. We suggest that a 
serious impact on dignity can be assumed if the culture carriers show, for example, serious efforts to 
keep a certain cultural good a secret. The respective acceptability-line must be established by the 
particular states and groups based on cultural borders and local specifics.  
All in all, we conclude that in very limited cases, cultural goods may require additional protection 
in the form of sui generis rights. However, the introduction of sui generis cultural property rights on 
an international level should be restricted only to cases where the dignity of culture carriers is 
seriously endangered. This has the advantage of not threatening the public domain and thus 
upholding the valuable dissemination of cultural knowledge and innovation. Beyond this category, 
however, there is a wide field in which regulatory interventions can facilitate the arrival of market 
actors at sensible decisions.  
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THE “REGULATORY CHOICE PROBLEM”—INTRODUCTION 
Geographical indications (GIs) are instruments that provide consumers information about special 
qualities of a product that are not identifiable either before or after a product’s consumption. Thus, 
they constitute a special kind of credence good.1 As consumers cannot determine the real origin and 
the specific traditional manufacture of a product, producers have to credibly convey information on 
the product’s attributes in additional ways. GIs are meant to resolve this situation of information 
asymmetry by protecting consumers from being misled and by reducing the consumer’s costs of 
obtaining information similarly to trademarks,2 thus supporting a well-informed decision. GIs 
therefore generate additional value for consumers and facilitate price premiums for producers. The 
extent to which producers can obtain the price premium depends on the consumers’ willingness to 
pay. This is determined by the market value of the products, which is again influenced by the 
information-providing effect of GIs. In addition, GIs can offer a high level of protection against 
imitation, thus maintaining producers’ income which benefits rural regions as it counteracts rural 
depopulation by providing jobs.3 
Current research on GIs is based on Regulation 510/2006 on the Protection of Geographical 
Indications and Designation of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs.4 That Regulation has 
replaced its similarly titled predecessor Regulation 2081/925 which was not conforming to the 
international trade rules of the WTO. Currently, a further amendment is being discussed in the 
European Union,6  which is also dealt with in this article. 
By implementing GIs beyond the original provision of information on a product’s quality, 
reputation and traditional production method, Regulation 510/2006 enables producers to 
differentiate their products from others in many ways.7 Nevertheless, it comes as a surprise that 
neither the original 1992 Regulation nor the currently effective Regulation address the protection of 
traditional knowledge, although many international fora discuss GIs in this context.8 To some extent 
the Regulation Proposal of 2010 compensates for this by aiming to preserve the quality and diversity 
of traditional products as “living cultural and gastronomic heritage”.9 Thus, GIs are seen as an 
instrument enabling commodification, but by no means forcing it. 
 
                                                             
1
 For the classification of goods into search, experience, and credence goods based on information asymmetry, see Phillip 
Nelson, “Information and Consumer Behavior” (1970) 78 (March-April) Journal of Political Economy 311; Michael R. Darby 
and Edi Karni, “Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud” (1973) 16(1) Journal of Law and Economics 67. 
2
 For the economic function of trademarks, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003), Ch.7. 
3 Roland Herrmann, Thilo Marauhn and Ramona Teuber, “Der Schutz geographischer Herkunftsangaben: 
Herausforderungen für agrarökonomische, rechtswissenschaftliche und interdisziplinäre Forschung” (2008) 57(7) 
Agrarwirtschaft 321. 
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6 European Commission, “Final Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on agricultural 
product quality schemes” (Regulation Proposal), December 10, 2010, COM(2010)733. 
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8 As part of the WTO’s Review of GIs under art.24, members “have highlighted the relevance of human factors to matters 
such as quality, traditional methods of production, vinicultural practices and methods of production, preparation and 
cultivation”. See World Trade Organization, “Review under Article 24.2 of the application of the provisions of the section of 
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9 See Regulation Proposal, p.13, para. (1). 
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While a GI does not save products from having to prevail on the market, it makes it easier, as 
reliable information on origin, production and quality generally facilitates a higher price. Specific 
preferences on behalf of consumers for authentic, traditionally manufactured products are 
documented in the Regulation Proposal10 and also in the empirical literature.11 Precisely for this 
reason, GI goals should also focus more on the traditional knowledge. GIs support the sustainability 
of traditional knowledge or cultural heritage, but they rather indirectly encourage valuing such 
knowledge instead of directly protecting it. They achieve this by identifying the content or the 
production method of products in the product specification. GIs safeguard such products by 
protecting them from free riding on the product’s reputation, thus maintaining their existence. But 
the definition and the protection of food-cultural particularities does not imply a preservation 
strategy freezing methods of production and thus local knowledge similar to a museum. Instead they 
rely on the market to determine which goods prevail. Therefore, a well-functioning market is a basic 
requirement to successfully use the GI instrument.12 
Unlike in other contexts of cultural property, GIs do not aim to directly protect particular actors 
and groups of actors such as indigenous groups. They rather provide protection rights for a certain 
region, thus also allowing external actors to benefit from protection if they move to the area and 
conform to the code of practice.13  Moreover, not only small scale producers are able to apply for 
GIs, but industrial producers are also able to do so. In practice, this occurs frequently—for example 
in the case of the largest French dairy firm Lactalis,14 the Swiss Emmi AG and the Swiss sausage 
company Bell AG. All of these leading international actors aim to enrich their products’ portfolio 
with attractive GIs. As a result, the regions benefit in terms of employment. At the same time, 
cultural idiosyncrasies are preserved if traditional production knowledge and regional pre-products 
lead to particular specialties for the end consumer. 
In summary, GIs provide a different protection potential than other “sui generis” rights that are 
based on copyright law.15 While the former favour actors generally in a specific region when 
manufacturing certain products, the latter protect the rights of specific actors identified as the 
carriers of cultural practices.16 
Precisely the fact that GIs are not ascribed to specific actors provides further potential to maintain 
and protect knowledge and the associated products that are already in the public domain and whose 
actual creators are not identifiable.17 Nonetheless, GIs offer considerable protection potential for 
cultural property, as they facilitate a commodification of entirely different products than the “sui 
generis” rights derived from copyright law. In this context, they complement the instruments 
                                                             
10 See Regulation Proposal, p.2, art.1.1 (Grounds for and Objectives of the Proposal). 
11 See e.g. Sean Beer, “Authenticity and Food Experience—Commercial and Academic Perspectives” (2008) 19 Journal of 
Foodservice 153; Stephen Brown, Robert V. Kozinets and John F. Sherry Jr, “Teaching Old Brands New Tricks: Retro Branding 
and the Revival of Brand Meaning” (2003) 67(July) The Journal of Marketing 19. 
12
 David R. Downes, “How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge” (2000) 25 Columbia 
Journal of Environmental Law 253; Shivani Singhal, “Geographical Indications and Traditional Knowledge” (2008) 3(11) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 732. 
13
 C. Bramley and J.F. Kirsten, “Exploring the Economic Rationale for Protecting Geographical Indicators in Agriculture” 
(2007) 46(1) Agrekon 69, available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/10128/1/ 
46010069.pdf [Accessed March 25, 2012]. 
14 See Alexander Wirsig, Adriano Profeta, Anna Häring and Roman Lenz, “Indigenous Species, Traditional and Local 
Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights” (2010) 9th European IFSA Symposium, Vienna, p.1724. 
15 E.g. Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries 1976 (UNESCO); Model Provisions for National Laws on the 
Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions 1985 (UNESCO and WIPO); 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, The 
Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions/Expressions of Folklore: Outline of Policy Options and Legal Mechanisms 
(Geneva: WIPO 2004). 
16 See Kilian Bizer, Matthias Lankau, Gerald Spindler and Philipp Zimbehl, “Sui Generis Rights for the Protection of 
Traditional Cultural Expressions” (2011) 2 JIPITEC 114. 




available for the protection of cultural property below the level of formal property rights like those 
for material property. 
By analysing and evaluating the EU regulations, this article develops ideas for improvement and 
possible alternatives, which were partly discussed by the European Union.18 It arrives at a 
recommendation contradicting the Regulation Proposal previously suggested by the European 
Commission. This article examines the regulations from two different perspectives: an information 
economic perspective and a cultural property perspective. The article proceeds as follows: after 
discussing the EU system of origin-labelling, different reform proposals are derived. Finally, 
alternatives and policy recommendations are evaluated and summarized. 
 
THE EU SYSTEM OF ORIGIN-LABELLING FOR FOOD SPECIALITIES 
As one of the strongest supporters of GIs on the international level,19 the European Union 
commands three instruments to obtain the goals previously outlined: Protected Designations of 
Origin (PDO), Protected Geographical Indications (PGI) and Traditional Speciality Guaranteed (TSG).20 
These elements of the European Union’s quality policy provide information on the specific 
characteristics and the associated quality of the products. In the narrow sense, only PDO and PGI are 
considered qualified GIs21; TSG designates traditional characteristics of a product and not necessarily 
the product’s actual origin22 even if the denominations often point to a region. Therefore, only a 
qualified label of origin requires a close link between the geographically (and traditionally) identified 
origin and specific product characteristics (such as quality, production method, reputation) 
(terroir).23 This enables a labelled product to differentiate itself from products from other regions or 
countries. The fact that this close relationship (cf. “intrinsic link”)24 cannot be clearly measured poses 
a central problem for the origin-labelling system.25 In practice, scientific links in terms of a 
measurable correlation between origin and qualities are more the exception than the rule.26 
On the demand side, these three instruments should convey different information on origin, 
quality and traditional production method of the protected products to consumers. It is compulsory 
to use the indications PDO, PGI and TSG or their symbols where the associated products are 
marketed under the registered name.27 However, the respective EU labels are very similar to each 
                                                             
18 For an overview of the discussed alternatives of the EU, see European Commission, “Impact Assessment on Geographical 
Indications”, December 10, 2010, SEC(2010)1524, Commission staff working paper; European Commission, “Impact 
Assessment on Traditional Specialities Guaranteed”, December 10, 2010, SEC(2010)1525, Commission staff working paper. 
19 See e.g. Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais, Norbert Olszak and Vincent Ruzek, “Towards a Flexible International 
Framework for the Protection of Geographical Indications” (2010) 1(2) WIPO J. 147, discussing the EU position in the WTO; 
see also Tim Josling, “The War on Terroir: Geographical Indications as a Transatlantic Trade Conflict” (2006) 57(3) J. Ag. 
Econ. 337, 349–359. 
20
 Regulated by Council Regulation 510/2006 of March 20, 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and 
designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs [2006] OJ L93/12, and Council Regulation 509/2006 of March 
20, 2006 on agricultural products and foodstuffs as traditional specialities guaranteed (Regulation 509/2006) [2006] OJ 
L93/1. 
21 See Regulation 510/2006 art.2 (Definitions of PDO and PGI). 
22 See Regulation 509/2006 art.2 (Definitions) and art.4 (Requirements as Regards Products and Names). 
23 For an extensive discussion on the French concept of “terroir”, see e.g. Justin Hughes, “Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: 
The Spirited Debate about Geographical Indications” (2006) 58 Hastings L.J. 299; Josling, “The War on Terroir” (2006) 57(3) 
J. Ag. Econ. 337. 
24 See Regulation Proposal, p.16, para. (17). 
25 See the argumentation in Adriano Profeta, Richard Balling, Volker Schoene and Alexander Wirsig, “The Protection of 
Origins for Agricultural Products and Foods in Europe: Status Quo, Problems and Policy Recommendations for the Green 
Book” (2009) 12(6) J. World Intell. Prop. 622. 
26 See the discussion to apply the multi-isotope analysis in the wine sector and its contradictory results in Simon Kelly, Karl 
Heaton and Jurian Hoogewerff, “Tracing the Geographical Origin of Food: The Application of Multi-element and Multi-
isotope Analysis” (2005) 16 Trends in Food Science & Technology 555, 563. 
27 See Regulation 510/2006 art.8.2; Regulation 509/2006 art.12.2 
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other and only differ slightly.28 The difference between the content of the labels is not recognizable 
without additional information. The risk of confusing consumers is correspondingly high and 
empirically confirmed.29  Further, various studies have already pointed towards a lack of public 
awareness and the low recognition level of GI labels.30 To a certain extent, the great differences in 
the ways in which Member States utilize the system depends on a country’s particular agricultural 
background, as those with a strong tradition in agriculture feature products with a high awareness 
level regardless of the EU labels. To initiate a protection procedure the awareness level of a product 
among consumers and the reputation of a product should be measured. Some authors point out the 
necessity of consumer surveys as suggested in the Guide to Community Regulations of the 
Commission Services.31 
In addition, the labelling of origin system bears problems on the supply side as well—for instance, 
the low participation of small scale producers due to arduous efforts, costly controls and the 
necessity to implement specified requirements.32 To some extent, the European Union has 
recognized the challenge of harmonizing competition conditions for products of the same category 
and balancing or counterbalancing the cost advantages of established enterprises (monopolists). 
Therefore, it aims to strengthen and recognize the role of cooperatives (groups), particularly in 
terms of modifying specifications, supervising the enforcement of the protection of the registered 
names and complying with the production requirements.33 
Although it is suggested that the registration procedures for PDO, PGI and TSG should be more 
transparent, the existing reform proposal continues to ignore a substantial problem, as the 
difference between PDO and PGI remains vague. The same protection level is given for these 
instruments despite the fact that the regional connection of the product is substantially different 
between PDO and PGI. Thus, different information should be provided on the actual product origin. 
This article therefore approaches the fundamental disparities between PDO and PGI and elaborates 
several reform alternatives, which are presented below. 
 
 
                                                             
28 Commission Regulation 628/2008 of July 2, 2008 amending Regulation 1898/2006 laying down detailed rules of 
implementation of Council Regulation 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs [2008] OJ L173/3, has introduced different colour schemes for GIs. Accordingly, the 
PDO label is identifiable with the combination of colours of red and yellow, while PGI with colours of blue and yellow. 
Nonetheless, as the labels are used in black and white or in negative, the difference between PDO and PGI remains only in 
the small wording inside the symbols. Interestingly, TSG labels use the same colours as PGI labels. Further, regarding the 
style and the design of the GI labels, there are no distinguishing characteristics, and TSG labels differ only slightly from 
them. 
29 See the analysis of the impacts on consumers in London Economics, Evaluation of the CAP Policy on Protected 
Designations of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical Indications (PGI): Final Report (London: 2008). 
30 Such as Ramona Teuber, “Producers’ and Consumers’ Expectations towards Geographical Indications—Empirical Evidence 
for Hessian Apple Wine”, presentation at the 113th EAAE Seminar: “A Resilient European Food Industry and Food Chain in a 
Challenging World”, Greece, 2009; Christos Fotopoulos and Athanasios Krystallis, “Quality Labels as a Marketing Advantage: 
The case of the ‘PDO Zagora’ Apples in the Greek Market” (2003) 37(10) European Journal of Marketing 1350; London 
Economics, Evaluation of the CAP Policy on Protected Designations of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical Indications 
(PGI) (2008). 
31 See Adriano Profeta and Richard Balling, “Evaluierung der Übergangsregelung des Herkunftsschutzes bei Agrarprodukten 
und Lebensmitteln in Europa gemäß Verordnung (EG) Nr. 510/06 und Verbesserungsvorschläge für die anstehende 
Modifikation” (2007) 56(4) Agrarwirtschaft 213, referring to the European Commission, Protection of Geographical 
Indications, Designations of Origin and Certificates of Specific Character for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs: Guide to 
Community Regulations, 2nd edn. (2004), Commission services working paper, p.14. 
32 See Rangnekar, “The Socio-economics of Geographical Indications” (2004) UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, Issue Paper No. 8; Stéphan Marette, “Can Foreign Producers Benefit from Geographical Indications under the 
New European Regulation?” (2009) 10(1) The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 65; Anselm K. 
Sanders, “Incentives for and Protection of Cultural Expression: Art, Trade and Geographical Indications” (2010) 13(2) J. 
World Intell. Prop. 81; G.E. Evans, “The Strategic Exploitation of Geographical Indications and Community Trade Marks for 
the Marketing of Agricultural Products in the European Union” (2010) 1(1) WIPO J. 159; see also European Commission, 
“Impact Assessment on Geographical Indications”, Commission staff working paper, SEC(2010)1524. 
33 See Regulation Proposal, p.20, para. (57). 
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POSSIBLE REFORM ALTERNATIVES 
GIs can generate additional values for consumers if the instruments are transparent and 
trustworthy. While the intention of the EU reform proposal to strengthen controls and requirements 
supports the reliability of the instruments itself, information on fundamental characteristics remains 
unknown if producers do not provide any further details about the production stages taking place 
within the region apart from the label. In this case, consumers are not able to clearly distinguish the 
grade of regional embeddedness of PDO from PGI protected products. Therefore, our analysis 
focuses on the question of how transparency between instruments of PDO and PGI can be increased 
and the EU GI system can provide efficient information to consumers as a requirement for higher 
willingness to pay. 
Apart from the fact that TSGs are not technically included as GIs, they also need to be considered 
as they are closely related to PDOs and PGIs and exhibit similar characteristics. From the consumer 
perspective the label seems to be very similar although the focus is quite different. For this reason, 
abolishing the TSG label is seen as an opportunity to clarify the information-providing effect of GIs 
(PDO and PGI).  
 
Table 1: Overview of reform options analysed34 
Instrument 
Option 1 
Origin transparency and differentiation 
based on tradition 
Option 2 
Concentration on one protection form 
(PDO) 
PDO 
Concentrating on developed specialities (EC 
Regulation 510/2006) 
Maintaining and specifying the EC 
Regulation 510/2006 
PGI 
Clearly labelling the origin of raw materials 
and a stronger focus on developing food-
cultural specialities (EC Regulation 510/2006) 
Abolition and transformation into PDO 
 
TSG Abolition (EC Regulation 509/2006) Abolition (EC Regulation 509/2006) 
 
In addition to abolishing TSGs, this article discusses two reform proposals (see Table 1). While the 
first alternative aims to increase transparency for PGIs more specifically than currently suggested in 
the Regulation Proposal, the second recommends further modifying the existing regulation. This also 
suggests abolishing the PGI category and transforming part of it into PDOs, with the result of 
maintaining and specifying solely the PDO instrument. Its implementation constitutes a considerably 
greater challenge for the community and still leaves many questions unanswered. However, this 
focus seems particularly reasonable from a cultural property perspective since it provides the 
greatest commodification potential for regions without risking the establishment of an uncontested 
monopoly. After all, a PDO can always be challenged by external actors buying regional companies 





                                                             
34 The reform alternatives analysed here were partly discussed during the process of the revision of the EU agricultural 
quality policy: (1) Abolition of TSG was suggested in European Commission, “Impact Assessment on Traditional Specialities 
Guaranteed”, 2010, Policy Options 4.3; (2) “Status quo accompanied with streamlining of procedures and clarification of 
PDO/PGI rules” (see European Commission, “Impact Assessment on Geographical Indications”, 2010, Policy Options 5.2.3). 
The option merging definitions of PGI and PDO were also discussed, suggesting the abolition of PDO (see Policy Options 
5.5). As it can be assumed from the current EU reform proposal, the EU quality system will further function in its current 




JUSTIFYING THE ABOLITION OF TSGs 
In order to avoid consumer confusion and to keep information on GIs transparent, the abolition of 
TSGs is necessary. In this light it is important to state that with TSGs’ lower level of protection,35 
which is limited to the production method without any regional connection, TSGs benefit from the 
clearly stricter requirements of PDO and PGI, which require an obvious regional link of the raw 
materials. As TSGs do not need to fulfil this requirement, they could be suspected of free-riding on 
the other, more demanding categories. If only for this reason, abolishing TSGs seems a legitimate 
step that could increase the trustworthiness of the other labels. 
From the cultural property perspective TSGs also provide the least protection of certain methods of 
production. They do not even aim to commodify regional raw materials, thus providing neither 
actor-related nor region-related protection. Under current law, TSGs aim to commodify the 
production method only, i.e. the recipe. For this reason, abolishing the TSG label is seen as an 
opportunity to advance the information-providing effect of GIs (PDO and PGI) without notably 
weakening the protection of cultural property. 
In summary, abolishing the TSG is reasonable from an information economic perspective, since the 
instrument confuses consumers, as is outlined in the following: 
Conflict with origin: 
According to Regulation 509/2006, products with characteristics based on origin or regional 
provenance cannot be registered as TSGs.36 TSG labels (which have the same colours blue and yellow 
and can be mistaken for PGI) do not inform the consumer about the origin of the product, but about 
their traditional production method as the name “traditional speciality” alludes to. Further, the 
production does not have to contain a link with the geographical origin. Accordingly, production is 
not limited to a certain region, but open to all producers. Precisely for this reason, TSGs are of little 
economic interest and are not used very much.37 
No clear differentiation from GIs: 
Eventually, there is no valid reason why an additional category needs to be kept for products 
without a geographical origin; yet, as Bérard and Marchenay note,38 in every country in the world, a 
geographical origin is linked to the product. Moreover, the previously mentioned restriction 
outruling registration of products with a reference to a specific geographical origin in the Regulation 
Proposal even strengthens the contradiction as GI instruments also reflect the elements of tradition. 
The differences between PDO, PGI and TSG thus become even more blurred, further increasing the 






                                                             
35
 According to Regulation 510/2006 GIs are protected inter alia “against any direct or indirect commercial use of a 
registered name … any misuse, imitation or evocation, even if the true origin of the product is indicated or if the protected 
name is translated or accompanied by an expression such as ‘style’, ‘type’, ‘method’, ‘as produced in’, ‘imitation’” … 
(art.13.1(a), (b)). Meanwhile, Regulation 509/2006 leaves the protection of TSG very unspecified stating that “registered 
names shall be protected against any practice liable to mislead the consumer” (art.17(2)). 
36 Regulation 509/2006 art. 4(1). 
37 To date a total of 37 products are registered as TSG products.  
See http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door [Accessed March 25, 2012]. 
38 Laurence Bérard and Philippe Marchenay, “Local Products and Geographical Indications: Taking Account of Local 
Knowledge and Biodiversity” (2006) 58(187) International Social Science Journal 109, 110. 
39 See the current example of Dutch “Boerenkaas”, a cheese from a farm distinguishing itself not with actual qualitative 
particularities, but a requirement that at least 50 per cent of the milk must originate from the farm producing the cheese. 




Limited perception of tradition: 
 
In terms of cultural traditions, other problems support the abolition of the instrument: currently the 
criterion of being a traditional product requires at least 25 years of documented history on the 
domestic market.40 
Considering the Regulation Proposal, it seems likely that this period will be extended to 50 years as it 
demands that only tradition passed on at least over two generations be recognized as culturally 
significant;41 PDOs and PGIs on the other hand have no such requirements. Again, GIs and TSGs 
prove to be inconsistent. In the case of GIs, the existence of a tradition and its meaning does not 
depend on an arbitrarily set time period, although like TSGs these instruments also describe 
traditional production methods. From this view, TSGs seem to set higher requirements regarding 
cultural and traditional connections than GIs. This again can be confusing as the qualitative 
requirements are otherwise rather less demanding. 
In total, given the blurry differences between the GI types and the TSG and the resulting consumer 
confusion, the continued existence of TSGs cannot be justified. In the end, TSGs are merely “second-
class” GIs. Nevertheless, abolishing TSGs requires an adequate transitional arrangement: in 
cooperation with all possible actors, regulations for companies holding TSGs would have to be 
modified to enable PGI recognition—or if possible PDO recognition—so as to facilitate transborder 
nomination as provided also by TSG. This might entail a long negotiation process, but should prove 
viable in many cases.42 Products not fulfilling the requirements of a PDO or PGI nomination could 
resort to the facultative quality specifications of the EU and international harmonization, i.e. within 
the Codex Alimentarius (food codex). While their scope of protection may be narrower, they are 
specifically tailored to preserve product identities without regional delimitation. Building private 
brands may be another opportunity, especially for industrial processors. 
OPTION 1: TRANSPARENCY REGARDING THE ORIGIN OF RAW MATERIALS AND DIFFERENTIATING 
THE TYPES OF PROTECTION 
 
In the light of the suggested abolition of the TSG norm, this article discusses a first alternative 
solution that is dedicated to the differences between PDO and PGI, which is seen as critical in the 
literature.43 This option aims at considerably improving transparency between PDO and PGI by 
specifying the differences between the two instruments and highlighting them. This is of great 
relevance should both instruments be retained as envisaged by the current Regulation Proposal. 
Only if consumers possess sufficient information on the product identity producers can expect rents 
appropriate to the product characteristics.44 
For this purpose, information on protected GIs needs to be fundamentally improved: 
Regarding protection criteria: 
 
Protection via PGI can only be granted for the geographical name of a product “which possesses a 
specific quality, reputation or other characteristics attributable to that geographical origin” and for 
which “the production and/or processing and/or preparation of which take place in the defined 
geographical area”.45 
                                                             
40 Regulation 509/2006 art.2(1)/b. 
41 Regulation Proposal, p.23, art.3(3). 
42 See for instance the case of traditional-type mozzarella cheese. The name “Mozzarella di Bufala Campana” was entered 
successfully in the DOOR database as a PDO product in 1996. Besides, the name of “Mozzarella” has also been registered as 
TSG in 1998. For more information, see http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door [Accessed March 25, 2012]. 
43 See Profeta, Balling, Schoene and Wirsig, “The Protection of Origins for Agricultural Products and Foods in Europe” (2009) 
12(6) J. World Intell. Prop. 622; Geiger, Gervais, Olszak and Ruzek, “Towards a Flexible International Framework for the 
Protection of Geographical Indications” (2010) 1(2) WIPO J. 147; Evans, “The Strategic Exploitation of Geographical 
Indications and Community Trade Marks for the Marketing of Agricultural Products in the European Union” (2010) 1(1) 
WIPO J. 159. 
44 As proposed by Regulation Proposal, p.24, art.4(a). 
45 Regulation 510/2006 art.2(1); Regulation Proposal, p.24, art.5(1), defining PDO and PGI. 
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In contrast, PDO requires that the “quality or characteristics” of the product be “essentially or 
exclusively due to a particular environment with its inherent natural and human factors”, with “the 
production, processing and preparation” all taking place in the demarcated geographical area. Both 
differentiation criteria are problematic. The connection between origin and product characteristics 
(quality) is challenging in almost all cases—also with respect to PDOs. It is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to prove that specific characteristics or quality differences are explicitly attributable to 
the region.46 In practice, PDOs strongly rely on the reputation closely connected to the region as 
initially envisaged for PGIs.47 Accordingly, on an international level the instrument is applied 
unequally: while the same categories of products are registered in northern EU Member States as 
PGIs, they can be found as PDOs in southern Member States.  
Moreover, it is not unusual that some PGI products exhibit stricter quality criteria than some PDO 
products.48 
If both protection norms are to be maintained, obviously the differentiation cannot be based only 
on the existing or non-existing link between (scientifically measurable) product characteristics and 
the region. Instead, a cultural differentiation with respect to a tradition’s link with the region might 
be a sustainable solution. So far, both concepts include the image of a regional specialty that should 
be preserved. This contradicts the results of research on cultural property,49 according to which 
establishing a consortium to use the protection rights is the first step to reinventing the regional 
tradition to be preserved with the GI.50 Especially in regions with a low level of food-cultural 
tradition like in many northern and eastern European Member States, GIs today are a driving force 
for constituting specialties. 
In this context, a clear differentiation of the two protection norms seems highly recommendable 
(see Table 2). The PDO should focus on traditions exhibiting a stronger link with the region as all 
production stages must take place within the region and a corresponding reputation. From a cultural 
property perspective, that would make PDO the instrument of propertisation of a historically 
anchored food-cultural speciality. In this case, requirements should be kept high. These could 
include proof of a traditional production of that good on the domestic market with regard to 
intergenerational transmission similar to the time period criteria currently suggested in the TSG. 
The PGI should then take on the character of an instrument for the promotion of food-cultural 
diversity. This would imply low requirements for evidence of relevant traditions since this protection 
scheme would also capture isolated and/or buried knowledge that are only the rudimentary nucleus 
for the constitution of PGI products. In this light, it is easy to argue in favour of limiting the scope of 
protection regarding name rights and only allowing for combinations of origin and rather generic 
product names (when for instance referring to “Allgäuer Emmentaler”). The PGI would also provide 
a protection for buried knowledge, which is deemed critical by the existing literature.51 
  
                                                             
46 This fact is especially contested in the wine sector. See Herrmann, Marauhn and Teuber, “Der Schutz geographischer 
Herkunftsangaben” (2008) 57(7) Agrarwirtschaft 321; Rangnekar, “The Socio-economics of Geographical Indications” (2004) 
UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No.8. 
47 Rangnekar, “The Socio-economics of Geographical Indications” (2004) UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, Issue Paper No.8. 
48 Profeta, Balling, Schoene and Wirsig, “The Protection of Origins for Agricultural Products and Foods in Europe” (2009) 
12(6) J. World Intell. Prop. 622. 
49 Stefan Beck and Leonore Scholze-Irrlitz, “Wie der Europäer is(s)t. Europäisierung durch Molekularisierung, 
Standardisierung und kreative Traditionalisierung von Nahrung und Ernährung” in Susanne Bauer et al. (eds), Essen in 
Europa (Berlin: Transcript Verlag, 2010). 
50 V. Amilen and A.W. Hegnes, “The Cultural Smell of Fermented Fish: About the Development of a Local Product in 
Norway” (2004) 2(1) Journal of Food, Agriculture and Environment 141. 
51
 See e.g. Singhal, “Geographical Indications and Traditional Knowledge” (2008) 3(11) Journal of Intellectual Property Law 
& Practice 732; Downes, “How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge” (2000) 25 Colum. J. 
Envtl. L. 253. 
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Table 2: Reform option 1- Differentiating the instruments with help of particular criteria 
 
Criterion/Instrument PDO PGI 
Geographical link High: entire value added 
chain is situated in the 
region 
Low: only one of the production steps is 
required to take place in the region 
(requirements of labelling the production 
steps make this transparent) 
Traditional linkage High requirements: 








High level of awareness 
or high reputation 
First nucleus for constitution or recognition 
 
Regarding product labelling: 
 
The PGI also creates consumer confusion as the origin of the raw materials is not common 
knowledge52 and is not legally specified. While it is legally sufficient for one production step to take 
place in the respective region, many PGI consortiums call for all raw materials to exhibit a regional 
link and thus do not take advantage of the opportunities of acquiring inexpensive raw materials 
from low cost regions. However, PGIs are also awarded to products for which it is impossible to 
obtain all the necessary raw materials from the region, i.e. Lübecker Marzipan. As a result, 
consumers cannot be sure of how much of the production process takes place in the respective 
region for PGIs. In future, more information on GIs should be displayed; such display will also act to 
strengthen the geographical link of the products. This would also require providing information on 
which part of the manufacturing process takes place in the mentioned region. All important raw 
materials and production processes for the product should be labelled according to their region 
(abbreviated on the product as well as in a detailed form in the barcode). This would enable an 
actual product identity and also a comprehensible origin authenticity supporting the purchase 
decisions of consumers. In addition, this would provide a further incentive for regionalisation. The 
product’s origin considerably influences purchase decisions concerning preferences for products 
from particular countries or regions. Mostly, the PGI’s name refers to the region in which the last 
production step took place (e.g. Black Forest Ham). An instrument making it obligatory to localise 
raw materials and production steps would provide an efficient solution honouring the prevailing 
opinion of the consumers by PGI products.53 
In total, the first option supports two different labels. On the one hand, the value of PGIs for 
consumers is increased by more information on origin and production steps, which highlights the 
link between product and region. Because the requirements regarding a tradition described in the 
product specification as a protection criterion are limited, they provide an opportunity to recognize 
products based on scattered or buried knowledge. On the other hand, PDOs are recognized for 
developed specialties with a historical tradition (proved existence of the production on the domestic 
market) and a corresponding reputation (prevailing opinion of the consumers), which count as 
existing cultural and gastronomic heritage as proposed by the Regulation Proposal.54 
 
                                                             
52 London Economics, Evaluation of the CAP Policy on Protected Designations of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical 
Indications (PGI) (2008), p.33. 
53 See Profeta, Balling, Schoene and Wirsig, “The Protection of Origins for Agricultural Products and Foods in Europe” (2009) 
12(6) J. World Intell. Prop. 622; Profeta and Balling, “Evaluierung der Übergangsregelung des Herkunftsschutzes bei 
Agrarprodukten und Lebensmitteln in Europa gemäß Verordnung (EG) Nr. 510/06 und Verbesserungsvorschläge für die 
anstehende Modifikation” (2007) 56(4) Agrarwirtschaft 213. 
54 See Regulation Proposal, p.13, para. (1). 
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OPTION 2: CONCENTRATION ON ONE PROTECTION SCHEME 
 
The second option results from a drastic proposal of some authors arguing in favour of abolishing 
both instruments of GIs.55 Furthermore, such radical demands were discussed in the course of the 
Commission’s preparatory work as well,56 a fact that points to the fundamental regulatory deficits. 
Apart from the stronger and yet more culturally justified differentiation of the two forms of GIs 
suggested by option 1, option 2 concentrates solely on one protection scheme, namely the PDO. 
This stricter alternative argues for maintaining and further specifying the PDO regime while aiming 
to abolish the PGI instrument.57 
Information economic aspects: 
Concentrating on one protection scheme creates an environment in which the PDO instrument 
fulfils the function of providing entire or unambiguous information on the product’s actual origin. As 
all production steps take place in the region signalled by the protected name, consumers on the 
national and international level are not misled in terms of the true product identity as is possible in 
the case of PGIs. These PDO qualities imply that producers can obtain a higher price level for their 
products than in case of PGI products,58 since their unambiguous authenticity of origin allows for 
identifying not only the actual origin, but also the original tradition and the alluded reputation. This 
stronger concept can also be explained by the fact that “consumers increasingly look for authentic 
products produced using specific and traditional methods”.59 This option would also prevent weaker 
instruments from free-riding on the PDO. 
Cultural property aspects: 
Currently, PDOs theoretically refer to products with “an intrinsic link … between product or foodstuff 
characteristics and geographical origin”.60 However, in reality only a few PDO protected products are 
able to provide unambiguous evidence that climate and soil determine the product in a specific way 
rendering the product unique. Therefore, it seems necessary for this alternative solution to again 
focus on strengthening the link between the geographically delimited area and the product on a 
cultural basis as suggested in option 1. This cultural link should be described in detail in the product 
specification (“code of practice”) which at the same time represents the codification of local 
knowledge via interaction with nature and environment,61 including traditional production process 
and (traditional) raw materials.62 
This option aims to protect the collective reputation of the goods and the region from 
misappropriation and dilution,63 enabling rights holders to obtain high price premiums. In overall, 
PDO products must meet three requirements (see fig.1): 
1. High geographical link: requiring that the entire value added chain is situated in the region.64 
2. Traditional anchorage: high requirements are of crucial interest regarding historical anchorage 
since the boundaries of the region of origin cannot be designated only on the basis of 
                                                             
55
 E.g. Profeta, Balling, Schoene and Wirsig, “The Protection of Origins for Agricultural Products and Foods in Europe” (2009) 
12(6) J. World Intell. Prop. 622. 
56 See European Commission, “Impact Assessment on Geographical Indications”, 2010, p.33, Policy Options 5.8. Accordingly 
the protection of geographical indications is suggested through a trademark system. 
57 This option is in contrast with the EU proposal of focusing only on the PGI scheme. See European Commission, “Impact 
Assessment on Geographical Indications”, 2010, Policy Options 5.5. 
58 See Regulation Proposal; London Economics, Evaluation of the CAP Policy on Protected Designations of Origin (PDO) and 
Protected Geographical Indications (PGI) (2008). 
59 See Regulation Proposal, p.2, art.1.1 (Grounds for and Objectives of the Proposal). 
60 Regulation Proposal, p.16, para. (17). 
61 Bérard and Marchenay, “Local Products and Geographical Indications” (2006) 58(187) International Social Science Journal 
109. 
62 Currently only TSG products must meet these requirements. See Regulation 509/2006 art.4(1). 
63 As argued by Rangnekar, “The Socio-economics of Geographical Indications” (2004) UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and 
Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No.8, in general regarding GIs (not only referring to PDOs). 
64 An exception can be found in imports of raw materials. See the exemption clause of Regulation 510/2006 art.2(3) and 
Regulation Proposal, p.24, art.5(2). 
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measurable scientific link between product quality and region. Profound linkage between the 
region and the product relating to the tradition of production across generations must be proved 
for a demarcated geographical area considering historical data and possible changes in the 
techniques of production in the past. 
3. Corresponding reputational link to the region of origin and high level of awareness on the part 
of consumers is also an essential criterion for being a product worthy for PDO protection. 
 
Figure 1: Reform option 2- Maintaining solely the PDO instrument based on a triple 
criterion65 
 
The demarcation of the region of origin is one of the crucial points in a registration process. Even if 
the delimitation of the authorized area rests upon more objective physical geographical 
particularities such as climate and geology, there are several disputes over precise boundaries due 
to the exclusion of potential producers.66 In the case of a more subjective cultural factors-based 
approach, as suggested above, the restriction of the protection area seems to be of a more complex 
nature. Since traditions change over time, several factors, such as the different development phases 
of the product in question or the development of production techniques per se, should be 
considered. 
The case of Melton Mowbray Pork Pie exemplifies these challenges very well.67 After a long 
negotiation process, an area larger than the original area of production has been considered for 
registration. The rationale behind that lies in the fact that, in accordance with the method of 
production described in the product specification, a wider area has been engaged in production for 
100 years demonstrated by extensive historical research.68 This case sheds light on the importance 
of not only a geographical but also on a traditional delimitation of a production area. This insight 
leads us to the following limitation regarding the notion of tradition69: defining the protection area, 
historical evidence is recommended for the time period in which a somewhat stable recipe is 
identified. Specifically, in case the area is determined on a cultural basis, attention should be paid to 
a particular product (to the first historical disclosure of the associated name to be protected) and 
not to references about general production of such goods as is currently detectable by several 
products, thus diffusing the proof of origin. The collective action of all stakeholders is required to 
take such decisions about the delimitation of region of origin based on historical data.  
 
 
                                                             
65 Source: Authors 
66 See Dev S. Gangjee, “Melton Mowbray and the GI Pie in the Sky: Exploring Cartographies of Protection” (2006) 3 I.P.Q. 
291, for details on the complexity of problems relating to the demarcation of a PDO protection area. 
67 See Gangjee, “Melton Mowbray and the GI Pie in the Sky” (2006) 3 I.P.Q. 291. 
68 See the registration document of Melton Mowbray Pork Pie: “Publication of an application pursuant to Council 
Regulation 510/2006 art.6(2) on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural 
products and foodstuffs” [2008] OJ C85/17. 
69 As also suggested by Gangjee, “Melton Mowbray and the GI Pie in the Sky” (2006) 3 I.P.Q. 291. 
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Accordingly, the question arises when the production of a particular product should count as 
“traditional”.70 On the one hand, building up a corresponding reputation of a product takes some 
time; on the other hand, traditions are usually associated with intergenerational transmissions, at 
least 50 years or a two generation criterion seems to be a suitable requirement for a minimum 
existence of a product, as also suggested by the Regulation Proposal.71 
In order for a single GI instrument (PDO) to be economically worthwhile, measures such as the 
following should additionally be taken into account: 
 
- The exceptional rule that “certain geographical designations shall be treated as designations of 
origin where the raw materials for the products concerned come from a geographical area 
larger than, or different from, the processing area”72 shall be maintained. Here, a labelling of 
the origin of the raw material seems indispensable: provided that the import of raw 
materials is an essential part of the traditional production or that the production were not 
possible without these raw materials (see Lübecker Marzipan) and that this procedure is 
corroborated by tradition, the origin of these raw materials should be clearly designated to 
avoid consumer confusion (see above). 
- Following up on the stronger focus on traditional links, it further seems meaningful to retain the 
exception—with a labelling obligation—that “traditional geographic names” can also be 
registered as PDOs as they define an agricultural product or foodstuff that has its culturally 
influenced origin in a geographically delimited area.73 
- For products to which PDO regulations do not apply, facultative quality specifications would 
provide an opportunity to inform consumers about particular commodifying characteristics and 
thus differentiate them from other products (see above). 
- Whereas many PGI products fulfil the criteria for PDO nomination, they are introduced as PGIs 
for strategic reasons in order to retain the option of switching between suppliers 
according to the economic conditions.74 As a result, many consumer protection watchdogs 
criticise these producers who decide against obtaining their raw materials from the same 
region for economic reasons despite its viability.75 For these products the “renomination” to 
PDO is reasonable and justified. Nonetheless, in case of undesirable and unseasonal weather 
conditions PDO products face a higher risk of insufficient supply of raw materials. Every 
seasonal product is taking this risk, to some extent. 
 
Summing up, the introduction of only one instrument would entail the following advantages: 
Transparent designations of origin: 
Abolishing PGIs would prevent, as far as technically possible, production steps from taking place 
outside the region. Thus, the link between the products and the geographical origin is clearly 
specified and strengthened on the basis of a traditional linkage. 
 
 
                                                             
70 Apart from the EU’s standpoint, at the national level there are different assumptions on “tradition”. For instance, Austria 
created a register for Traditional Austrian Specialties on its own initiative, which only regards products as “traditional” 
when their production exists for at least 75 years or over three generations. See “Bundesministerium für Land- und 
Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft“,  available at  
http://www.lebensministerium.at/lebensmittel/qs-lebensmittel/trad-lebensmittel/TraditionelleLM.html  
[Accessed March 25, 2012]. 
71 Regulation Proposal, p.23, art.3(3). 
72 Regulation 510/2006 art.2(3); Regulation Proposal, p.24, art.5(2). 
73 See Regulation 510/2006 art.2 (2). This exception clause is not considered in the Regulation Proposal. 
74 See Evans, “The Strategic Exploitation of Geographical Indications and Community Trade Marks for the Marketing of 
Agricultural Products in the European Union” (2010) 1(1) WIPO J. 159. 
75 Profeta, Balling, Schoene and Wirsig, “The Protection of Origins for Agricultural Products and Foods in Europe” (2009) 




The extent of controls would apply to all production steps and render the control tasks easy to 
comprehend. This could enhance consumer trust. By using only one GI label, consumers are 
protected from confusion due to the existence of various labels with differing information content.76 
As a “mark of authenticity”,77 the label could further convey unambiguous information about the 
characteristics of the products (clear origin, proven tradition and high reputation). 
Spillover effects: 
If all production steps take place in a particular region, the product name obtains a collective 
reputation regarding all production steps. This implies concentrated cooperation of all actors and 
strengthens rural and regional identity, as well as cohesion. The reputation of a PDO product can 
have a positive effect on agri-tourism,78 as in the case of Italy where the consumption of GI food 
products encouraged by the national law has turned regional gastronomic traditions into one of the 
main attractions of farm tourism.79 In this way, PDO products provide incentives to commodify 
regional products as well as traditional knowledge and can thus promote economic development in 
the region. 
Protection of local knowledge: 
Despite the fact that the PDO regime protects the name of the product directly, the vital element of 
the product specification manifests itself in the production procedure involving local knowledge and 
practices.80 
Many authors criticise that within a GI system local knowledge remains unrecognised as an object of 
protection, and therefore rests in the public domain.81 Consequently, traditional producers leaving 
the region cannot be stopped to produce similar or identical products from outside the region. 
Nevertheless, if requirements of traditional production methods with regional historical anchorage 
are fulfilled, the PDO does contribute to a certain extent to the protection of local knowledge 
(codified in the product specification) by protecting its reputation from free-riders. 
The product and the associated local knowledge attributed to a geographically delimited area 
cannot be marketed under the same traditional name by producers outside the region. This creates 
an environment where culinary heritage is protected and the maintenance and sustainability of 
traditional knowledge is encouraged. From a cultural perspective it certainly does not imply a 
monopolization of knowledge or limits access to knowledge and innovation. The knowledge can be 
used under a different product name.82 The new regime establishes and protects a link to traditional 
knowledge, significantly influenced by the region,83 materialized in the product, and associated with 
the product name itself. Overall, a PDO system would oblige producers to adhere to the 
geographical and the stricter cultural limitations contributing to the preservation and persistence of 
regional traditional knowledge. 
                                                             
76 See the discussions on the proliferation of GI instruments in Marette, “Can Foreign Producers Benefit from Geographical 
Indications under the New European Regulation?” (2009) 10(1) The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade 
Policy 65. 
77 See Teshager Dagne, “Law and Policy on Intellectual Property, Traditional Knowledge and Development: Legally 
Protecting Creativity and Collective Rights in Traditional Knowledge Based Agricultural Products through Geographical 
Indications” (2010) 11(1) The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 68, 99. 
78 Josling, “The War on Terroir” (2006) 57(3) J. Ag. Econ. 337, 360, pointed this out, namely that particular GIs “are 
potentially useful in the development of agri-tourism, where the cultural identity bestowed by the mystique of terroir”. 
79 See Katia L. Sidali, “A Sideway Look at Farm Tourism in Germany and in Italy” in Katia L. Sidali and Birgit Schulze (eds), 
Food, Agri-Culture and Tourism (Berlin: Springer, 2011). 
80 Bérard and Marchenay, “Local Products and Geographical Indications” (2006) 58(187) International Social Science Journal 
109. 
81 See Sanders, “Incentives for and Protection of Cultural Expression” (2010) 13(2) J. World Intell. Prop. 81; Rangnekar, “The 
Socio-economics of Geographical Indications” (2004) UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue 
Paper No.8. 
82
 See Bernard O’Connor, The Law of Geographical Indications (London: Cameron May Ltd, 2004). See also the successful 
marketing of Spanish Cava after it was prohibited from calling it “champagne”. 
83 Daphne Zografos, Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural Expression (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010). 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
The current Regulation Proposal of the European Community contains some modifications 
particularly affecting the level of controls, thus increasing the transparency of the GI system. In the 
eyes of the authors, however, this proposal does not constitute a viable legal basis to solve the 
numerous, widely discussed criticism by the literature and recognized by the European Union. The 
critique is focused on sufficiently qualified labels of origin. The previous policy of the European 
Union faces the dilemma of aiming to incorporate GIs in rural development policy, whereas regional 
protection rights are only granted in the case of a scientifically based justification for delimiting the 
product name to its specific region. Otherwise, the baseline of the European Common Market, the 
prevention of protectionism, is severely challenged. Nevertheless, it is precisely the unambiguous 
scientific link between origin and measurable product characteristics that is rather the exception 
than the rule. 
The compromises arising from this fundamental contradiction between the previous two regional 
protection instruments (PDO and PGI) and TSG are not resolved convincingly. In recent years, the 
number of articles arguing in favour of a stronger differentiation between PDO and PGI84  or even in 
favour of merging or, in contrast, abolishing the two indications85 have increased. A study by London 
Economics, commissioned by the European Commission, shows interesting results86: in many 
Member States, the slight differentiation between PDO and PGI is regarded as an additional cost of 
information gathering for consumers, an opinion shared by consumer associations (Belgium, 
Germany and Italy) as well as producer cooperatives. 
This article argues for a more plausible regulation from an information economic perspective as 
well as a cultural property perspective. The current debate on an amendment of the GIs regulations 
of the European Union includes similarly radical ideas, which have, nonetheless, not been 
incorporated in the final version of the Regulation Proposal. On the one hand, this confirms that 
international or supranational negotiations produce minimal results, rather than merely radical 
reforms, a phenomenon apparently also applicable to the European Union.87 On the other hand, this 
minimal reform proposal reveals that an interdisciplinary perspective is required to provide 
evidence-based insights to the design of criteria for GI with regard to the years in existence, regional 
delimitation, etc. The pressure on international level in fora such as WIPO and WTO additionally 
points to the need for a more cultural-economic analysis of the GI regime rather than pure 
information economics. 
As a result, this article argues to drastically modify the existing regulations and suggests keeping 
only one instrument, namely the PDO, which not only draws on a definite geographical, but also a 
stricter cultural connection between the product and the region. While GIs generally do not allow 
for the protection of all types of traditional knowledge,88 this reform option would be able to 
contribute to protect at least one certain kind of traditional knowledge from misappropriation and 
dilution. The new PDO regime based on tradition could contribute to protecting knowledge 
attributed to a specific region and manifested in products. In order to evaluate which products fulfil 
the PDO requirements, it would be helpful to design and regularly apply consumer surveys 
                                                             
84 cf. Profeta and Balling, “Evaluierung der Übergangsregelung des Herkunftsschutzes bei Agrarprodukten und 
Lebensmitteln in Europa gemäß Verordnung (EG) Nr. 510/06 und Verbesserungsvorschläge für die anstehende 
Modifikation” (2007) 56(4) Agrarwirtschaft 213. 
85 Profeta, Balling, Schoene and Wirsig, “The Protection of Origins for Agricultural Products and Foods in Europe” (2009) 
12(6) J. World Intell. Prop. 622. 
86 London Economics, Evaluation of the CAP Policy on Protected Designations of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical 
Indications (PGI) (2008), pp.160–166. 
87 Matthias Lankau, Kilian Bizer and Zulia Gubaydullina, “Die verborgene Effektivität minimaler Resultate in internationalen 
Verhandlungen: Der Fall der WIPO” in Regina Bendix, Kilian Bizer and Stefan Groth (eds), Die Konstituierung von Cultural 
Property: Forschungsperspektiven (Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2010). 
88
 Dagne, “Law and Policy on Intellectual Property, Traditional Knowledge and Development” (2010) 11(1) The Estey Centre 
Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 68; O’Connor, The Law of Geographical Indications (2008); Singhal, 
“Geographical Indications and Traditional Knowledge” (2004) 3(11) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 732. 
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measuring the perception of PDO candidates. As only agricultural products with a high reputation 
can prevail on the market, this is an important aspect. The protection of PDO products is justified 
since only products that have gained high reputation over years are at high risk of being copied and 
misappropriated. 
For all formerly existing products that are no longer produced, acceptable evidence of an 
undisputed link of the local knowledge with the geographically delimited area should be discussed 
according to a still arbitrarily set time period,89 since in those cases reputation does not seem to be 
verifiable. How these alternative solutions would support the invention of new regional products 
and production methods requires further research. 
In conclusion, using only one GI instrument (PDO), in contrast to keeping both PGI and PDO as 
suggested by option 1, facilitates a more efficient exchange of information between producers and 
consumers. This can help to maintain the price of the so-called “tradition-based, reputable” 
agricultural products,90 thus keeping them alive. It simultaneously contributes to the desired 
promotion of traditional knowledge attributed to products of culinary heritage. 
 
                                                             
89 The degree of historical ties between GI regions and the product origin is already considered as a decision rule for 
disputes on whether to register a product as a PDO or a PGI. See Evans, “The Strategic Exploitation of Geographical 
Indications and Community Trade Marks for the Marketing of Agricultural Products in the European Union” (2010) 1(1) 
WIPO J. 159, 170, discussing the decision over Bavarian beer. 
90 Dagne, “Law and Policy on Intellectual Property, Traditional Knowledge and Development” (2010) 11(1) The Estey Centre 




ARE PROTECTED DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATION 
DISTINGUISHED BY CONSUMERS? 







The basic rationale of providing geographical indications (GIs) from information economic 
perspective is to dissolve the information asymmetry related to the actual provenance of the 
products between producers and consumers. The intention of the European Union (EU) towards GIs 
is best observed in the fact that before the international community laid the foundation for a 
multilateral GI system with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) in 1994 in the realms of the World Trade Organization, the EU had already passed its own 
regulation on GIs two years earlier.1 Up to now more than a thousand products are registered as GIs 
in the DOOR database2 turning the EU sui generis system into one of the most comprehensive 
supranational regimes.  
While granting exactly the same protection level,3 the EU offers two instruments for products 
intended for human consumption.4 They may be protected either as designation of origin (PDO) or 
geographical indication (PGI).5 The requirements with regard to the product´s grade of regional 
embeddedness are, however, quite different. To be registered as PDO, a product must be entirely 
produced in the region of origin, which the name of the product indicates. PGI products require at 
least one part of the production to be within the defined area. 
The question of whether consumers distinguish between these quality schemes is of crucial interest 
to policy makers and producers. Especially, if consumers are not able to differentiate between PDO 
and PGI although having different levels of regional (geographical) anchorage, the presence of this 
dual system even seems to increase the risk of confusing, or misleading consumers as to the true 
origin of the products. Therefore, the article´s objective is to investigate this question by providing a 
systematic review of empirical evidence related to two streams of literature. After examining the 
most important differences of these instruments from an information economics perspective, as 
first, it analyses differences in consumers’ awareness and understanding of PDO and PGI. Secondly, 
the article investigates the comparison of consumers´ willingness to pay (WTP) for PDO and PGI 
providing an additional approach to capture whether consumers distinguish between these 
instruments. The article's overall aim is to provide insights into the effectiveness of the EU GIs in 
terms of solving information asymmetries. Furthermore, it presents a guide for future research to 
justify the existence of these instruments from information economic perspective.  
                                                             
1 Council Regulation No. 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications and designations 
of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs and Council Regulation No. 2082/92 of 14 July 1992 on 
certificates of specific character for agricultural products and foodstuffs.  
2 The DOOR Database of the EU also includes the category of TSG (Traditional Speciality Guaranteed), which 
does not constitute a GI. See http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html.  
3 In details, the EU guarantees inter alia protection against any direct and indirect commercial use of a 
particular name, where the exploitation of the reputation of the protected name is at stake; against any 
misuse, imitation or evocation even in translated form or accompanied by expressions “style”, “type”, 
“method”, “as produced in”, “imitation” or similar, including ingredients as well (EU Regulation 1151/2012, 
Art.13 - hereinafter it is referred to as “EU Regulation”). This is, however, a significantly broader scope of 
protection as envisaged by the TRIPS Agreement, Art. 21.  
4 EU Regulation, Title I, Article 1, Objectives 1, b. 
5
 Hereafter commonly referred to them as “EU GIs”. 
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THE EU GI SYSTEM FROM INFORMATION ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
The provision of GIs is justified since geographically embedded products constitute a special kind of 
credence good.6 Unless reliable information is provided on the geographical origin of a product, 
there exists an information asymmetry between sellers, who (falsely) claim the regional provenance 
of their product, and its buyers. As shown by Akerlof (1970) such a situation leads to market failure 
due to adverse selection. Applying the same indication for low quality products (i.e. products of a 
different provenance) renders it impossible for high quality products having particular quality 
attributable to the region or origin to prevail on the market. Preventing the market to fail requires 
limiting the usage of GIs exclusively to those products that truly originate from the specific region. 
This transforms the region of origin cue, which is a credence attribute of a product, into search one 
(Crespi and Marette 2003, Teuber et al. 2011). Only this limitation can credibly inform consumers of 
a product´s real provenance. Thus, similarly to trademarks public intervention promoting exclusive 
GIs prevents consumers from being misled and reduces their costs of obtaining relevant product 
information.7 Overall, the provision of GIs raises social welfare by maintaining the quality of 
products, which have special characteristics attributable to a place of origin increasingly valued by 
consumers (Ilbery and Kneafsey 1998).  
What is more, due to the fact that GIs are the collective property of all producers within a 
demarcated region who are allowed to produce GI products, they also require public interventions in 
order to prevent collective action problems (Olson 1971). It is necessary to coordinate producers of a 
particular regional product with high reputation in order to ensure a particular product quality for 
which exclusive rights have been granted (Gangjee 2012). Since collective reputation is at stake, 
institutions are required to determine and implement quality standards, which have become key 
elements to the functioning of market mechanisms (Bramley et al. 2009).  
In order to address these protection rationales, the EU implements PDO and PGI8 to protect 
geographical names.9 While granting the same protection level,10 these instruments require rather 
different degrees of geographical embeddedness. The name of PDO should refer to a product, whose 
“quality or characteristics are essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment 
with its inherent natural and human factors”. Meanwhile, PGI identifies a product “whose given 
quality, reputation or other characteristic is essentially attributable to its geographical origin”.11 
Concluding, both instruments should present an intrinsic link between the characteristics of a 
product and its geographical origin12 whatever this is based on. It could for instance reflect a regions’ 
                                                             
6 For more detail about credence goods see Nelson (1970) and Darby and Karni (1973). 
7 For the economic function of trademarks, see Landes and Posner (2003), Chapter 7. 
8 The EU has first refined the EC Regulation 2081/1992 in 2006 by passing the revised EC Regulation 510/2006 
enabling to open up the EU sui generis system to non‐EU countries as well. The second revision phase has been 
closed with the new EU Regulation No 1151/2012 in 2012 as a result of the review process launched by the 
European Commission in 2008. Please note that wine sector products are not covered by this EU Regulation. 
For this, see Regulation (EC) 491/2009; Regulation (EC) 479/2008; Regulation (EU) No 670/2011. 
9 The name should identify the specific product linked to a restricted geographical area in the form as it is used, 
independent of whether in trade or in common language. Moreover, historical languages are also permitted. 
See furthermore EU Regulation, Art. 7. 
10
 See footnote 4.  
11 EU Regulation, Art. 5, 1(b) and 2(b) 
12
 EU Regulation, p. 2 (17) 
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culture, know-how or a different kind of reputation. However, the precise distinguishing 
characteristics between the two instruments are merely based on subjective considerations opening 
up numerous ways of interpretations.  
The requirements of the production steps (production, processing and preparation) are, however, 
less subjective and very different. A PDO must be related to a product whose entire production shall 
take place in the demarcated geographical area. Even the packaging itself is declared as a tool of 
safeguarding the overall quality of a product and must be within the defined region.13 Thus, the 
entire control procedure is carried out within this area offering higher food safety (Henseleit et al. 
2007). In contrast, for products registered as PGI it is sufficient when at least one production step is 
resident in the geographical area the name covers.14 Without doubt, the limitation of necessary steps 
of production greatly reduces the relevance of the demarcated region for its specific products.  
All in all, both in terms of a product’s intrinsic link to a geographical region as well as its true 
provenance, PDO and PGI products must convey different information to consumers. Consequently, 
the question arises: Do consumers receive and understand this information? 
In case the product´s name is registered as PDO or PGI, it is not mandatory to communicate any 
additional information on the production steps than the Union GI symbols15 and the registered name. 
The EU Regulation merely allows that “depictions of the geographical area of origin (…) and text, 
graphics or symbols referring to the Members State and/or region in which that geographical area of 
origin is located” may appear on the labeling.16 This, even though voluntarily applied, leads clearly to 
help consumers to identify the products with geographical roots but only when the whole production 
process takes place within this depicted area. Nevertheless, it also does not ensure that, in case of 
PDO, information about raw materials coming from a geographical area other than the one indicated 
by the product name is delivered. In particular, the legislation permits the processing and usage of 
raw materials coming from other regions when its production area is defined and there are special 
conditions determined for their production.17 Moreover, in case of PGIs, even depictions do not 
explicitly inform whether the production and/or processing and/or preparation are carried out in the 
region mentioned.  
In summary, if the labeling does not provide additional information about the detailed production 
process and thus about the regional anchorage, then only the compulsory EU GI symbols and the 
indications’ designation of origin or geographical indication (or their abbreviations: PDO or PGI) are a 
source of information. Thus, solely based on these, consumers only gain information on whether or 
not they buy a product entirely produced in the geographical area the name of the product identifies, 
presupposing that they are aware of the clear differences between PDO and PGI products. 
So, do consumers really distinguish between PDO and PGI? More precisely, are they protected from 
being misled as to the geographical origin of the products through the dual system implemented in 
its current form?  
                                                             
13 EU Regulation, Art.7 (e) 
14 EU Regulation, Art. 5, 1(c), 2(c) 
15
 For a comparison of PDO and PGI symbols, see Bicskei et al. (2012).  
16 EU Regulation, Art.12(4) 
17
 This exception is only applicable for animals, meat and milk (see EU Regulation, Art. 5 (3)). 
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PROCEDURE OF THE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
To answer these questions the article considers empirical evidence, on the one hand, on consumers’ 
awareness of the dual system in the EU and, on the other hand, on their’ understanding of 
differences between the EU GIs. Furthermore, in order to control for customers’ understanding, 
measuring the differences between these regimes through their market performance provides a 
promising approach. Consequently, the article compares consumers´ WTP between PDO- and PGI-
labeled products in their domestic market being the main destination of EU-GI-labeled products 
(AND-International 2012). Similarly to trademarks, GIs are expected to provide producers with a price 
premium above marginal costs (Correa 2002). Theoretically, consumers should be willing to reward 
producers for their efforts in maintaining distinct quality characteristics if they recognize GIs. 
Consequently, this article hypothesizes that consumers reveal higher WTP for PDO than for PGI 
products if they are able to distinguish between them. Since a PDO requires stricter criteria that 
producers should meet than PGIs, PDOs should increase the consumers' confidence and be perceived 
as indicating additional value. This must not only relate to the particularities of a products’ 
provenance. Empirical research reveals that some consumers are ethnocentric and value domestic 
over foreign products in order to support domestic producers (see Teuber et al. 2011, van Ittersum 
et al. 2007, Lusk et al. 2006). Based on that, it is to be assumed that the WTP for PDO should be 
higher than for PGIs since it constitutes a stronger regional embeddedness. 
To collect observations for answering the research question, the article draws on several databases 
such as AgEcon Search, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink, Wiley Online Library and Google Scholar. As the 
first step, studies identified with keywords “geographical indications”, “protected geographical 
indications”, “protected designation of origin”, “awareness/ recognition” and “willingness to pay” 
(combined or in abbreviated form) were selected. Since the work done on GIs is immense, the focus 
was narrowed down to include only empirical studies conducted on GIs implemented by the EU. This 
eliminates a broad range of conceptual and theoretical considerations and research on associated 
topics such as country of origin, region of origin and trademarks. Next to these, particular attention 
was paid to studies funded or maintained by the EU itself, available of respective EU sites.18  
RECOGNITION OF PDO AND PGI IN THE EU 
In spite of the bulk of empirical research on GIs, only five studies specifically compare customers’ 
recognition between PDO and PGI per se (see Table 1). Four of these studies apply face-to-face 
interviews as elicitation method. Only Verbeke et al. (2012) use an online-questionnaire. The 
consumer segment addressed varies across studies and findings are very diverse. In particular, 
comprehensive research with extensive observations in the early phase of the EU system, such as 
Eurobarometer 1998 (EC 1998),19 as well as recent studies such as Velčovská et al. (2012)20, and 
Special Eurobarometer 2012 (EC 2012a), report a relatively low level of awareness of EU GIs among 
non-specified (usual) consumers. Accordingly, only a limited proportion of consumers has ever seen 
                                                             
18 See www.europa.eu. 
19 The European Commission has been monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member States since 
1973 addressing major topics concerning European citizenship. For the Public Opinion Analysis sector of the 
European Commission see http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm. Eurobarometers are based on 
random (probability) sample design. 
20
 Non–probability sample design and judgment sampling technique was used. 
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or heard of PDO and PGI, their full name or their associated symbols. Nevertheless, PDO and PGI are 
more or less equally recognized among consumers as the actual Special Eurobarometer 2012 also 
confirms.  
Table 1 - Overview of the Studies on Consumers´ Awareness of PDO and PGI 
Study 













Awareness of  









N/A N/A PDO (5%), PGI (3%); 
Full indication (PDO 
12.6%, PGI 7.6%) 
Have you ever seen or heard of 
Protected Designation of Origin 
and Protected Geographic 
Indication or of its 
abbreviations PDO and PGI? 
 









Yes Yes PDO (30.1%), 
PGI (25.1%) -only for UK, 
FR 
Have you ever heard of 
Protected Designation of Origin 
and Protected Geographic 
Indication or of its 
abbreviations PDO and PGI? 
 










N/A Yes PDO (68%), PGI (37%); 
IT, FR, ES > BE, NO, PL 
Have you ever heard of food 
products with PDO (Protected 




Velčovská et al. 
(2012/2011) 
CZ, IS 267/ Non–
probability/ 
Interviews 
N/A N/A PDO (3%), PGI (4%)-CZ 
PDO (6%), PGI (8%)-IS 











N/A N/A PDO (14%), PGI (14%) Which of the logos are you 
aware of? 
Note: *Main shopper is defined as a person who is responsible for all of the household shopping.  
Countries are referred to by their official abbreviation. **Shopper of regional products is a consumer who indicated that he had already 
purchased regional products.  
In contrast, two studies addressing shoppers of regional products (see van Ittersum et al. 2000, 
Verbeke et al. 2012) reveal a higher recognition level of EU GIs. This is, however, not surprising since 
consumers of regional products must be treated as a consumer segment that might be aware of GIs 
with a higher probability. Many of the products they purchase are GI labeled. Probably because of 
that, differences in recognizing PDOs and PGIs also seem to be considerably stronger according to 
Verbeke et al. (2012). The study of van Ittersum et al. (2000) report similar results, although PGI was 
measured only in 2 of the 5 countries (see Table 1). What is more, Verbeke et al. (2012) also show a 
high variation in the recognition of EU GIs among countries. Italy, France and Spain reveal 
considerably higher knowledge of PDO and PGI than Norway, Poland and Belgium. Likewise, London 
Economics (London Economics 2008) presents that among the 27 EU Member States consumers´ 
(main shoppers´) awareness level about the EU GIs (not separating for PDO and PGI) varies 
determinately. They find that there is a small but positive correlation between the number of 
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registered names and the recognition of the symbols.21 Interestingly, countries with a leading 
position in the EU GI registrations also have their own historically routed origin labeling regimes 
(such as Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée (AOC) in France, Denominazione di origine controllata (DOC) 
in Italy or Denominación de Origen (DO) in Spain). This shows that consumers of these countries are 
more sensitive to origin labeling than consumers of north European countries (Norway, for instance, 
see Verbeke et al. 2012).  
Surprisingly, next to the simple examination of the awareness of EU GIs, the precise understanding of 
the major characteristics of these instruments has received very limited attention, yet. Most of the 
research mainly focuses rather on the general meaning of EU GIs not specifying for PDO and PGI (cf. 
London Economics 2008, van Ittersum et al. 2000). Studies, which pay attention to the understanding 
of PDO and PGI with regard to credibility (Velčovská et al. 2012), quality and traditional character of 
the products (Verbeke et al. 2012) are rather the exception. To the best of our knowledge, only one 
study (Eurobarometer 1998) investigates the precise differences between PDO and PGI concerning 
the production stages, being the most important factor. The data of Eurobarometer 1998 is, 
however, obtained in the very early phase of the GI system and cannot reflect the recently increasing 
trend of consumer awareness of and interest in the instruments (Verbeke et al. 2012 referring to 
Arfini et al. 2011).  
Summing up, empirical evidence highlights, on the one hand, that awareness of EU GIs might be 
dependent on the consumer segment addressed. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that general 
consumers are more or less equally aware of PDO and PGI. Although this awareness is increasing, the 
overall recognition level of EU GIs is insufficient and far behind other quality schemes such as Fair 
Trade and Bio (Velčovská et al. 2012, p. 55, London Economics 2008). On the other hand, consumers´ 
understanding of the exact differences between PDO and PGI regarding the regional embeddedness 
remains undetectable based on the literature.  
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR EU GIs 
The assessment of consumers´ WTP allows for capturing whether consumers distinguish between EU 
GIs. There is a plethora of case studies that compare consumers´ WTP for PDOs and PGIs, which, 
however, apply diverging empirical methods.  
Firstly, there exist choice experiments with hypothetical products, which would support to draw 
precise conclusions on whether consumers value the same product labeled with PDO more than with 
PGI. Generally, these studies provide information about the meaning of the labels in advance. Thus, 
consumers are fully aware about the differences between PDOs and PGIs when revealing their WTP. 
In such an environment Aprile et al. (2012) find that compared to non-labeled olive oils Italian 
consumers are willing to pay more on average for GI-labeled products, and they value PDO even 
more than PGI. Also targeting olive oils, Menapace et al. (2011) identify the same trend for 
consumers in Canada. Yet, since WTP is expected to depend on the product type and sector in 
question (Correa 2002), for the robustness of these findings other product classes covered by the 
European legislation should be analyzed, as well.  
                                                             
21 The data is based on the national Omnibus surveys run by Ipsos. The Omnibus survey captures a 
representative sample of each Member State (London Economics 2008). 
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Secondly, there is also a possibility to compare WTP for PDO and PGI by taking real products already 
registered in the EU from the same product class. For instance, Schamel et al. (2007) compare 
consumers´ WTP for Parma ham (PDO), and black forest ham (PGI) based on auction market data. 
They find that PDO (Parma) ham sells at higher premium relative to PGI (Black Forest) ham. However, 
the interpretation of such results should be cautious: WTP for real products on the market carrying 
real names captures more information than simple hypothetical products. In case of Parma ham, 
inter alia the reputation of Italian products or the region Parma, and different methods of production 
can also be responsible for a higher WTP, not only the presence of PDO per se. In addition, it remains 
unknown whether the obtained difference in price premia is also valid for the period before GI 
registrations. Clearly, different valuations of PDO and PGI products can also be independent of the GI 
registration. Even previously, customers could have valued Parma ham higher than black forest ham. 
Summing up, comparing price premia for real products taking other EU GI products as a reference, 
hardly allows precise comparisons of customers’ awareness of differences between the GI labels.  
Another possibility to analyze perceived differences between EU GIs is to compare price premia for 
PDO or PGI labeled products with generic non-labeled ones of the same product class. Deselnicu et 
al. (2013) provide the only meta-analysis,22 which considers 61 products.23 The authors find that 
PDOs realize higher price premia than PGIs. For the interpretation of their result in the light of this 
article, however, some factors should be carefully considered. First of all, they also incorporate wines 
into the analysis, which constitutes a culinary specialty, which is not covered by EU Regulation (No 
1151/2012).24 Furthermore, they even include such studies that do not focus on the presence or 
absence of PDO and PGI and its impact on price premia. They only vary the name of the region of 
origin per se for estimating WTP (such as Stefani et al. 2005, 2006, Santos and Riberio 2005). 
Consequently, these estimations are misleading and do not value the label per se. Thirdly, their 
analysis also covers studies, which include regional products as GIs although they have still not been 
registered as EU GIs at the time of the data collection (cf. Azeite do Alentejo Interior in Santos and 
Riberio 2005). Thus, the value of the GI label per se is not possible to be evaluated. Fourthly, as the 
number of estimations for the products included in their analysis differs, the results they obtained 
are biased towards the products with many estimations (see Fotopoulos and Krystallis 2003, Loureiro 
and McCluskey 2000). Considering these particular shortcomings, Deselnicu et al.´s (2013) conclusion 
that PDO command higher price premia than PGI is not reliable. Consequently, their results are 
misleading and cannot answer this article’s research questions. 
As a result, in order to address whether there are differences in WTP for PDO and PGI, the following 
sections magnify those studies, which deal with products already registered as GIs in the DOOR 
Database at the time of the data collection. Another criterion is that they establish price premia by 
taking similar products without GI labels as a reference (i.e., synchronic evaluation, see Barjolle et al. 
2009).25 Only ten case studies fulfill these requirements (see Table 2).  
                                                             
22 Here, I would like to thank the authors for providing me with their dataset, which enabled me to precisely 
identify the case studies they considered to belong to PDO and PGI products. 
23 Within their study they included geographical indications covered by institutions other than the EU´s, as well. 
Therefore, this number refers only to those products, which were identified as EU GIs in their database. 
24
 See footnote 9.  
25 The data collection started in 2010 within the scope of the research of the Interdisciplinary Research Group 
on Cultural Property having no knowledge about the ongoing research of Deselnicu et al. (2011). 
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In total, they examine 24 products of which 92 percent received GI status between 1996 and 1998, 
and only 2 of them later than 2000.  
Table 2 - Overview of the Products for which WTP was Estimated 
 
Although having a coherent selection of studies, for the interpretation of the dataset in the light of 
the research question some factors deserve particular attention. To begin with, only 6 of a total of 23 
possible product classes26 are covered by these case studies. What is more, the product class of 
cheeses is overrepresented since more than half of the observations (63 percent) relate to it. The 
categories “olive oils”, “fresh meat and meat products”, “fruits and vegetables” represent only 17, 8 
and 8 percent of the sample, respectively. Furthermore, the sample only represents products of very 
few countries, namely Italy, Spain, Greece, France and the Netherlands. These are actually the 
biggest promoters of GIs (except the Netherlands) having the highest number of registrations in the 
EU DOOR register.27 Among these, Italy provides the highest number of products in the sample, 
particularly within the class of “oils and cheeses”. Correspondingly, the representation of only few 
product types mostly of countries with long traditions in origin labeling does not allow precise 
interpretation the WTP data with respect to the consumers´ valuation of PDO and PGI. 
The biggest obstacle to shed light on whether consumers value PDO and PGI differently based on 
their WTP, is, however, that there are 8 estimations for PGI from two studies (Loureiro and 
McCluskey 2000, Menapace et al. 2011). These relate to only 2 products (Galician veal and Tuscan 
                                                             
26 See the DOOR database: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html.  
27
 The number of registered products per countries: 254 (IT), 200 (FR), 164 (ES), 99 (GR), and 9 (NL) inclusive 
the category of Traditional Speciality Guaranteed (TSG) according to the DOOR database, accessed on 
25.07.2013. 
Product Name (estimates) Product Class PDO/PGI Registr.Date COO* Elic.Meth.** Author of study (year)
1 Azafrán de la Mancha 1.8. Other products*** PDO 2001 ES R Sanjuán-López et al. (2009)
2 Camembert de Normandie (3) 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 FR R Bonnet and  Simioni (2001); 
Hassan and Monier-Dilhan (2006)
3 Casciotta d'Urbino 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
4 Fontina 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
5 Garda (Olive Oil) 1.5. Oils and fats PDO 1997 IT H Menapace et al.(2011)
6 Gorgonzola 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
7 Feta 1.3. Cheeses PDO 2002 GR H van Ittersum et al. (2007)
8 Montasio 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
9 Murazzano 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
10 Noord-Hollandse Edammer 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 NL H van Ittersum et al. (2007)
11 Opperdoezer Ronde (Potato) 1.6. Fruit, vegetables PDO 1996 NL H van Ittersum et al. (2007)
12 Parma Ham (2) 1.2. Meat products PDO 1996 IT H Arfini (2000); 
van Ittersum et al. (2007)
13 Parmigiano-Reggiano (2) 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT H Arfini (2000);
van Ittersum et al. (2007)
14 Pecorino Romano 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
15 Pecorino Siciliano 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
16 Pecorino Toscano 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
17 Peza Irakliou Kritis 1.5. Oils and fats PDO 1996 GR H Fotopoulos and Krystallis (2001)
18 Raschera 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
19 Robiola di Roccaverano 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
20 Taleggio 1.3. Cheeses PDO 1996 IT R Galli et al.(2011)
21 Ternera Gallega (Galician veal) (6) 1.1 Fresh meat PGI 1996 ES H Loureiro and McCluskey (2000)
22 Terra di Bari (Olive Oil) 1.5. Oils and fats PDO 1997 IT H Menapace et al.(2011)
23 Toscano (Olive Oil) (2) 1.5. Oils and fats PGI 1998 IT H Menapace et al.(2011)
24 Mila Zagoras Piliou (Apples) (4) 1.6. Fruit, vegetables PDO 1996 GR H Fotopoulos and Krystallis (2003);  
van  Ittersum et al. (2007)
*COO: Country of Origin; **Elicitation Method: based on real (R) or hypothetical (H) purchase 
*** Class 1.8. Other products of Annex I of the Treaty (spices etc.)
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olive oil, respectively). The rest (22 products) of the sample’s products is registered as PDO. 
Moreover, for PDO products there exist estimations based on both real (based on market data) and 
hypothetical purchase. For PGI only hypothetical WTP is available. Furthermore, taking into 
consideration how many years after the registration the study was conducted, there is an 
inconsistency between PDO and PGI, again. While in case of PDO the average time lag between the 
registration and the study is 7 years, the PGI Ternera Gallega (Galician veal) study has been 
conducted only one year after the registration, and the Toscano olive oil was examined 8 years after 
the registration, yielding an average 4.5 year time lag. Some time left after the registration is, 
however, required during which consumers develop their awareness and knowledge about EU GI 
products.   
In conclusion, although the bulk of empirical research on WTP provides many approaches on how to 
assess those possible differences of PDO and PGI, it does not support the reliable determination of 
whether consumers differentiate between these instruments.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This article investigates whether consumers distinguish between PDO and PGI. This is of high 
relevance since even after two revision phases the European Union further maintains the dual GI 
system despite its serious shortcomings. Generally, GIs should serve as a tool to dissolve the 
information asymmetry between producers and consumers as to the true origin of the products. Yet, 
PDO and PGI constitute quite divergent degrees of geographical anchorage. The EU system, however, 
does not require the provision of information in addition to the GI symbols and names, for instance, 
on the production stages within the geographical region. Thus, unless consumers recognize the 
precise qualitative differences between both instruments, there is a high risk of confusion as to the 
true origin of the products jeopardizing the information economic rationale behind the protection of 
GIs. 
The article addresses this question by integrating and synthesizing empirical findings related to 
consumers' awareness of and willingness to pay for PDO and PGI. Based on that, it shows that PDO 
and PGI are more or less similarly recognized among general consumers. It is, however, unclear 
whether they precisely understand the differences regarding the geographical embeddedness of PDO 
and PGI due to the lack of relevant studies. The state-of-the-art of research on WTP, for instance, 
delivers insights into very few product types of mostly agricultural countries with long traditions in 
origin labeling. Consumers of these countries could thus be more sensitive to origin labeling and thus 
reveal a biased perception, which does not necessarily hold if interpreted for the entire EU. In 
addition, it is methodologically quite difficult to clearly quantify the difference in WTP in case of real 
products irrespective inter alia of the product´s type, the sector in question, the production and 
marketing methods applied (Correa 2002). Consequently, research with hypothetical products of 
different types should be maintained in future research. Providing consumers with an explanation of 
PDO and PGI in advance could deliver evidence whether consumers value the same product with 
PDO differently than with PGI. Finally, there is a need for the promotion of the awareness of PDO and 
PGI per se and their relation to the region of origin. The existing practice of the EU, however, rather 
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promotes particular projects related to registered products, not to the recognition of the EU dual 
system per se.28 
Policy‐makers and producers must understand how the GI instruments are valued by consumers in 
order to be aware of their effectiveness in terms of solving information asymmetries. In case 
consumers do not recognize the differences between PDO and PGI, it renders even the strongest 
instrument, the PDO, ineffective in its capability to provide better opportunities for economic 
success. Unfortunately, the existing empirical evidence is insufficient to draw a conclusion on 
whether consumers distinguish between these quality labels. Thus, it still remains unknown whether 
the existence of two GI instruments is economically justified.  
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 Recently the EU approved again a € 27,15 million EU support for the promotion of particular agricultural 
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COOPERATION PREFERENCES IN THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 
– AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 
 
 







Recent literature on social identity demonstrates that social preferences vary depending on the 
social environment. Experimental research by Chen and Li (2009), for instance, shows that when 
interacting with individuals of a common identity subjects reveal a significantly higher degree of 
positive reciprocity than when interacting with individuals of different identities. Additionally, they 
are more likely to make social welfare maximizing choices. Although having immediate relevance for 
the provision of public goods, this relationship has not been experimentally analyzed, so far. 
Consequently, we ask whether subjects hold differing cooperation preferences in the provision of 
public goods under the institution of social identity, making salient the persons’ identity with which 
an individual interacts. To this purpose, we induce social identity in the laboratory by having subjects 
solve a simple group identity task with anonymous communication via chat. The experiment features 
a within-subject design that is based on one-shot public good games using the strategy method, 
which is an often used method for the elicitation of cooperation preferences.1 Three matching 
protocols are in effect: in-group matching, when subjects interact with individuals of their own 
identity; out-group matching, when groups are composed of subjects of different identities and 
random matching, in which no identity is induced, serving as a control.  
Our results clearly show that cooperation preferences in public good provision vary depending on the 
social environment. In particular, we find that when matched with individuals of a common identity, 
subjects consistently show the preference for higher levels of conditional cooperation and thus less 
self-serving bias than when interacting with individuals that are perceived to belong to different 
identities. What is more, we identify an elevated propensity to be a free-rider when being matched 
with individuals of a different identity than in in-group matching. These findings have direct 
relevance for positive predictions of policy effects. Social identity systematically activates different 
preferences to cooperate with one-another which directly influences social welfare. It is thus 
reasonable to devise institutions that stress the belonging to the group providing a public good. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
cooperation preferences in public goods provision as well as on social identity and formulates the 
research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the experimental design, which is followed by a detailed 
presentation of our results. The article concludes in section 5 and derives implications for economic 
policy.  
2 State of Research and Hypotheses 
2.1 Literature Review 
Cooperation preferences in public goods provision were first empirically analyzed by Fischbacher et 
al. (2001). Using a variant of the strategy method (Selten, 1967) in a one-shot public good game the 
authors elicited subjects’ contributions as a function of the average contributions of their group 
members. The authors find that 50 percent of the subjects can be classified as conditional co-
operators, i.e. subjects whose contributions are positively correlated with the level of others’ 
                                                             
1 Obviously, preferences do not lend themselves to direct measurement. We are aware of the fact that all the strategy 
method may enable us is to observe subjects’ responses to other subjects’ hypothetical behavior and to measure 
cooperation strategies. However, these allow for an approximation of actual cooperation preferences (cf. Volk et al., 2012). 
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average contributions, and 30 percent as free riders.2 Similar findings were reported in various 
replication studies, reviewed by Chaudhuri (2011).  
While free-riding is best explained by assuming individuals maximize their own utility instead of the 
groups’ utility based on purely selfish preferences, conditional cooperation may be understood best 
as social preference for positive reciprocity (cf. Falk, 2003, p. 147).3 As per Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2002, p. C3-C4) a positive reciprocal individual “[…] responds to actions that are perceived to be kind 
in a kind manner […]”. In that sense, conditional cooperators perceive high contributions of their 
remaining group members to be a kind action and reciprocate this kindness by high own 
contributions. It is to be noted, however, that even conditional cooperators show a self-serving bias 
to some extent since on average they do not reciprocate their team members’ contributions by an 
equal own contribution (perfect conditional cooperation), but depart in the selfish direction. This has 
direct bearing on the amount of public good provided, especially in long term interactions. 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), for instance, argue that the self-serving bias alone may be 
responsible for decaying public good contributions in the long run.4 
To which extent these heterogeneous cooperation preferences differ between institutional settings, 
has merely received little academic attention, so far. Existing studies typically compare individuals’ 
decisions in different games or variants of the same game (cf. Blanco et al., 2011). Yet, to the best of 
our knowledge in case of public goods provision there exists no study that specifically examines 
differences in cooperation preferences in relation to social identity. 
The origin of experimental economic research on social identity defined as “[…] a person’s sense of 
self derived from perceived membership in social groups” (Chen and Li, 2009, p. 431), lays in the 
social identity theory pioneered by Tajfel and Turner (1979). This theory was developed in order to 
establish the psychological foundations of discriminatory behavior and comprises three components 
– categorization, identification and comparison. Categorization denotes the apparently quick process 
of placing individuals including oneself into certain social categories such as religious, ethnic or other 
groups. The second process, identification, characterizes the process by which individuals associate 
themselves with certain groups – the in-group(s). Conversely, out-groups are social groups that an 
individual does not identify with. In the last process of social comparison individuals start to compare 
their in-group with the out-group, which generally leads to in-group favoritism and out-group 
discrimination (cf. Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Chen and Li, 2009; Hoff and Pandey, 2006).5 This 
phenomenon, termed as in-group bias, is increasingly attributed to the different expectations on the 
behavior of in-group as opposed to out-group members (cf. Yamagishi et al., 1999; Yamagishi and 
Kiyonari, 2000; Jackson, 2011; Ioannou et al., 2012).  
                                                             
2 The remaining types are either “hump-shaped cooperators”, i.e. individual whose contributions are positively correlated 
with the average of the others up to a maximum and then decline again, or belong to the class “others”. 
3 Conditional cooperation may as well be explained by the social preference for inequity aversion, as modeled by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Nevertheless, in this article we will proceed by referring to positive 
reciprocity. 
4 Additionally, the heterogeneity of cooperation types may explain decaying contributions to public goods as well. In the 
course of repeated interactions, conditional cooperators may get increasingly frustrated by interacting with individuals that 
are free-riding on their contributions and react with lower own contributions, as well (Burlando and Guala, 2005). 
5
 See Chen and Li (2009) for a detailed account on theoretical and empirical findings on social identity theory. 
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Studies outside the public goods environment show furthermore that social identity positively 
influences social welfare when individuals interact with in-group matches as opposed to random6 
and/or out-group matching. These findings thus provide a hint that in case of public good provision 
subjects may exhibit a stronger preference for cooperation, as well. Firstly, studying the effects of 
social identity on social preferences in dictator and two-person response games, Chen and Li (2009) 
find that group identity has a significant positive effect on the likelihood of social welfare maximizing 
choices. The authors consequently predict that “in games with a unique Pareto-efficient outcome, 
people with salient group identities are more likely to choose cooperation when matched with an in-
group member” (Chen and Li, 2009, p. 447). Next, employing a two-player coordination game with 
induced social identity Charness et al. (2007) equally find that a salient group identity may enhance 
social welfare, depending on the institutional structure. They manipulate the saliency of group 
membership by varying whether the decision maker’s group is present when decisions are made, 
whether feedback is given about the outcome of the game and whether there is payoff dependence. 
Similarly, McLeish and Oxoby (2007), verify that individuals show higher cooperation with in-group 
than with out-group matches, measured by the offers extended by the proposer in a two person 
response experiment with induced social identity. Making use of real identification with Swiss army 
platoons, Goette et al. (2006) similarly identify greater cooperation in a prisoners’ dilemma game 
when individuals are matched with members of their own platoon. Lastly, Chen and Chen (2011) 
detect that in in-group matching individuals coordinate to the socially efficient high effort 
equilibrium in minimum-effort games. All in all, these findings demonstrate that social identity 
renders individuals more likely to strive for social welfare when matched with in-group members.  
What is more, two studies establish a direct connection between social identity and the preference 
for conditional cooperation, by revealing that social identity impacts on subjects’ preferences for 
positive reciprocity. Firstly, based on the results of a series of two-person response games in a 
within-subject design, Chen and Li (2009) find that when matched with in-group members individuals 
reward perceived “good behavior” to a higher extent than when matched with out-group members. 
Specifically, individuals exhibit a significant 19 percent increase in positive reciprocity (Chen and Li, 
2009, p. 445).7 Secondly, relying on a between-subject design and a similar game setting Currarini 
and Mengel (2012) report a 34 percent higher positive reciprocity in in-group matching. Since 
positive reciprocity is the theoretical foundation for conditional cooperation, we similarly expect 
social identity to impact on subjects’ preferences for conditional cooperation in public goods 
provision by increasing the amounts individuals reciprocate to the rest of the group given their 
alternative average contributions.  
At the moment, however, there are only two studies focusing on how social identity impacts on 
public goods provision (Solow and Kirkwood, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2005). Yet, neither of them 
specifically allows drawing conclusion on its impact on cooperation preferences. Most insights can be 
gained from Eckel and Grossman (2005), who employ different treatments designed to induce 
increasing strengths of identity. The authors find that enhanced team identification yields 
consistently higher cooperation levels indicating less free-riding in general. Unfortunately, the 
                                                             
6 In random matching subjects interact with others that are not perceived to belong to any particular identity.  
7
 Additionally, subjects are significantly more forgiving for “bad behavior”, i.e. they exhibit less negative reciprocity (Chen 
and Li, 2009, p. 445). 
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authors analyze aggregate data only making it impossible to elicit whether increased contributions 
are due to differences in conditional cooperation or for instance because free-riders adjust their 
behavior. 
2.2 Research Hypotheses 
Based on the current state of literature we formulate the following research hypothesis. Drawing on 
Chen and Li (2009), subjects exhibit the preference for higher degrees of positive reciprocity in in- 
than in out-group matching. Consequently, we expect in-group matches to reciprocate others’ 
average contributions to a higher degree than out-group matches.  
HYPOTHESIS 1A:  When matched with in-group members, subjects reveal the preference for higher 
levels of conditional cooperation than in out-group matching. 
A matching of subjects at random, without identity influence, nevertheless creates a general feeling 
of belonging together, since individuals interact with others that are perceived as “group members”. 
This feeling might be less strong than between in-group matches where subjects saliently belong to 
their own identity. Yet, it might be stronger than in out-group matching, because here subjects 
saliently belong to different identities (cf. Chen and Chen, 2011), which often leads to out-group 
discrimination (see Section 2.1). Therefore: 
HYPOTHESIS 1B:  When subjects are matched randomly, they will reveal the preference for less 
conditional cooperation than when matched with in-group members. 
HYPOTHESIS 1C:  When subjects are matched randomly, they will reveal the preference for more 
conditional cooperation than when matched with out-group members. 
Depending on the strength of the identity effect on conditional cooperation, individuals might exhibit 
different propensities to be a certain cooperation type. Therefore: 
HYPOTHESIS 2A:  When matched with in-group members, subjects show a higher propensity to be a 
conditional cooperator and a lower propensity to be a free-rider than in out-group 
matching. 
HYPOTHESIS 2B:  In-group matching yields a higher relative share of conditional cooperators than 
out-group matching. Similarly, there will be less free-rider in in- than in out-group 
matching. 
3 Experimental Design 
Our experiment follows a within-subject design and is based on a public good game in strategy 
method (cf. Fischbacher et al., 2001). Generally, groups comprised three subjects each possessing 20 
points that could be invested either in their private account (20 - gi) or into a project, symbolizing the 
public good. The payoffs associated with this decision were given by the following formula: 
3
1




     
Accordingly, it is individually more beneficial to invest into the private account, because it returns 1 
point for each point invested instead of 0.4 points returned by the project. Basically, subjects had to 
make two decisions, an unconditional and a conditional contribution to the public good. Their 
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unconditional contribution was simply the decision of how many of their 20 points they would like to 
invest in the public good. Here, they were asked to state what they expect the remaining group 
members will invest unconditionally, as well. For their conditional contribution subjects were asked 
to fill out a contribution table consisting of 21 entries for which they had to decide how much they 
would invest if their group members invested on average (round to the next higher integer value) 0-
20 points in the public good. After both decisions were taken, a random mechanism8 chose one 
group member that was to contribute according to her conditional contribution decision. The 
remaining two group members contributed according to their unconditional contributions.  
The experimental design consisted of four stages in which subjects played the public good game in 
three different matching protocols (see Table 1). Please note that in each matching the game was 
played only once in order to directly conclude on subjects’ cooperation preferences, ruling out any 
strategic or reputational motivations that might be prevalent in long term interactions with stable 
group membership (cf. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).9  
 
Stage Identity (ID) Treatments Control Treatments 
1 Random Matching Random Matching 













Table 1 – The Experimental Design 
In stage 1 the public good game was played with subjects being randomly assigned to different 
groups (random matching). In stage 2 we induced a strong form of social identity based on insights of 
Eckel and Grossman (2005) and Chen and Li (2009) using a design pioneered by Ibañez and 
Schaffland (2012). We randomly assigned subjects to different groups with each group having been 
given a different color. These groups were then given a joint problem solving task in order to create a 
positive group experience (Eckel and Grossman, 2005). Given 10 minutes time, subjects had to jointly 
find hidden objects in a picture and report coordinates of their location (row and column).10 To this 
purpose, subjects could discuss solutions with their group members via an online chat tool. In order 
to elevate subjects’ propensity to coordinate and to render this task a true group exercise, our 
instructions explicitly stated that answers would only count as correct should each group member 
enter them correctly. The task was played as a tournament in which the group with the highest 
number of objects found won. In order to prevent negative associations from not winning this task, 
only the winning team received a congratulation message at the end of the experimental session. 
The remaining teams were not provided with information about their results and position relative to 
                                                             
8 A dice was thrown by one participant in a session that determined the respective group member. 
9 We are aware that the strategy method could be demanding and that subject could be confused making their initial 
decisions. Yet, since we mainly analyze stage 3 and 4 we are confident that confusion was reduced to a minimum. 
10
 Please see Appendix 6 for the instructions used in this experiment. 
69 
 
the other groups. Lastly, there were no monetary incentives for winning this game avoiding any 
income effects. 
In the following two stages (3 and 4) subjects were matched with individuals belonging to the same 
group that solved the identity task (in-group matching, stage 3 or 4) as well as with subjects 
belonging to different identities (out-group matching, stage 4 or 3). The individuals’ identities were 
made salient by indicating the color of their group. In out-group matching for instance subjects thus 
saw that they interacted with two individuals of different color groups (blue, red and green, for 
instance). We switched the order of playing in-group and out-group matching to control for possible 
sequence effects. In order to compare in- and out-group with random matching accounting for the 
stages when decisions are made, we carried out control treatment, in which subjects played three 
times the one-shot public good game in random matching. 
Since the instructions were handed in successively, subjects learned the matching procedure only 
during the experiment. Additionally, any information on payoffs was only revealed after the 
experiment’s last stage. In case of the ID-treatments random matching was always played in stage 1 
followed by the induction of social identity. Its main purpose is to identify player types without any 
identity influence, as done by Fischbacher et al. (2001), for instance, and to analyze their behavior in 
our ID-treatments. Please note that due to the different time stages our design does not allow a 
coherent comparison of decisions taken in in- or out-group matching with random matching of the 
ID-treatments. To this purpose we ran the control treatments.  
The experiment was carried out in the Göttingen Laboratory of Experimental Economics (GLOBE) at 
the University of Göttingen from October 2011 to January 2012 using the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). We observed decisions of 135 subjects in ID-treatments and 42 subjects in 
control treatments. The sessions took approximately 1.5 hours and the subjects earned 14€ on 
average including a show-up fee of 2.50 €. 
4 Results 
4.1 Social Identity and the Level of Conditional Cooperation 
4.1.1 Conditional Cooperation in In-Group and Out-Group Matching 
Containing the core result of our analysis, Figure 1 depicts a comparison of subjects’ average 
conditional cooperation in the ID-treatments. In line with recent literature, using a within-subject 
analysis we find that across the whole range of others’ contribution (0-20) subjects in in-group 
matching are willing to contribute on average more to the public good than in out-group matching. 
Applying a fixed-effects panel regression using in-group matching as the base category and 
controlling for initial decisions in Stage 1 reveals that this difference is significant and amounts to 
approximately 0.48 points (Table 2, Model 1).11 Moreover, it tends to be robust to the order of the 
ID-treatments (Models 2 and 3). Accordingly, when subjects are matched with individuals of their 
own identity, they show the preference for reciprocating their group members’ contribution by 
                                                             
11 The form of social identity that we induce in this experiment is still weak compared to social identity existing in real life, 
such family bonds or religious identification. Consequently, the rather small differences observed here provide a hint that 
real social identities invoke much stronger preference differences. 
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higher own contributions. Conversely, interacting with individuals of different identities triggers 
preferences for lower levels of conditional cooperation. 
 
Figure 1 – The Degree of Conditional Cooperation in In- and Out-Group Matching (all subjects) 
 
 
Table 2 – The Effect of ID-Matchings on Conditional Cooperation (Fixed Effects Panel Regression) 
 
RESULT 1:  The level of conditional cooperation is consistently and significantly higher when subjects 
















































Fixed Effects Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Subjects All Subjects All Subjects FRs CCs OT
In-Group First Out-Group First
Random Matching (Stage 1) 0.0511 -0.2664 0.3831 -1.0714* 0.1533 0.5357
(0.230) (0.306) (0.343) (0.571) (0.282) (0.524)
Out-Group Matching -0.4801** -0.6453* -0.3074** -0.6405* -0.5419* -0.1735
(0.192) (0.351) (0.143) (0.327) (0.278) (0.244)
Group Average 0.5303*** 0.5017*** 0.5602*** 0.0506* 0.7891*** 0.0687
(0.038) (0.052) (0.057) (0.029) (0.032) (0.051)
Constant 0.6900* 0.7948 0.5804 0.5656*** -0.0995 3.2318***
(0.394) (0.558) (0.553) (0.129) (0.359) (0.468)
Observations 8,505 4,347 4,158 1,260 5,481 1,764
R-squared 0.445 0.433 0.460 0.095 0.725 0.022
Number of n 135 69 66 20 87 28
Model
Dependent Variable: Conditional Contributions
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses, FR=Free-Rider, CC=Conditional Cooperator, OT=Others; 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Differences in cooperation preferences between in-group and out-group matches are not only 
identifiable when looking at all subjects, but also when scrutinizing the behavior of individual 
cooperation types. To this purpose, we used the contribution table entries of stage 1 (free of social 
identity influences) to classify subjects as conditional cooperators and free-riders12 and observed 
their behavior in the ID-treatments. As to be seen in Figure 2, in both ID-treatments free-riders on 
average depart from full free-riding. When matched with out-group members their average own 
contribution always remains below 1 point. Free-riders in in-group matching, however, reciprocate 
their group members’ cooperation to a significantly higher degree (Model 4), which tends to increase 
with the level of others’ cooperativeness. In full, this difference amounts to approximately 0.64 
points. Consequently, even those subjects that exhibit purely selfish preferences turn to be more 
cooperative when interacting with individuals of their own identity than in out-group matching. 
Similarly, conditional cooperators reciprocate their in-group members’ contribution to a significantly 
higher degree than when matched with out-group members (Model 5). This pattern holds for all 
levels of group members’ contributions and overall amounts to approximately 0.54 points. 
 
Figure 2 – The Degree of Conditional Cooperation of Free-Riders (FRs) and Conditional Cooperators 
(CCs) in In- and Out-Group Matching 
 
RESULT 2:  Free-riders and conditional cooperators are prone to show a preference for higher levels 
of conditional cooperation in in-group than in out-group matching. 
 
All in all, we conclude that research hypothesis 1A cannot be rejected. Our results clearly indicate 
that when matched with individuals of a common identity, subjects reveal the preference for 
                                                             
12 We defined conditional cooperators as subjects who exhibit a positive significant Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
(p<0.01) between own conditional contributions and others’ average contributions. Subjects were classified as free-riders if 





















































stronger forms of conditional cooperation and thus less self-serving bias than when matched with 
individuals of saliently different identities. These individuals will thus contribute more to the public 
good at a given level of (expected) contributions of their group members, leading to a higher social 
welfare.13 Accordingly, social identity can be a determining factor for cooperation in public goods, 
since it influences subjects’ preferences for conditional cooperation. 
4.1.2 Conditional Cooperation in ID-Matchings and in Random Matching of the Control 
Treatments 
For comparing cooperation preferences in both ID-matching protocols with random matching, we 
revert to the stages when decisions are taken, separately.14 This necessitates switching from within- 
to across-subject analyses using the random matching decisions of the control treatments in stages 3 
and 4. Yet, in order to keep as much within-information as possible, we analyze how subjects – in 
their relative treatments – adjusted their conditional cooperation strategy compared to the 
preceding stage that contained a public goods game (stage 1 and 3, respectively). Comparing these 
changes allows drawing conclusion regarding differences in conditional cooperation between the 
treatments. The following two graphs depict how subjects adjusted their cooperation strategy in 
stage 3 as opposed to stage 1 (Figure 3) and in stage 4 compared to stage 3 (Figure 4). In addition, 
Table 3 reports the results of an according OLS regression that tests for differences between 
treatments and uses in-group matching as the base category. 
In both decision stages we find that when subjects are matched with in-group members, they 
consistently exhibit higher changes in conditional cooperation compared to the benchmark stage 
than when randomly matched. The differences between both treatments are more pronounced in 
stage 3, with approximately 1.27 point, than in stage 4 (0.70 points). Yet, in both stages they are 
highly significant (see Table 3, Model 1 and 2). We thus conclude that hypothesis 1B cannot be 
rejected. Individuals, who interact with group members sharing the same identity, show preferences 
for higher levels of conditional contributions than in case of random matching. 
 
 
                                                             
13 This is supported by our findings on the level of unconditional contributions to the public good. In in-group matching 
subjects contribute significantly more points than in out-group matching (on average 6.92 and 6.07, respectively, z = 
16.934, p= 0.000, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This holds true no matter if in-group or out-group matching is played first. In-
group first yields: 6.81 (in) and 5.83 (out), z = 8.911, p=0.000, Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Out-group matching first yields: 
7.03 (in) and 6.32 (out), z = 15.422, p=0.000, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). 
14 When analyzing subjects behavior in the control treatments, we find consistently falling conditional contributions in each 
decision stages (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p1-3=0.000, p1-4=0.000, p3-4=0.000, subscripts denote decision stages). This 
highlights that in- and out-group matching may only be meaningfully compared with random matching if it takes place in 
identical decision stages. We thus use the random matching decisions of the control treatments in stage 3 and 4, to 




Figure 3 – Average Change in Conditional Contribution of Stage 3 compared to Stage 1  
 
 
Figure 4 – Average Change in Conditional Contribution of Stage 4 compared to Stage 3  
 
 































































































Dep. Var.: Change in (1) (2)







Out-Group - Random = 0 p=0.6266 p=0.5411
Observations 3,717 3,717
R-squared 0.018 0.020
Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by individuals




RESULT 3:  When matched with in-group members, subjects consistently show a preference for 
higher levels of conditional cooperation than in random matching. 
When subjects are matched with out-group members, average changes in conditional cooperation in 
Stage 3 (compared to stage 1) tend to be higher than in random matching for most of the range of 
group members’ contributions. In contrast, in stage 4 (compared to stage 3) they are mostly lower.  
Importantly though, in neither period are those differences significant (Table 3, Model 1 and 2). We 
thus conclude that there is no consistent difference between preferences for conditional cooperation 
in random and out-group matching. Consequently, we reject hypothesis 1C, which derives that the 
level of conditional cooperation should be consistently lower in out-group than in random matching. 
RESULT 4:  The level of conditional cooperation in out-group and random matching is not 
consistently different. 
Lastly, this analysis reveals significantly higher changes in conditional cooperation in case of in-group 
compared to out-group matching for both decision stages (Table 3, Model 1 and 2). This effectively 
reinforces the results of the previous section. 
RESULT 5: The difference in cooperation preferences between subjects matched with in-group and 
out-group members is consistently identifiable across subjects, as well. 
4.2 Social Identity and Cooperation Types 
In order to deepen our knowledge about cooperation type stability, we analyze whether and how 
subjects switched cooperation type when matched with in- and out-group members. Overall, the 
relative share of conditional cooperators, free-riders and others15 in random matching of stage 1, in-
group and out-group matching is in line with the literature. Conditional cooperators form the most 
common type (63 percent), followed by free-riders (approximately 19 percent) and others 
(approximately 18 percent) and no significant treatment effects on type distribution can be found.16 
Consequently, we have to reject hypothesis 2B, which derives that in-group matching ought to yield 
higher shares of conditional cooperators and lower shares of free-riders. Thus, social identity as we 
have induced in the experiment does not affect the aggregate distribution of cooperation types.   
RESULT 6:  The distribution of cooperation types is relatively stable across all treatments. 
Looking at the changes in cooperation types at individual level, Table 4 contains the nine possible 
combinations, which are expressed in actual frequencies (upper number) and frequencies that are 
expected to occur by chance alone (lower number). Both numbers represent the shares of total 
participants taking part in the ID-treatments (135).17 In terms of actual frequencies there is a rather 
high stability of cooperation types. 88.2 percent of all subjects did not change their cooperation type 
                                                             
15 The category “others” subsumes all subjects of which there were too few to be included as a separate category, such as 
hump-shaped and unconditional cooperators. 
16 We tested for statistical differences using a chi-square test. Usually, it is only applicable for independent observations, 
which is why we simulated a test statistic distribution using the relative share of cooperation types observed in the control 
treatments. This non-significant result is robust to various ways of testing, for instance analyzing treatment sequences 
independently or comparing the ID-treatments with control treatments. 
17 Please note that we deliberately did not include random matching of stage 1 into this analysis, firstly because we are 
mainly interested in type shifts between the ID-treatments, yet also since random and ID matching never take place in 
identical decision stages.  
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in response to whom they were matched with – in both treatments 58.5 percent were conditional 
cooperators, 15.6 percent remained to be free-riders and 14.1 percent stayed in the “other” 
category. Using Cohen’s Kappa as a measure of stability, automatically correcting for frequencies that 
are expected to occur by chance alone, we confirm that there is a very high overall stability of 
cooperation types, no matter how subjects are matched.18 Nevertheless, the kappa score is 
statistically different from perfect agreement (κ=1), so that we cannot rule out completely that shifts 
take place. Indeed, 5.2 percent of subjects switched from being in-group conditional cooperators to 
free-riders in out-group matching. In comparison, only 0.7 percent of subjects switched from out-
group conditional cooperator status to being a free-rider in in-group matching. Though merely 
weakly significant (p=0.0730), a sign test for matched pairs confirms that when matched with 
individuals that do not belong to their own identity, subjects are more likely to choose to free-ride on 
the contributions of others.19 In contrast, we do not find an even marginally significant difference in 
the propensity to be a conditional cooperator in the different treatments. Hence, we have to partially 
reject hypothesis 2A according to which subjects show a higher propensity to be a conditional 
cooperator in in-group than in out-group matching, as well. 
RESULT 7:  While the individual propensity to be a conditional cooperator is stable no matter how 
subjects are matched, there is a marginally increased probability to be a free-rider when 
subjects are matched with out-group members compared to in-group matching. 
 
Table 4 – Combinations of Cooperation Types in In- and Out-Group Matching as Share of Total Sample 
Size (135). Upper (Lower) Numbers Denote the Observed (Expected) Frequency of Being Conditional 
Cooperator (CC), Free-Rider (FR), Other (OT) 
Summing up, although there is an increased propensity to be a free-rider when matched with 
individuals of a different identity, we do not find strong evidence that social identity significantly 
impacts on cooperation types in global. Yet, this is not totally surprising, since the common definition 
of conditional cooperators subsumes many different forms of contribution strategies. Hence, even if 
subjects’ degree of conditional cooperation drops considerably when going from in-group to out-
group matching, they may still be classified as conditional cooperators. Consequently, an analysis of 
types may only be secondary to finer grained analyses of the quality of conditional cooperation as 
demonstrated by the previous section. 
                                                             
18 κin,out = 0.779 (se= 0.0635, p=0.0000). See Landis and Koch (1977) for guidelines on the interpretation of Cohen’s Kappa. 
19 As a robustness check we ran a fixed effects conditional logit regression on the probability to be a free-rider in the 
different matching settings (standard errors clustered around n). Here, we similarly find that there is an increased likelihood 




















5 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This article contributes to the understanding of cooperation preferences in the provision of public 
goods by empirically analyzing whether these vary in decision situations involving salient identities of 
the subjects one interacts with. In line with recent literature on social identities’ effect on positive 
reciprocity (Chen and Li, 2009), our results indicate that cooperation preferences are indeed 
dependent on the social environment. Specifically, when matched with individuals of a common 
identity, subjects across all levels of their group members’ cooperativeness exhibit significantly 
higher levels of conditional cooperation and thus less self-serving bias than when matched with 
individuals of different identities. At a given level of (expected) contributions of their group 
members, subjects in identity homogeneous groups can thus be expected to contribute more to the 
public good than in identity heterogeneous groups. What is more, while individuals are equally likely 
to be conditional cooperators under both ID-treatments, we identify an elevated propensity for 
subjects to be a free-rider, when interacting within out-groups. Consequently, social identity seems 
to be a determining factor, which impacts on social welfare in the context of public goods provision 
by altering subjects’ preference for conditional cooperation. 
From a policy perspective these results are of importance. By means of positive belief management, 
economic policy already tries to exploit that most people are willing to cooperate if others do so, as 
well. Yet, this mainly addresses conditional cooperators. Still not having any indication how purely 
selfish people react to this institution, we provide evidence that not only conditional cooperators´ 
but also free-riders´ affinity for cooperation can be systematically increased simply by mitigating 
one´s perceived feeling of belonging to the group one interacts with. In order to enhance the 
provision of public goods, social identity thus seems to be an effective tool, in addition to the 





6 Appendix – Instructions to the Experiment20 
Welcome to the experiment! Thank you very much for your participation. 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you get the chance of winning money additional to 
the € 2.50, which you receive in any case. Your earnings will depend on your decisions and on those 
by the other players in your group. At the end of the experiment all sums of money, which you will 
have earned through your decisions, will be added and given to you personally and in cash. 
It is forbidden to speak during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. A 
member of our team will come to you and answer your question privately. 
We will be talking about points rather than Euros in the course of the experiment. Hence, your total 
income will be calculated in points in the first instance. The total number of points which you will 
achieve during the experiment will be converted in Euros at the end, using the following equation: 
1 point = 17 Cents. 
All participants will be divided in groups with 3 players each. Except for us, i.e. the conductors of the 
experiment, nobody will know who is in which group. All decisions will be made anonymously and 
your identity will neither be revealed during the experiment nor in public. 
Each task of the experiment has its own instructions, which you have to read step by step. While 
doing so, please consider the respective hints which will appear on the monitor. 
Please click on OK when you are ready. 
 
The Basic Decision Situation 
Later, you will be informed about the experiment’s procedure in detail. At this point, we would like 
to introduce the basic decision conditions you will face in this experiment. Some example exercises 
can be found subsequently.  
At each point in time, you will be a member of a group consisting of 3 players. In every task, you hold 
20 points. Your task is to decide whether you invest these 20 points in a private account or whether 
you want to invest them fully or partly in a project. Each point which you do not invest in a project 
will be automatically deposited on your private account. 
 
Your income from your private account: 
For each point which you deposit on your private account (and, therefore, you do not invest in the 
project), you will earn one point. Hence, a deposit of 20 points on your private account will produce 
an income of 20 points from your private account. If you, for instance, deposit 6 points on your 
private account, you will earn 6 points from this account. Nobody except you will earn anything from 
your private account. 
 
Your income from the project: 
All group members will profit equally from your contribution to the project. Vice versa, you profit 
from the investments by other group members. The income every member gets from the project is 
calculated as follows:  
 
Income from the project = (sum of all contributions to the project) x 0.4 
 
Should the sum of all contributions to the project be, for example, 30 points then you and all other 
group members gain (30 x 0.4) = 12 points each from the project. Should the sum of all contributions 
to the project be, for example, 10 points then you and all other group members gain (10 x 0.4) = 4 
points each from the project. 
 
                                                             
20
 Instructions in German are available upon request (Matthias.Lankau@wiwi.uni-goettingen.de). 
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Your total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and your income from the 
project. 
 
Income from the private account (= 20 – your contribution to the project) 




Please complete the following exercises. They do merely serve the purpose of familiarising you with 
the calculation of the different sorts of income, which may occur to you when making different 
decisions on the use of the 20 points starting capital. 
Please complete all the exercises and always report your full mathematical procedure. While 
calculating, you may use the calculator function on the monitor. When you are done, you have to 
enter your results in the computer. 
1. Each group member has 20 points at their disposal. Imagine that all three group members 
(including yourself) do not contribute anything to the project. 
a. What is your total income? ….. 
b. What is the total income of each of the other group members? ….. 
2. Each group member has 20 points at their disposal. You invest 20 points in the project. The other 
two group members also contribute 20 points to the project. 
a. What is your total income? ….. 
b. What is the total income of each of the other group members? ….. 
3. Each group member has 20 points at their disposal. The other two group members contribute 10 
points each (i.e., 20 points in total) to the project. 
a. What is your total income if you, additional to the 20 points, contribute 0 points to the 
project? 
b. What is your total income if you, additional to the 20 points, contribute 5 points to the 
project? 
c. What is your total income if you, additional to the 20 points, contribute 15 points to the 
project? 
4. Each group member has 20 points at their disposal. You contribute 7 points to the project. 
a. What is your total income if the other group members, additionally to your 7 points, 
contribute 1.5 points each, i.e., 3 points in total, to the project? 
b. What is your total income if the other group members, additionally to your 7 points, 
contribute 4 points each, i.e., 8 points in total, to the project? 
c. What is your total income if the other group members, additionally to your 7 points, 
contribute 9 points each, i.e., 18 points in total, to the project? 
 
First Task 
You are now the member of a group of three, which was put together randomly. 
The task contains the decision, which was described at the beginning and is only conducted once.  
As you know, you have 20 points at your disposal, which you can either invest in the project or 
deposit on your private account.  
In this task, every group member has to make two types of decisions, which we will term (1) the 
“unconditional” contribution to the project, or the (2) “conditional” contribution to the project (the 
contribution table), respectively.  
Both decisions are vital for your income from this task. So please make your decisions thoughtfully. 
Step 1: Your Unconditional Contribution to the Project 
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Please determine how many of your points you, without knowing the contributions of the other 
group members, want to invest in the project. Please enter this amount into the following computer 
screen: 
 
Please state what you expect each of the other two group members to contribute to the project 
(average amount of money they invest in the project). 
Once you have made both statements, please click on OK. 
 
 
Step 2: Your Conditional Contribution to the Project – the Contribution Table 
With your second decision you have to fill in a contribution table. In the contribution table you have 
to enter your contribution to the project for every possible average contribution (rounded up) of 
the other group members. Hence, you can, dependent on the average contribution of the others, 
determine your decision on your contribution. You will get a clear hint of what to do when you take a 






The numbers left to the boxes mark the possible average contributions, which the other members 
can make to the project. You just have to enter in each box how much you, under the condition that 
the others contribute the stated average amount, want to invest in the project. You have to make an 
entry in each box. 
For example, you have to enter how many points you want to invest in the project if the other group 
members contribute 0 points; how many points you invest if the others contribute 1, 2 or 3 points 
and so on and so forth. You can enter integral numbers ranging from 0 to 20 in each box. 
Once you have typed a number in each box, please click on OK. 
After all participants in the experiment made their decision on their conditional contribution and 
filled in the contribution table, one member of each group is selected at random. For these selected 
members only the contribution table is relevant for their decisions and payoff. For the other two 
group members, who were not selected by the random choice mechanism, only the unconditional 
contribution is relevant for their decisions and payoff. The average of both unconditional 
contributions by these two group members defines which contribution by the selected member shall 
be invested in the project. 
When you make the decision on your unconditional contribution and fill in the contribution table, 
you do of course not know if you will be picked at random. Hence, you have to make both decisions 
carefully, because both can become relevant for you. The following examples will explain the 
procedure: 
 
Example 1: You are selected by the random choice mechanism. Therefore, the contribution table is 
relevant for your payoff. For the other two group members the unconditional contributions are 
relevant. 
Let us assume that the other two group members invest 0 and 4 points in the project, which would 
mean an average contribution of two points. If you entered in the contribution chart that you would 
invest 1 point if the others averagely invested 2 points, then this would make a total contribution of 
0+4+1=5 points to the project. All group members would then earn 5 x 0.4 = 2 points from the 
project plus the respective incomes from their private accounts, in your case 20 - 1 = 19 points. Your 
income would then be 21 points. 
If you, however, stated that you would invest 16 points, if the others averagely invested 2 points, this 
would make a total investment of 0+4+16=20 points in the project. As a result, all group members 
would receive a payoff of 20 x 0.4 = 8 points plus the income from their private accounts, in your 
case 20 – 16 = 4 points. Your total income would then be 12 points. 
 
Example 2: You are not selected by the random choice mechanism. For you and another group 
member then your unconditional contribution to the project is the relevant decision. 
Let us assume that your unconditional contribution to the project is 16 points, the contribution by 
the other group member is 20 points. This makes an average contribution of 18 points to the project. 
Should the player who was selected by the random choice mechanism have stated that he or she 
would contribute 1 point to the project if the other group members averagely invested 18 points, 
then the total contribution to the project would be 16+20+1=37 points. All group members then 
would earn 37 x 0.4 = 14.8 points from the project additional to their respective income from their 
private accounts. In your case you would earn 20 – 16 = 4 points from your private account, which 
would then make a total income of 18.8 points. 
Should the selected group member have stated an investment of 19 points to the project if the 
others averagely invested 18 points, then the total contribution to the project would be 16 + 20 + 19 
= 55 points. Every group member would have a project income of 55 x 0.4 = 22 points plus their 






The Random Choice Mechanism 
At the beginning of this game each group member receives a number between 1 and 3. As you might 
remember, one participant, namely no. 8, was selected at the beginning of the experiment. This 
participant will dice a number between 1 and 6 after all participants decided on their unconditional 
contribution and filled in the contribution table. The numbers 1 and 2 stand for group member one, 3 
and 4 for group member two and 5 and 6 for member three. Participant no. 8 will enter these in the 
computer. In case no. 8 dices the numbers which correspond to your member number, the 
contribution table will be relevant for your decisions and payoff and for the other group members 
the unconditional contribution will be relevant. In any other case the unconditional contribution is 
relevant for you. 
Please click on OK once you have read and understood the instructions. 
 
Second Task 
Please note: Do not open the attached envelope before you are asked to do so! 
For the second task, you will be arbitrarily assigned a new group, which will be marked by a specific 
colour. 
Only those solutions which are given correctly by ALL THREE group members will be considered 
correct in this group task. 
During this task the group members are allowed to communicate with each other. By doing so, they 
can find a solution together. On the left hand side of the computer screen a chat box is positioned, 
which can be used for communication. Your conversation will be recorded. You have 10 minutes to 
solve the task. Only within this time span are you able to communicate with your team members. 
Please take into account that every group member has to type in the solutions which will have been 
found by your group. You have to click on OK before the 10 minutes have run out. The time left will 
be shown to you in the upper right hand corner of your screen. 
All participants will be shown a picture and a list of objects. The task is to find the hidden objects in 
the picture. The inscriptions on the left and the upper side give the numbers of the lines and 
columns. You are asked to insert this information in the boxes which will be shown on the right hand 
side of the screen. The first box refers to a line, the second to a column. An example for this exercise 
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The group which finds most of the objects in the 10 minutes time is the winner group. At the end of 
the experiment you will be informed whether you are a member of the winner group. In this case, 
you will receive a congratulation message. 
Please click on OK when you are ready. 
 
Third Task21 
This task corresponds to the first one. It is conducted only once.  
This time, however, you will only play together with members of your own group, with who you 
solved the picture puzzle in the second task. 
Again, you hold a deposit of 20 points. Please decide how many points you want to invest in the 
project and how many you want to put on your private account.  
This task also consists of two decisions, your (1) conditional contribution to the project and (2) the 
contribution table, with which you can make your decisions conditional on the other group members’ 
contributions. 
Please decide very carefully in both cases, for both the conditional contribution and your input into 
the contribution table are potentially relevant for the payoff. To determine the relevance of the 
decision, we will use the same random choice mechanism as before. 
When you are ready, please click on OK.  
 
                                                             
21 Three sessions of the experiment were played by matching subjects with in-group members in the third task and with 






This task corresponds to the first one. It is conducted only once.  
This time, however, you will only play together with members of different-coloured groups.  
Again, you hold a deposit of 20 points. Please decide how many points you want to invest in the 
project and how many you want to put on your private account.  
This task also consists of two decisions, your (1) conditional contribution to the project and (2) the 
contribution table, with which you can make your decisions conditional on the other group members’ 
contributions. 
Please decide very carefully in both cases, for both the conditional contribution and your input into 
the contribution table are potentially relevant for payoff. To determine the relevance of the decision, 
we will use the same random choice mechanism as before. 
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HOW PEER-PUNISHMENT AFFECTS COOPERATIVENESS IN HOMOGENEOUS AND 
HETEROGENEOUS GROUPS  
– A PUBLIC GOOD EXPERIMENT WITH SOCIAL IDENTITY 
 







When a public good is provided, the social optimum is reached if all group members bear the costs 
and contribute to its provision. However, since no one can be excluded from the benefits the public 
good generates there is a strong incentive for self-interested individuals to free-ride on their peers’ 
contributions. Although free-riding does not reveal itself as prominent a behavioral pattern as classic 
economic theory predicts, experimental evidence suggests that there is still a considerable lack in 
cooperativeness lowering social efficiency. Nevertheless, previous research showed that individuals 
have a proclivity to adjust their behavior depending on the institutional environment in which the 
public good is provided. In this respect, two factors are of crucial importance. Firstly, social identity of 
group members with whom individuals interact influences cooperation. Recently, Lankau et al. 
(2012) demonstrated that individuals reveal the preference for consistently higher conditional 
cooperation when matched with group members with a common identity (in-group matching) as 
opposed to being matched with individuals saliently belonging to different social groups (out-group 
matching) or randomly matched individuals. This in-group bias in the propensity to cooperate seems 
to be a deeply rooted phenomenon of human interactions (Eaton, Eswaran, and Oxoby 2011) and has 
been confirmed by numerous contributions both in psychological and economic experimental 
research (cf. for instance Taifel and Turner 1979; Chen and Li 2009). Secondly, it is a well-established 
phenomenon that the possibility of costly decentralized punishment by individual group members for 
uncooperative behavior strongly enhances cooperation (cf. Fehr and Gächter 2000; Masclet et al. 
2003). Clearly, both institutions impact on people’s cooperativeness and are thus highly relevant to 
the maintenance of common resources. However, their interaction in a public good environment did 
not receive any academic attention, so far. Consequently, the goal of this article is to provide initial 
evidence on subjects´ cooperativeness in the provision of public goods in case their social identity is 
salient and there is a possibility to punish group members for misbehavior. In particular, we ask how 
the institution of costly peer-punishment impacts subjects’ cooperativeness in homogeneous groups 
composed of members sharing a common social identity and in heterogeneous groups consisting of 
members of different identities. For this purpose, we artificially induce social identity with the help of 
a simple group task that subjects solve jointly by communicating anonymously via chat. Our 
experiment is based on one-shot public good games using the strategy method (Fischbacher, 
Gächter, and Fehr 2001; Selten 1967), which allows us to observe contributions to the public good 
conditional on every possible average contribution level of the remaining group members. It thus 
elicits subjects’ cooperativeness in more detail than unconditional contributions alone, and serves us 
as a preferred measure of cooperativeness. What is more, it enables us to classify subjects into 
different cooperation types depending on their initial cooperation strategy providing deeper insights 
into cooperative adjustments under different institutional settings.  
In summary, our findings provide hints that group composition in terms of individuals´ identity 
decisively influences to what extent subjects alter their cooperativeness under punishment 
compared to equal matching conditions that are free of peer-sanctions. In particular, we prove that 
subjects who are matched with out-group members increase their cooperativeness to the highest 
degree. Based on the example of free-riders we are able to show that this is predominantly caused 
by an anticipation of comparatively strong punishment for uncooperative behavior by group 




within in- and out-groups essentially revealing that peer-punishment eliminates the in-group bias 
that is present without peer-punishment.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 deals with the relevant literature and 
presents our hypotheses. While Section 3 introduces the experimental design, Section 4 discusses 
the relevant findings. The article ends with a conclusion in Section 5. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
When people face social dilemmas, individual interest is at odds with social interest. Thus, much 
theoretical and empirical research has been devoted to understand how to enhance voluntary 
contributions to public goods. Research in experimental economics demonstrated that social identity 
as “the individual's self-concept derived from perceived membership in social groups” (Charness, 
Rigotti, and Rustichini 2007, 1342) and also peer-punishment are prone to foster cooperativeness in 
the provision of public goods. 
To begin with, the experimental economic research on social identity is rooted in the social identity 
theory introduced by Tajfel and Turner (1979). The core element of this theory is the analysis of the 
psychological foundations of discriminatory behavior, which is determined through three processes. 
Accordingly, individuals relatively quickly sort themselves by certain social categories such as gender 
or race (categorization) and derive self-esteem from that (in-)group (identification). These processes 
are subsequently complemented by individuals comparing their in-group with out-groups they do not 
identify with (comparison). Taken together, these processes generally trigger in-group favoritism and 
thus out-group discrimination commonly referred to as in-group bias (cf. Tajfel and Turner 1986; Hoff 
and Pandey 2006).1 By now, there are several studies that focus on the effects of social identity on 
subjects’ cooperativeness in a public good context. Firstly, Eckel and Grossmann (2005) study the 
impact of team identification on cooperation in a repeated-play public good game with various 
degrees of enhanced team identification. The authors find that strengthening team identification 
(e.g., prior group task before the game, creation of in-group/out-group conflict) yields consistently 
higher cooperation levels and less free-riding. Secondly, Lankau et al. (2012) explicitly study the 
impact of social identity on cooperation preferences in public goods provision. Using the strategy 
method in multiple one-shot public good games, the authors confirm the existence of an in-group 
bias. Specifically, they find that when subjects interact with members of their own identity they show 
a consistently higher preference for conditional cooperation and thus less self-serving bias2 than 
when matched with out-group and random individuals. What is more, even the least socially oriented 
cooperation types, initially identified as free-riders, reveal higher levels of conditional cooperation in 
in-group matching. Other recent studies documenting subjects’ increased cooperativeness in 
providing public goods when bound together by a common identity include Blackwell and McKee 
(2013), Chakravarty and Fonseca (2012 and 2013). Similarly, various other experiments outside the 
public goods context demonstrate that social identity positively influences social welfare when 
individuals interact with in-group members as opposed to out-group members (cf. Chen and Li 2009; 
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 See Chen and Li (2009) for a detailed account on theoretical and empirical findings on social identity theory. 
2
 Subjects reveal self-serving bias when they do not reciprocate their team members’ contributions by an equal 




Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini 2007; McLeish and Oxoby 2011; Goette, Huffman, and Meier 2006; 
Chen and Chen 2011).3 In sum, the existing experimental research provides solid evidence that 
salient social identity in terms of group composition matters with regard to cooperativeness, and 
confirms the well-established in-group bias in human interactions.4 
The possibility of costly decentralized punishment by individual group members without central 
authority has been identified as an effective instrument to maintain cooperation in the provision of 
public goods, as well. Initially, Fehr and Gächter (2000) studied the punishment institution in an 
environment where both the offender and the punisher bear tangible costs of the penalties, though 
one punishment point costs the offender three times more than the punisher. Specifically, the 
authors conducted two treatments with and without punishment and distinguished between 
stranger5 and partner matching.6 In both settings without punishment constraints they found that 
contributions to the public good decreased over the ten periods approaching almost complete free-
riding. On the contrary, contribution levels steadily increased towards full cooperation under 
punishment in the partner matching condition.7 In another experiment Fehr and Gächter (2002) have 
identified similar tendencies for strangers, as well.8 Contribution levels increased under punishment, 
while they decreased when the opportunity to punish was removed. Likewise, Masclet et al. (2003) 
and Noussair and Tucker (2005) demonstrated that the fear of being punished drives subjects to 
increase their contribution to the public good. What is more, several other studies have replicated 
the experiments of Fehr and Gächter and by and large confirmed their findings (cf. Anderson and 
Putterman 2006; Bochet et al. 2006; Nikiforakis 2008; Page et al. 2005; Sefton et al. 2007). All in all, 
these findings confirm that costly peer-punishment motivates individuals to behave more 
cooperatively in long term interactions. 
However, the question of how costly punishment precisely affects cooperation when social identity is 
salient and subjects are interacting either in homogenous or heterogeneous groups, has not been 
examined in a one-shot public goods environment, yet.9 Using two-person bargaining games in 
between-subjects design, McLeish and Oxoby (2007) provide some insight on how these institutions 
simultaneously influence cooperation. The authors induced group identity by letting groups jointly 
solve a series of questions via face-to-face communication. Next, pairs were randomly matched and 
                                                             
 
3 For a detailed review of these studies, see Lankau et al. (2012). 
4 For further research on in-group favoritism see Hermann et al. (2012).  
5 Stranger matching meant a random group assignment in each period. 
6 The composition of the group was stable over the periods. 
7 Full cooperation was declared as a dominant behavioral standard regardless whether the punishment or the 
non-punishment treatment was conducted firstly. However, this behavioral norm was not found in the stranger 
treatment. 
8
 This experiment was designed identically to the previous experiment (Fehr and Gächter 2000) with the 
exception that punishment and non-punishment treatments were conducted only with strangers. In this study 
a subject could never meet another subject more than once during the game (perfect stranger matching). 
9
 The interaction of social identity and third-party punishment has been the focus of a few studies already. See 
for instance Goette et al. (2006; 2012). In contrast to our emphasis on peer-punishment, the punisher in these 
studies is an individual whom the violation does not affect economically (Goette, Huffman, and Meier 2012). 
Additionally, Weng and Carlsson (2013) study endowment heterogeneity, peer-punishment and social identity 
in a work team environment using public good games. However, they do not include a treatment for identity 




informed about the other’s group affiliation. After the proposer decided how much of his 
endowment to keep for himself and how much to allocate to the responder, in the punishment 
treatment the responder had the opportunity to engage in costly punishment by reducing the 
proposer´s income by 1.5 points for each point given. They demonstrated, first of all, that 
cooperation expressed by the level of offers extended both with and without punishment is higher 
within in-groups than in out-group matching. Secondly, they did not find significantly different 
cooperation levels between punishment and no-punishment treatments. This finding, however, 
contradicts previous research emphasizing that the threat of peer-punishment increases cooperation 
levels (see Fehr and Gächter 2000; 2002; Masclet et al. 2003 and Noussair and Tucker 2005). 
Summing up, these results provide only limited insights into two-person interactions. Evidently, they 
cannot be easily transferred to a public good environment involving groups of more than two 
persons. In contrast to two-person interactions investment in punishment constitutes a second order 
public good in group, because every group member benefits if an offender increases his cooperation 
due to received sanctions. Clearly, this entails incentives to free-ride on others’ costly sanctioning 
efforts. Consequently, these subjects form different expectations on the likelihood to be punished 
than subjects paired with just one person, which in turn influences their cooperativeness differently. 
As a result, we still lack evidence whether the hitherto reported effects of peer-punishment are valid 
and stable across groups, in which social identity is salient. This is, however, highly relevant since in 
real life most interactions are multilateral rather than bilateral.  
Based on previous findings, we formulate the following research hypotheses. As extracted from the 
literature on public good games, peer-punishment usually tends to influence cooperation positively. 
Thus, we hypothesize conservatively that peer-punishment uniformly increases cooperativeness 
independent of whether subjects are matched with in-group or out-group members. 
Hypothesis 1 (Punishment Effect Hypothesis): The threat of peer-punishment equally impacts 
subjects’ cooperativeness under social identity independent of group composition.  
What is more, research on social identity has shown that subjects’ cooperativeness is biased to their 
in-group members as opposed to out-group members. Consequently, in line with our Hypothesis 1 
we expect that when peer-punishment is present identity-homogeneous groups tend to show higher 
cooperation than heterogeneous ones. 
Hypothesis 2 (In-Group Bias Hypothesis): Under punishment-threat subjects reveal higher 
cooperativeness when matched with in-group members than in out-group matching.  
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
To test the hypotheses presented above, our experiment features both within- and between-subject 
design elements and contains two types of treatments (see Table 1). The no-punishment (NP) 





In the punishment (P) treatments we complement this public good game with monetary peer-
punishment relying on a design of Noussair and Tucker (2005). 10,11   
In total, the experiment consists of three stages (see Table 1). The participants of the experiment 
were assigned to groups comprising three subjects. In Stage A subjects were randomly assigned to 
groups (random matching) and played a one-shot public good game in strategy method without 
punishment – both in the P and the NP-treatments. Each group member was endowed with 20 
points, which could be invested either into a public good (ci), framed as a project or in their private 
account (20 - ci). The following formula (Formula 1) denotes the payoff function without punishment 
for each individual i:  
FORMULA 1:  
Payoff function without punishment 
 
Accordingly, it is more beneficial to contribute nothing to the project because every point invested 
returns only 0.4 points, while the private account yields exactly 1 point. Given 20 points endowment 
each, subjects were required to make two investment decisions, their unconditional and conditional 
contribution to the project. Hence, they were asked to decide how much of their endowment they 
would like to invest in the public good regardless of what the other group members contribute 
(unconditional contribution). Here, they were also asked for their expectations regarding the average 
unconditional contribution of the remaining group members. Next, subjects had to fill out a 
contribution table consisting of 21 entries asking them how much they would invest in the project if 
their two group members invested on average 0-20 points (conditional contribution).12 Afterwards, in 
order to render both decisions potentially payoff-relevant, a random mechanism13 chose one group 
member who had to contribute according to the conditional contribution decision. For the other two 
group members their unconditional contributions were thus applicable.  
The main purpose of Stage A was to elicit subjects’ initial cooperativeness independent of any 
identity or punishment influences, which facilitated analyses of treatment effects in later stages of 
the experiment. Furthermore, it helped classifying subjects based on their revealed cooperativeness 
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 Please note that the NP- and P-conditions originate from two independent experiments (see Lankau et al. 
2012 and Bicskei et al. 2013, respectively). The present paper merges both datasets in order to holistically 
analyze the effects of punishment on cooperation under social identity.  
11
 We are really grateful that C. Noussair and S. Tucker as well as U. Fischbacher have provided us with their 
experimental protocols. 
12
 Average investments of the other group members were rounded to the next higher integer value. 
13
 One participant in each session rolled a dice to determine the respective group member. This served the 




into free-riders and conditional cooperators14 (cf. Fischbacher et al. 2001; 2010; Burlando and Guala 
2005) allowing for a differentiated analysis of their behavioral adjustments in later stages. 
TABLE 1 
Experimental Design 







In-Group Matching (NP) 
Out-Group Matching (NP) 







In-Group Matching (P) 
Out-Group Matching (P) 
- Random Matching (P) 
 
Stage B contained the group task, which served the purpose to induce social identity within the 
laboratory. The design we used was introduced by Ibañez and Schaffland (2012) and is based on 
insights from Eckel and Grossman (2005) and Chen and Li (2009).15 The subjects were randomly 
reassigned to groups of different colors and they had to jointly find hidden objects in a picture and 
report their location given 10 minutes time. Group members were in connection via chat enabling 
them to communicate anonymously and discuss solutions with their group members. The answers 
were counted as correct only if each group member entered them correctly. This was a necessary 
step to foster coordination and render this task a true group exercise. The winning group was the 
one, which found the most objects. Since this task was intended to induce positive group experience 
(Eckel and Grossman 2005), only the winning team received a message of congratulation at the end 
of the experimental session.16 
In the NP-treatments of Stage C subjects played a public good game similar to Stage A. In the P-
treatments, after being informed how many points their group members contributed separately to 
the project, subjects had the possibility to distribute punishment points to each group member. 17 On 
the one hand, the distribution of punishment points was costly for the punisher (see Table 2). On the 
other hand, each punishment point distributed reduced this stage’s earning of the punished by 10%. 
If a group member received 10 or more points his income from that stage was reduced by 100%. In 
order to account for possible costs of this stage of the P-treatment, and also to avoid the possibility 
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 Technically, free-riders are those subjects that reveal a conditional contribution of zero independent of how 
much their group members contribute to the public good. Subjects are classified as conditional cooperators 
when showing a positive and significant (p<0.01) spearman rank-correlation coefficient between own 
conditional contributions to the public good and the average contributions of their group members. 
15
 We are thankful that M. Ibañez and E. Schaffland have provided us with the instructions to their identity 
game. Please see Appendix B for the instructions used in this experiment. 
16
 In order to avoid any income effects, there were no monetary incentives for winning this game. 
17





of monetary losses, subjects received a one-off lump-sum payment of 60 points in addition to the 
basic endowment of 20 points (see Formula 2). 
TABLE 2 
Punishment Points (Pik) and Cost of Punishment (K) 
 
FORMULA 2  
Payoff function with punishment 
 
In Stage C, following a between-subject approach three different matching protocols were in effect 
(see Table 1). On the one hand, subjects were either matched with members of their own identity, 
with whom they shared the same color when solving the group identity task in Stage B (in-group 
matching); or with members of different colors, thus three different identities (out-group matching). 
Both matching conditions are together referred to ID matchings. In order to make group identity 
salient, the color of an individuals’ group as well as the color of her group members was clearly 
indicated during the game both in in-group and out-group matching. On the other hand, we carried 
out a control treatment both in P- and NP-treatments, in which subjects were randomly assigned to a 
group (random matching) and played the same one-shot public good game as in the ID matching 
protocols, yet without participating in Stage B (see Table 1).  
The instructions were handed out successively, so that subjects learned the group assignment rule 
and whether they were in a P- or NP-treatment only at the relevant stage during the experiment. 
What is more, in the NP-treatments any information on contributions and payoffs was only revealed 
after the experiment’s last stage. The same holds true for the P-treatments with the exception that in 
Stage C subjects were provided with necessary information on the contribution behavior of their 
group members in order to be able to make decisions about punishment points. At the end of Stage 
C, all subjects received detailed information on the earnings of Stage A and C and the final payment 
including the 2.5 € show-up fee. Moreover, in the P-treatments, subjects were only informed about 
the total sum of punishment points they received, yet they did not learn which group member 
punished them exactly. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of a European university from October 2011 to July 
2012 using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We collected the decisions of 384 subjects18 from 
different faculties, specifically, 177 subjects participated in the NP- and 207 subjects in the  
                                                             
 




P-treatments.19 Depending on the number of participants per session, the amount of groups and thus 
the number of color identities ranged from 3-8 per session. Our subjects were recruited from 
volunteers of the ORSEE system of the university and at the university’s cafeteria. The sessions took 
approximately 1.5 hours and the subjects earned 15€ on average including the show-up fee. 
Effects of a punishment threat on cooperativeness under social identity 
At first, we investigate how the anticipation of peer-punishment affects subjects’ cooperativeness in 
different group compositions under social identity compared to a setting without such threat (NP-
treatment). Please note that although the basic decision situation of stage C was equally based on 
the 20 points endowment received in both P and NP-treatments, in contrast to the NP-treatment 
subjects in the P-treatment were given additional 60 points endowment in order to avoid bankruptcy 
(see section III). Consequently, differences in cooperativeness between the P and NP-treatments may 
be influenced by this lump-sum payment, as well. We assume, however, that this influence is equal 
independent of with whom subjects are matched. Given this assumption, any difference in the effect 
of punishment between the three matching conditions under social identity should then only be due 
to the effects of punishment in the respective matching. Therefore, our subsequent analyses focus 
on a difference-in-difference approach. 
In order to keep as much within-information as possible we analyze how subjects – in their 
respective treatments – adjusted their conditional contributions in Stage C as opposed to Stage A. 
Comparing these changes between the treatments allows drawing more precise conclusions 
regarding differences in cooperativeness than the analysis of behavioral strategies in the particular 
stages independently. 
To this purpose, Figure 1 depicts to what extent subjects adjusted their conditional contributions in 
Stage C as opposed to Stage A with and without punishment in the three matching protocols. When 
interacting with out-group members, punishment seems to induce the highest increase in 
cooperativeness amounting to almost 5 points at its peak (i.e., when the average contribution of the 
others is twenty). Especially, when matched with in-group members behavioral adjustments to 
punishment seem to be lower. Running a diff-in-diff analysis confirms that the increase in 
cooperativeness is significantly higher in out-group than in in-group matching (see Table 3, Model A, 
row 10).  
Comparing out-group with random matching reveals that the changes in cooperativeness are higher 
when interacting with out-group members. Yet, this difference is not significant. All in all, we thus 
have to reject Hypothesis 1. Our results clearly demonstrate that punishment has a differing effect 
on cooperativeness depending on group composition.20 
Result 1: Under the threat of peer-punishment subjects increase their cooperativeness 
significantly stronger when matched with individuals saliently belonging to different 
identities than with individuals of their own identity. 
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 Appendix A contains summary statistics providing details on the number of sessions and subjects per session. 





The Effects of Punishment on the Average Change in Conditional Contributions 
 
TABLE 3 
 The Impact of Punishment on Cooperativeness in Different Matching Conditions  
Linear Regression (OLS)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Change in Conditional Cooperation Row All Subjects CCs FRs Others No FRs
Punishment (P) 1 0.542* 0.475* 3.000 -0.387 0.318
(0.312) (0.269) (1.870) (0.837) (0.271)
OUT x P 2 1.012* 0.322 3.250 0.218 0.341
(0.523) (0.468) (2.254) (0.970) (0.434)
IN x P 3 0.705 0.287 1.056 1.400 0.506
(0.460) (0.463) (2.240) (1.001) (0.416)
No Punishment (NoP) 4 -1.008* -2.193*** 1.177 -0.179 -1.445**
(0.540) (0.720) (1.103) (0.888) (0.583)
OUT x NoP 5 0.317 1.468* -1.177 -0.959 0.631
(0.651) (0.831) (1.103) (1.567) (0.722)
IN x NoP 6 1.274** 2.365*** 0.537 -0.207 1.466**
(0.620) (0.825) (1.494) (0.919) (0.656)
IN: P - NoP 7 0.981* 0,589 2,342 1.400* 0.802*
OUT: P-NoP 8 2.244*** 1.522*** 6.25*** 0,97 1.473***
Control: P-NoP 9 1.550* 2.668*** 1,823 -0,207 1.764***
Diff-in-Diff Analyses OUT vs IN 10 1.264* 0,933 3.908* -0.431 0.670
OUT vs. Control 11 0,695 -1,145 4.427* -1,177 -0.290
IN vs. Control 12 -0,569 -2.078** 0,519 1,608 -0.960
Punishment IN - OUT 13 -0.306 -0.035 -2.194 1,183 0,165
(0.540) (0.538) (1.767) 0,736 0,462
No Punishment IN - OUT 14 0.957** 0.898 1.714* 0,752 0,835
(0.474) (0.578) (1.007) (1.312) (0.523)
Number of obs 8.064 5.334 1.134 1.596 6.930
R-squared 0.058 0.060 0.390 0.022 0.038
Note: standard errors clustered over individuals, Stat. Sign.: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Next, we ask how certain cooperation types with differing social attitudes adjust their 
cooperativeness. To do so, we classify subjects – based on their initially revealed cooperativeness in 
Stage A of the experiment – into free-riders (FR) and conditional cooperators (CC). While free-riders 
reveal purely selfish cooperation preferences, conditional cooperators tend to be motivated by a 
social preference based on positive reciprocity (cf. Falk 2003; Lankau et al. 2012). Consequently, the 
more their group members contribute to the public good, the higher their own contribution is in 
return. Yet, even conditional cooperators do not perfectly reciprocate their group members’ 
contributions and exhibit a certain self-serving bias by frequently contributing less to the public good 
than their group members (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001; Lankau, Bicskei, and Bizer 2012). 
Subjects, which fell into neither category, are termed “others”.21 Table 4 summarizes the distribution 
of those cooperation types.  
TABLE 4 
Frequency and Distribution of Cooperation Types in Stage A 
Cooperation Type Frequency Percent 
Free-Rider (FR) 54 14.06 
Conditional Cooperators (CC) 254 66.15 
Other 76 19.79 
Total 384 100 
 
Figure 2 and 3 show the impact of peer-punishment on free-riders’ and conditional cooperators’ 
cooperativeness in in-group, out-group and control treatments, respectively. We find, on the one 
hand, that independent of how free-riders are matched, peer-punishment increases their 
cooperativeness. The strongest behavioral adjustment is present when free-riders interact with out-
group members, which is significant at the 10 percent level (see Table 3, Model C, row 10). While 
they are not cooperative at all without the threat of peer-punishment, under punishment they are 
for instance willing to contribute 12 points on average to the public good if their group members 
contribute 20. When matched with in-group members or in random matching these differences are 
lower and merely amount to approximately 4 points on average. Indeed, the linear regression in 
Table 3 (Model C, row 10 and 11) confirms that the impact of punishment on free-riders’ 
cooperativeness in out-group matching is significantly stronger than in the in-group or control 
treatment.  
On the other hand, the punishment effect on conditional cooperators does not seem to be as 
pronounced as in case of free-riders (see Figure 3 and Table 3, Model B and C, row 7, 8). Moreover, 
we find that conditional cooperators reveal a very similar behavioral adjustment under punishment 
when matched with in-group and with out-group members (Table 3, Model B, row 10). 
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 In our analysis we neglect “others”, since their behavior subsumes many different cooperation patterns, 
which occur too infrequently to form separate categories. Such patterns are for instance characterized by 
hump-shaped cooperation, yet also by behavior not following any inherent logic. Clearly, treatment effects on 




Result 2: In ID matchings free-riders are prone to show stronger adjustments in 
cooperativeness in response to peer-punishment than conditional cooperators. It is 
strongest when matched with out-group members. 
FIGURE 2 
The Effects of Punishment on Average Changes in Conditional Contribution of Free-Riders 
 
FIGURE 3 
The Effects of Punishment on Average Changes in Conditional Contribution of  
Conditional Cooperators 
 
In order to explain this differential reaction to punishment, we argue, on the one hand, that socially 
oriented conditional cooperators voluntarily contribute to the public good so that the threat of 
punishment does not evoke a particularly strong increase in their cooperativeness. Purely self-
interested free-riders, on the other hand, strongly adjust their cooperation strategy under 
punishment due to the perceived threat of monetary losses following their uncooperative behavior. 
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Effects of Social Identity under Peer-Punishment-Threat 
After having established that peer punishment drives cooperativeness particularly in identity 
heterogeneous groups, we proceed by analyzing whether subject’s cooperativeness differs 
dependent on group composition when a punishment threat is present. Figure 4 depicts the average 
change in conditional cooperation between Stage C and A under punishment as influenced by the 
three group assignment conditions (left panel) contrasted by the corresponding cooperativeness 
without punishment (right panel). 
FIGURE 4 
ID Matchings Effects on Changes in Conditional Cooperation with and without Punishment 
 
 
Firstly, under punishment subjects seem to be similarly cooperative in in- and out-group matching 
(left panel). For low levels of others’ contribution to the public good they even contribute on average 
slightly more when matched with out-group members. On the whole, however, we do not find any 
significant difference in conditional cooperation between both ID treatments under punishment (see 
Table 3, Model A, row 13). This starkly contrasts the findings on subjects’ cooperativeness without 
punishment.22 In line with prior research on the effects of social identity on cooperation (cf. Chen 
and Li 2009; Eckel and Grossman 2005), subjects’ cooperativeness without punishment is significantly 
biased towards their in-group members (right panel, for regression result see Table 3, Model A, row 
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 One interesting reflection regarding our research design, pointed out to us by a commentator, is the fact that 
both ID-matching protocols entail a higher cooperativeness than the random matching protocol under 
punishment could be simply due the design of the control treatment. Specifically, it did not require subjects to 
take part in Stage B, so that missing the experience of solving the picture task explains the observed difference. 
Yet, if this was true we should observe similar differences between those treatments without punishment, as 
well. However, without punishment subjects in out-group matching reveal a similar cooperativeness as those of 
the control treatment (see Figure 4 and Table 3). Consequently, it is not the participation in Stage B but rather 


























































































































14).23 Consequently, we argue that the fear created by a punishment institution overrides the 
reluctance to cooperate with out-group members and renders individuals to be as cooperative as in 
in-group matching. Evidently, as summarized by Result 1, behavioral adjustments through 
punishment seem to be comparatively strongest when subjects are matched with out-group 
members. This is most likely due to an anticipation of higher punishment by individuals that do not 
belong to their own identity, which seems to be mainly driven by free-riders. They exhibit the highest 
increase in cooperativeness under punishment when matched with out-group members (Result 2). 
Indeed, when dropping free-riders from the regression analysis in  Table 3 (Model E, row 10), we no 
longer find a significant difference in punishments’ impact on subjects’ cooperativeness in in-group 
and out-group matching. 
Mild support for the claim that subjects fear comparably strong punishment by outsiders in response 
to antisocial behavior is given by considering their actual punishment behavior (see summary 
statistics in the Appendix A). Subjects in out-group matching distributed on average 2.34 punishment 
points to group members that contributed less than they did (non-spiteful punishment). In in-group 
and random matching non-spiteful punishment merely amounted to 1.51 and 2.25 points, 
respectively.24 Consequently, since members of identity heterogeneous groups tend to punish 
deviant behavior on average more severely than identity homogenous groups or randomly matched 
groups, it is not unreasonable to assume that subjects anticipate such reaction in response to 
unsocial behavior and adjust their cooperativeness accordingly.25  
Overall, since we no longer observe an in-group bias, we have to reject Hypothesis 2, as well. This 
result is inconsistent with McLeish and Oxoby (2007) who find in two-person interactions that both 
with and without punishment cooperation is higher in in-groups than in out-groups. However, they 
did not find any punishment effect on cooperation either. 
Result 3:  The presence of peer-punishment eliminates the existence of an in-group bias, which 
is prevalent when social identity is salient and no punishment is available. 
Lastly, subjects’ cooperativeness under punishment both in in- and out-group matching is slightly 
elevated compared to random matching of the control treatment in which no social identity is 
induced (Figure 4, left panel). In in-group matching this difference is merely borderline significant 
(Table 3, Model A, row 3, p=0.127). In out-group matching significance is given at the 10 percent level 
(Table 3, Model A, row 2). Together, these results suggest that a simultaneous application of peer-
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 The induction of social identity in Stage B was identical both in the NP as well as the P treatments. 
Consequently, the existence of an in-group bias without punishment clearly shows that the non-existence of 
such bias with punishment cannot be explained by an unsuccessful identity induction.  
24
 Wilcoxon Rank Sum Tests: In vs. Out, p<0.05; Cont vs. In, p<0.01; Out vs. Cont, p>0.1. For a detailed 
discussion of subjects’ punishment behavior and its relation to anger-like emotions see Bicskei et al. (2013). 
25
 Please note that due to our experimental design, the actual amount of punishment points received cannot 
influence subjects’ cooperativeness. Only after they make their contribution decisions do subjects learn how 
much they have been punished. It is thus impossible to directly conclude from punishment points to 




punishment and social identity is a viable option to boost cooperativeness in public goods 
provision.26 
Result 4:  Under punishment subjects seem to reveal an increased cooperativeness in in- and 
out-group matching compared to groups without saliency of social identity. 
On the one hand, this result complements to some degree the findings by Noussair and Tucker 
(2005) who established that when peer-punishment is combined with another institution, namely 
with the possibility of non-monetary social sanctions, it results in a higher cooperativeness than 
when applied by itself. On the other hand, it contradicts Weng and Carlsson (2013), who find that 
punishment has a similar effect on cooperativeness in groups without a salient social identity and in 
groups sharing a common salient identity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we investigate the question of how the threat of peer-punishment and social identity 
simultaneously affect cooperativeness in the provision of public goods. In particular, our aim is to 
provide insights on the influence of punishment on subjects’ cooperativeness in homogeneous 
groups bound together by a common social identity and in heterogeneous groups consisting of 
individuals saliently belonging to different identities. To this purpose, we induce social identity in the 
laboratory and devise one-shot public good games using the strategy method both with and without 
the institution of costly peer-punishment. Our experiment is the first that asks for effects of peer-
punishment in public goods provision dependent on whether subjects interact in identity-
homogenous or identity-heterogeneous groups. In particular, it adds to McLeish and Oxoby (2007), 
who focus on two-person interactions, by incorporating the influence of a group setting on subjects’ 
anticipated punishment and their cooperation under social identity. Punishment within groups itself 
constitutes a second order public good that incentivizes subjects to free-ride on group members 
punishment efforts. 
The results of our study indicate first of all that group composition plays a crucial role in how a peer-
punishment threat affects cooperation under social identity. The strongest increase in 
cooperativeness can be observed among subjects in out-group matching, especially for those who 
were classified as free-riders based on their initially revealed cooperativeness. This is most likely due 
to an anticipation of comparably strong punishment by individuals who do not belong to their own 
identity. Secondly, in contrast to the institutional setting without peer-punishment, in which 
individuals’ cooperativeness is clearly biased towards members of their own identity (in-group bias), 
the anticipation of stronger peer-punishment by out-group members generally seems to erode this 
reluctance to cooperate with out-group members and renders individuals as cooperative as in in-
group matching. Lastly, our results indicate that social identity and peer-punishment complement 
each other. In in- and out-group matching under punishment subjects’ cooperativeness is elevated 
compared to the control treatment, in which group members were randomly matched and no social 
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 Our results thus highlight that subjects who are randomly matched and form groups without salient identity 
exhibit rather different behavioral patterns under punishment and without it compared to the ID-treatments. 




identity was induced. Concluding, the combination of social identity with a peer-punishment 
institution seems to be a viable option to foster subjects’ cooperativeness compared to situations 
when social identity is not salient. 
Summing up, it is empirically established that fragmentation and polarization of societies restrain the 
provision of public goods (Eaton, Eswaran, and Oxoby 2011) since individuals strongly identifying 
with particular groups are willing to cooperate less with members of different identities. We 
established, however, that implementing peer-punishment erodes the reluctance to cooperate in 
identity heterogeneous groups and renders people as cooperative as when being part of an identity 
homogenous group.  
VI. APPENDIX 
A. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Summary Statistics
IN OUT CONT IN OUT CONT
n 69 66 42 84 75 48
Session # 3 3 3 7 6 3
Unconditional Contribution- Stage A 5.83 7.38 8.29 7.37 6.33 9.33
(0.72) (0.74) (0.95) (0.66) (0.66) (0.98)
Contribution (real)- Stage A 4.10 7.18 8.26 6.70 5.76 7.77
(0.60) (0.74) (0.99) (0.65) (0.64) (0.96)
Change in unconditional Contributions 0.99 -1.06 -0.38 2.37 3.68 0.94
 (Stage C - Stage A) (0.64) (0.60) (0.47) (0.50) (0.73) (0.70)
Change in real Contributions 1.22 -1.73 -1.52 2.55 3.61 1.21
 (Stage C - Stage A) (0.66) (0.65) (0.85) (0.56) (0.77) (0.82)
Average Punishment received n/a n/a n/a 2.14 2.60 2.83
(Stage C) (0.35) (0.38) (0.43)
Average Punishment distributed n/a n/a n/a 1.07 1.30 1.42
(Stage C) (0.15) (0.18) (0.22)
Average Non-spiteful Punishment distributed n/a n/a n/a 1.51 2.34 2.25
(Stage C) (0.25) (0.32) (0.30)
Note: Standard errors in parantheses.
NP-Treatment P-Treatment
 
B. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE EXPERIMENT (NP-Treatment) 
Welcome to the experiment! Thank you very much for your participation. 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you get the chance of winning money additional to 
the € 2.50, which you receive in any case. Your earnings will depend on your decisions and on those 
by the other players in your group. At the end of the experiment all sums of money, which you will 
have earned through your decisions, will be added and given to you personally and in cash. 
It is forbidden to speak during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. A 
member of our team will come to you and answer your question privately. 
We will be talking about points rather than Euros in the course of the experiment. Hence, your total 
income will be calculated in points in the first instance. The total number of points, which you will 
achieve during the experiment will be converted in Euros at the end, using the following equation: 




All participants will be divided in groups with 3 players each. Except for us, i.e. the conductors of the 
experiment, nobody will know who is in which group. All decisions will be made anonymously and 
your identity will neither be revealed during the experiment nor in public. 
Each task of the experiment has its own instructions, which you have to read step by step. While 
doing so, please consider the respective hints which will appear on the monitor. 
Please click on OK when you are ready. 
The Basic Decision Situation 
Later, you will be informed about the experiment’s procedure in detail. At this point, we would like 
to introduce the basic decision conditions you will face in this experiment. Some example exercises 
can be found subsequently.  
At each point in time, you will be a member of a group consisting of 3 players. In every task, you hold 
20 points. Your task is to decide whether you invest these 20 points in a private account or whether 
you want to invest them fully or partly in a project. Each point which you do not invest in a project 
will be automatically deposited on your private account. 
Your income from your private account: 
For each point which you deposit on your private account (and, therefore, you do not invest in the 
project), you will earn one point. Hence, a deposit of 20 points on your private account will produce 
an income of 20 points from your private account. If you, for instance, deposit 6 points on your 
private account, you will earn 6 points from this account. Nobody except you will earn anything from 
your private account. 
 
Your income from the project: 
All group members will profit equally from your contribution to the project. Vice versa, you profit 
from the investments by other group members. The income every member gets from the project is 
calculated as follows:  
 
Income from the project = (sum of all contributions to the project) x 0.4 
 
Should the sum of all contributions to the project be, for example, 30 points then you and all other 
group members gain (30 x 0.4) = 12 points each from the project. Should the sum of all contributions 
to the project be, for example, 10 points then you and all other group members gain (10 x 0.4) = 4 
points each from the project. 
Your total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and your income from the 
project. 
Income from the private account (= 20 – your contribution to the project) 




Please complete the following exercises. They do merely serve the purpose of familiarising you with 
the calculation of the different sorts of income, which may occur to you when making different 
decisions on the use of the 20 points starting capital. 
Please complete all the exercises and always report your full mathematical procedure. While 
calculating, you may use the calculator function on the monitor. When you are done, you have to 
enter your results in the computer. 
 
1. Each group member has 20 points at their disposal. Imagine that all three group members 
(including yourself) do not contribute anything to the project. 




b. What is the total income of each of the other group members? ….. 
2. Each group member has 20 points at their disposal. You invest 20 points in the project. The other 
two group members also contribute 20 points to the project. 
a. What is your total income? ….. 
b. What is the total income of each of the other group members? ….. 
3. Each group member has 20 points at their disposal. The other two group members contribute 10 
points each (i.e., 20 points in total) to the project. 
a. What is your total income if you, additional to the 20 points, contribute 0 points to the 
project? 
b. What is your total income if you, additional to the 20 points, contribute 5 points to the 
project? 
c. What is your total income if you, additional to the 20 points, contribute 15 points to the 
project? 
4. Each group member has 20 points at their disposal. You contribute 7 points to the project. 
a. What is your total income if the other group members, additionally to your 7 points, 
contribute 1.5 points each, i.e., 3 points in total, to the project? 
b. What is your total income if the other group members, additionally to your 7 points, 
contribute 4 points each, i.e., 8 points in total, to the project? 
c. What is your total income if the other group members, additionally to your 7 points, 
contribute 9 points each, i.e., 18 points in total, to the project? 
 
First Task 
You are now the member of a group of three, which was put together randomly. 
The task contains the decision, which was described at the beginning and is only conducted once.  
As you know, you have 20 points at your disposal, which you can either invest in the project or 
deposit on your private account.  
In this task, every group member has to make two types of decisions, which we will term (1) the 
“unconditional” contribution to the project, or the (2) “conditional” contribution to the project (the 
contribution table), respectively.  
Both decisions are vital for your income from this task. So please make your decisions thoughtfully. 
Step 1: Your Unconditional Contribution to the Project 
Please determine how many of your points you, without knowing the contributions of the other 








Please state what you expect each of the other two group members to contribute to the project 
(average amount of money they invest in the project). 
Once you have made both statements, please click on OK. 
Step 2: Your Conditional Contribution to the Project – the Contribution Table 
With your second decision you have to fill in a contribution table. In the contribution table you have 
to enter your contribution to the project for every possible average contribution (rounded up) of 
the other group members. Hence, you can, dependent on the average contribution of the others, 
determine your decision on your contribution. You will get a clear hint of what to do when you take a 
look at the following screen. 
 
 
The numbers left to the boxes mark the possible average contributions, which the other members 
can make to the project. You just have to enter in each box how much you, under the condition that 
the others contribute the stated average amount, want to invest in the project. You have to make an 
entry in each box. 
For example, you have to enter how many points you want to invest in the project if the other group 
members contribute 0 points; how many points you invest if the others contribute 1, 2 or 3 points 
and so on and so forth. You can enter integral numbers ranging from 0 to 20 in each box. 
Once you have typed a number in each box, please click on OK. 
After all participants in the experiment made their decision on their conditional contribution and 
filled in the contribution table, one member of each group is selected at random. For these selected 
members only the contribution table is relevant for their decisions and payoff. For the other two 
group members, who were not selected by the random choice mechanism, only the unconditional 
contribution is relevant for their decisions and payoff. The average of both unconditional 
contributions by these two group members defines which contribution by the selected member shall 
be invested in the project. 
When you make the decision on your unconditional contribution and fill in the contribution table, 
you do of course not know if you will be picked at random. Hence, you have to make both decisions 
carefully, because both can become relevant for you. The following examples will explain the 
procedure: 
Example 1: You are selected by the random choice mechanism. Therefore, the contribution table is 





Let us assume that the other two group members invest 0 and 4 points in the project, which would 
mean an average contribution of two points. If you entered in the contribution chart that you would 
invest 1 point if the others averagely invested 2 points, then this would make a total contribution of 
0+4+1=5 points to the project. All group members would then earn 5 x 0.4 = 2 points from the 
project plus the respective incomes from their private accounts, in your case 20 - 1 = 19 points. Your 
income would then be 21 points. 
If you, however, stated that you would invest 16 points, if the others averagely invested 2 points, this 
would make a total investment of 0+4+16=20 points in the project. As a result, all group members 
would receive a payoff of 20 x 0.4 = 8 points plus the income from their private accounts, in your 
case 20 – 16 = 4 points. Your total income would then be 12 points. 
Example 2: You are not selected by the random choice mechanism. For you and another group 
member then your unconditional contribution to the project is the relevant decision. 
Let us assume that your unconditional contribution to the project is 16 points, the contribution by 
the other group member is 20 points. This makes an average contribution of 18 points to the project. 
Should the player who was selected by the random choice mechanism have stated that he or she 
would contribute 1 point to the project if the other group members averagely invested 18 points, 
then the total contribution to the project would be 16+20+1=37 points. All group members then 
would earn 37 x 0.4 = 14.8 points from the project additional to their respective income from their 
private accounts. In your case you would earn 20 – 16 = 4 points from your private account, which 
would then make a total income of 18.8 points. 
Should the selected group member have stated an investment of 19 points to the project if the 
others averagely invested 18 points, then the total contribution to the project would be 16 + 20 + 19 
= 55 points. Every group member would have a project income of 55 x 0.4 = 22 points plus their 
points from their private account, in your case 4 points. Your total income would then be 26 points. 
 
The Random Choice Mechanism 
At the beginning of this game each group member receives a number between 1 and 3. As you might 
remember, one participant, namely no. 8, was selected at the beginning of the experiment. This 
participant will dice a number between 1 and 6 after all participants decided on their unconditional 
contribution and filled in the contribution table. The numbers 1 and 2 stand for group member one, 3 
and 4 for group member two and 5 and 6 for member three. Participant no. 8 will enter these in the 
computer. In case no. 8 dices the numbers which correspond to your member number, the 
contribution table will be relevant for your decisions and payoff and for the other group members 
the unconditional contribution will be relevant. In any other case the unconditional contribution is 
relevant for you. 
Please click on OK once you have read and understood the instructions. 
 
Second Task 
Please note: Do not open the attached envelope before you are asked to do so! 
For the second task, you will be arbitrarily assigned a new group, which will be marked by a specific 
colour. 
Only those solutions which are given correctly by ALL THREE group members will be considered 
correct in this group task. 
During this task the group members are allowed to communicate with each other. By doing so, they 
can find a solution together. On the left hand side of the computer screen a chat box is positioned, 
which can be used for communication. Your conversation will be recorded. You have 10 minutes to 
solve the task. Only within this time span are you able to communicate with your team members. 
Please take into account that every group member has to type in the solutions which will have been 
found by your group. You have to click on OK before the 10 minutes have run out. The time left will 




All participants will be shown a picture and a list of objects. The task is to find the hidden objects in 
the picture. The inscriptions on the left and the upper side give the numbers of the lines and 
columns. You are asked to insert this information in the boxes which will be shown on the right hand 
side of the screen. The first box refers to a line, the second to a column. An example for this exercise 
is given below. 
 
Picture      Computer Screen 
         
 
The group which finds most of the objects in the 10 minutes time is the winner group. At the end of 
the experiment you will be informed whether you are a member of the winner group. In this case, 
you will receive a congratulation message. 
Please click on OK when you are ready. 
Third Task 
This task corresponds to the first one. It is conducted only once.  
This time, however, you will only play together with members of your own group, with who you 
solved the picture puzzle in the second task. 
Again, you hold a deposit of 20 points. Please decide how many points you want to invest in the 
project and how many you want to put on your private account.  
This task also consists of two decisions, your (1) conditional contribution to the project and (2) the 
contribution table, with which you can make your decisions conditional on the other group members’ 
contributions. 
Please decide very carefully in both cases, for both the conditional contribution and your input into 
the contribution table are potentially relevant for the payoff. To determine the relevance of the 
decision, we will use the same random choice mechanism as before. 





Third Task (P-Treatment) 
This time, however, you will only play together with members of your own group, with who you 
solved the picture puzzle in the second task. 
Again, you receive a basic endowment of 20 points.  
In addition to this basic endowment, every participant receives an amount of 60 points (extra 
endowment) in this task. This one-off payment can be used to pay for possible costs during this task.  
This task consists of two stages and is conducted only once. 
 
Stage 1: 
Please decide how many of your 20 points (basic endowment) you want to invest in the project and 
how many you want to put on your private account.  
This task also consists of two decisions, your (1) unconditional contribution to the project and (2) 
the contribution chart, with which you can make your decisions conditional on the other group 
members’ contributions. 
Please decide very carefully in both cases, for both the unconditional contribution and your input 
into the contribution chart are potentially relevant for the payoff. To determine the relevance of the 
decision, we will use the same random choice mechanism as before. 
Your income from this stage will be displayed on the screen. 
 
Stage 2: 
At the beginning of the second stage, you will receive information how much each of your group 
members contributed to the project. In this stage you have the opportunity to register your approval 
or disapproval of each other group member’s decision by distributing points. 
In this stage you have the opportunity to reduce or leave equal the income of each group member 
by distributing points. You can award a large number of points to any member of your group if you 
disapprove of his or her decision (10 points for the most disapproval, 0 points for the least 
disapproval). Each point you distribute to a particular player lowers his or her payment by 10%.  
You incur a cost for allocating points to other members, which is discussed in detail below. 
You must decide how many points to give to each of the other two group members and enter these into 








If you do not wish to change the income of a specific group member then you must enter 0. If you 
distribute points, you have costs in points, which depend on the amount of points you distribute. You 
can distribute between 0 and 10 points to each group member. The more points you give to any 
group member, the higher your costs. Your total costs are equal to the sum of the costs of 
distributing points to each of the other two group members. The following table illustrates the 
relation between distributed points to each group member and the cost of doing so in points. 
Suppose for example that you give 2 points to one member. This costs you 2 points. If you give 9 
points to another member this costs you an additional 25 points. In this case your total costs of 
distributing points would be 27 (2+25) points. Your total cost of distributing points can be calculated 
on the input screen (on the right hand side). As long as you have not pressed the ok button you can 
revise your decision. 
If you choose 0 points for a particular group member, you do not change his or her income. However 
if you give a member 1 point (by choosing 1) you reduce his or her income by 10 percent, etc. The 
amount of points you distribute to each member determines therefore how much you reduce their 
income from the first stage. 
Whether or by how much the income from the first stage is totally reduced depends on the total of 
the received points from all other group members. If somebody received a total of 3 points (from all 
other group members in this period) his or her income would be reduced by 30 percent. If somebody 
received a total of 4 points his or her income would be reduced by 40 percent. If anybody receives 10 
or more points their income from the first stage will be reduced by 100 percent. The income from 
the first stage for this member would in this case be reduced to zero. 
The other group members can also assign points to you if they wish to. 
Please state hereafter what you consider how many points you will receive in total from the other 
two group members. 
Your total income 
Your total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows: 
Your total income 
If you receive less than 10 points: 
= [(income from the 1st stage) x (10 – received points)/10] 
– (cost to you of points you distribute) + extra endowment 
If you receive 10 or more points: 
= 0 – (cost to you of points you distribute) + extra endowment 
After all participants have made their decision, your income from the task will be displayed on the 
screen. 
Exercises 
To check your understanding of the experiment, please answer the following questions. While 
calculating, you may use the calculator function on the monitor. When you are done, you have to 
enter your results in the computer. 
1. Suppose in the second stage of this task, you distribute the following amounts of points to the 
other two group members: 9 and 5. What is the total cost of the points you distribute? ________ 
2. What are your costs if you distribute a total of 0 points? ________ 
3. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you receive a total 
of 0 points from the other group members? ________ 
4. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you receive a total 
of 4 points from the other group members? ________ 
5. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you receive a total 
of 15 points from the other group members? ________ 
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Several studies have shown that social identity fosters the provision of public goods and enhances 
the willingness to reciprocate the cooperative behavior of group members. Nonetheless, the 
question of how social identity affects negative reciprocity in identity-homogeneous and -
heterogeneous groups has only received little attention. Consequently, we seek to fill this gap by 
examining whether social identity affects individuals’ willingness to sanction deviating group 
members in a public good context. Moreover, we devote particular attention to the role of anger-like 
emotions in negative reciprocity. To test our hypotheses, we employ one-shot public good games in a 
strategy method with induced social identity. Our results indicate that members of identity-
homogeneous groups are prone to reveal less negative reciprocity than identity-heterogeneous 
groups when they face contributions smaller than their own. We also find that anger-like emotions 
much more strongly influence punishment behavior when individuals are matched with members of 
different identities than in identity-homogenous groups. These findings contribute to an increased 
understanding of the nature of social identity and its impact on reciprocity, improving economists’ 
ability to predict behavior while taking emotions into consideration. 
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- How does social identity influence negative reciprocity in public goods provision? 
- We conduct one-shot public good games with in-group, out-group and random matching. 
- Higher negative reciprocity in out-groups than in in-groups. 
- Higher behavioral influence of anger-like emotions in out-groups than in in-groups. 
- Group composition is of relevance when public policy addresses one’s social identity. 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND FORMS OF GOVERNANCE  
– MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY PUNISHMENT AND THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS  
 





In the private provision of public goods the long-term maintenance of cooperation is a real challenge. 
Experimental research has shown that contributions to common goods decrease over time (see e.g. 
Keser and van Winden 2000, Fischbacher and Gächter 2010, Lankau et al. 2013). Nevertheless, the 
possibility of peer-punishment imposed by group members without a central authority has been 
investigated as an effective institution providing incentive for compliance and enforcing long-term 
cooperation in social dilemma games. In a public good context, after observing the individuals’ 
voluntary contributions, every subject has the possibility to punish other group members. In terms of 
the costs incurred by punishment two instruments are distinguished: Monetary punishment (MP) 
and non-monetary punishment (NMP). Firstly, assigning MP points to individuals reduces the 
earnings of the offender. Consequently, by lowering yields of self-interested behaviour it creates a 
monetary threat forcing subjects to increase their contributions (Noussair and Tucker 2005). Yet, MP 
also functions as a communication tool by signalling disapproval of an individuals’ behaviour. This 
implies social pressure1 or social disapproval (the more points assigned, the greater the disapproval), 
which may equally raise contributions. Overall, MP has been considered as successful in overcoming 
the problem of shirking (see Ostrom et al. 1992; Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 
2004). Nevertheless, its influence on social welfare is less clear-cut since MP points are costly not 
only for the offender but also for the punisher. Secondly, the assignment of points to group members 
without monetary consequences (NMP) also constitutes social pressure. NMP is also considered to 
be effective in boosting cooperation compared to situations without punishment (see experimental 
research of Masclet et al. 2003; Gächter and Fehr 1999, and former works e.g. of Barron and Gjerde 
1997; Kandel and Lazear 1992). Nevertheless, especially in long-term interactions it appears to be 
hardly as effective as MP (cf. Noussair and Tucker 2005; Dugar 2013). Yet, due to the costliness of 
MP, the level of social welfare under threat of MP and NMP is comparable (see Noussair and Tucker 
2005).  
Summing up, MP and NMP create different strengths of threat for subjects and their application has 
diverging consequences for social welfare. Correspondingly, an analysis of an institutional 
environment including both sanctioning mechanisms (BP institution) helps to disentangle whether 
subjects choose to exert social pressure per se or rather additional monetary pressure. Clearly, in 
some cases NMP alone could be sufficient to influence subjects´ contribution behaviour, which 
should affect especially those who are sensitive to social pressure. In these instances signalling 
disapproval by MP could even be too severe and counterproductive. However, in other cases 
disciplining subjects could require stronger social pressure that also implicates monetary 
consequences. To our best knowledge, there exists only one single study that combines MP and NMP 
in a public good context (see Noussair and Tucker 2005). Yet, it provides insights only for groups 
whose members are randomly selected and thus neglects the social environment in which subjects 
interact. However, extensive research has shown that group composition in terms of social identity 
does influence subjects´ behaviour and impacts decisively on social welfare (e.g. Chen and Li 2009; 
Lankau et al. 2012). Therefore, the aim of this article is to gain evidence on which forms and 
strengths of governance groups tend to use dependent on the social environment. In particular, 
within the framework of a ten-period public goods game we analyse how subjects in identity-
                                                             
1 The impact of social pressure on behavior has been incorporated in several economic models. See Akerlof 
(1980) and Lindbeck et al. (1999). 
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homogenous and identity-heterogeneous groups apply monetary and non-monetary sanctions and 
how this influences cooperation and social welfare. To this purpose, we induce group identity in the 
lab with the help of an identity group task based on Ibañez and Schaffland (2012),2 and apply three 
different matching protocols. Subjects either interact with common identities (in-group matching) or 
with individuals of different identities (out-group matching). Our control groups are randomly 
assigned without any identification (partner matching). Another novelty of our paper – besides the 
recognition of the specificity of social environment under BP institution – lies in the fact that we are 
the first to address the punished subject’s emotions of anger and guilt and their influence on 
subsequent contributions. Generally, emotions have been proven to motivate behaviour (Hopfensitz 
and Reuben 2009). Consequently, our research sheds light on how these influence decision making in 
different social contexts and to what extent they determine long-term cooperation.  
The article proceeds with deriving hypotheses based on previous literature (Section 2). Section 3 
presents the experimental design. We discuss the main results of the experiment in Section 4. Its first 
section investigates the effectiveness of the identity group task, followed by the demonstration of 
the influence of social identity on contribution behaviour and social welfare. Afterwards, we analyze 
the form of governance via MP and NMP. The final section discusses the role of punishment and 
emotions on subsequent contributions. Lastly, the article summarizes and concludes in Section 5. 
2 Related Research and Hypotheses 
The recent stream of research on social identity has proved that the importance ascribed to the 
sense of belonging to a particular group influences individuals’ connotations and behavior towards 
their own group (in-group) as well as towards other groups they do not belong to (out-group) (Bicskei 
et al. 2013a).3 In particular, when subjects interact in identity-homogenous groups they are likely to 
cooperate more with individuals that share the same identity than in identity-heterogeneous groups 
(see e.g., Solow and Kirkwood 2002; Wit and Wilke 1992; Lankau et al. 2012). What is more, they 
reciprocate the contributions of group members to a higher degree than out-group members 
(Lankau et al. 2012). Overall, in-group subjects are regarded as having a higher proclivity to make 
social welfare maximizing choices as opposed to subjects in out-groups (Chen and Li 2009). 
Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that social identity also affects subjects´ behavior 
under the threat of peer-punishment. Particularly, Bicskei et al. (2013b) find that subjects 
anticipating MP behave differently in in- and out-groups. Under the threat of MP they observe a 
comparably higher increase in cooperativeness in out- than in in-groups, which even eliminates the 
in-group bias that is commonly observed without punishment. The authors claim that this is due to 
out-group members anticipating harsher punishment than in-group members. More importantly, 
Bicskei et al. (2013a) establish that in case anti-social behaviour is observed, in-group members 
punish less frequently and with lower intensity than out-group members. They confirm the findings 
of Chen and Li (2009) who demonstrate that group members are more forgiving towards defection 
by an in-group member and reveal less negative reciprocity. Currarini et al. (2012) also find in two-
person interactions that subjects are less likely to punish misbehaviour when caused by an in-group 
member than by an out-group member. Based on these studies, we thus assume that the social 
                                                             
2
 Herewith we thank M. Ibañez and E. Schaffland for providing us with their identity group task protocol. 
3 The social identity theory was pioneered by Tajfel and Turner (1979). See Chen and Li (2009) for an overview 
of theoretical and empirical evidence on social identity. 
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environment influences how subjects disclose their disapproval when both MP and NMP are 
available. Especially, we expect that in-group members rather apply NMP than MP since it 
constitutes a lower level of negative reciprocity.  
Hypothesis 1 (Governance): Compared to out-groups, subjects in in-groups are more likely to govern 
each other by NMP than by MP. 
Prior research suggests that in-groups are more likely to reveal higher cooperation level than out-
groups. Based on Hypothesis 1, we thus expect that in-groups also gain higher social welfare than 
out-groups, since NMP does not reduce subjects’ earnings.   
Hypothesis 2 (Social Welfare): Under the possibility of both MP and NMP identity-homogeneous 
groups reach higher social welfare than identity-heterogeneous groups. 
Recently, a bulk of research demonstrated that emotions play a determinant role in decision making. 
In particular, various contributions investigated how emotions such as anger and irritation influence 
punishment behaviour in general (see Reuben and van Winden 2008; Bosman et al. 2005; Bosman 
and van Winden 2002). Yet, Bicskei et al. (2013a) highlight that emotions have different action 
tendencies based on the group composition. Specifically, they establish that anger-like emotions 
(anger, contempt and irritation) fuel punishment in out-groups more than in in-groups. They 
conclude that in-group matching mitigates the role of these negative emotions in triggering 
punishment. The question, however, of how emotions influence the effectiveness of punishment in 
terms of maintaining contributions has still been neglected in the literature. In fact, when an 
offender is detected through punishment internal peer pressure in form of guilt may cause disutility 
to this individual (Elster 1989).4 Such an emotion has, however, a high action tendency. It requests 
atonements or confession (Elster 1998). Therefore, we assume that in-group members are striving to 
maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Feeling guilty forces them to rectify their 
selfish behaviour by increasing their contributions in the next period. Thus, in identity-heterogeneous 
groups the influence of guilt on subsequent contributions is likely to be much lower.  
Hypothesis 3 (Guilt): In in-groups the emotion of guilt in reaction to being punished is more influential 
in motivating changes in subsequent contributions than in out-groups.  
Being punished can trigger feelings of anger as well, which also tend to motivate behaviour 
(Zeelenberg et al. 1998; Hopfensitz and Reuben 2009). Whether it fosters or even lowers subsequent 
contributions is still an unanswered question. Yet, based on prior findings we know that in-group 
members are more forgiving than out-group members. Moreover, they are able to mitigate the 
impact of anger-like emotions on their behaviour (Bicskei et al. 2013a). Consequently, we expect that 
anger will affect contributions less in in-groups than in out-groups. 
Hypothesis 4 (Anger): In in-groups the emotion of anger in reaction to being punished is less 
influential in motivating changes in subsequent contributions than in out-groups. 
                                                             
4
 Evidently, being detected through punishment can also trigger external peer pressure, thus shame (Elster 
1989). This, however, forces subjects to hide and disappear. Due to the design specificity of a public good game 
in which punishment that a subject receives is only visible for this particular subject, the emotion of shame is 
assumed to be not of relevance. 
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3 Experimental Design  
To test these hypotheses the experiment consisted of two stages (Stage A and B, see Table 1). In 
each stage participants were assigned to groups consisting of four subjects. We conducted four 
treatments: An In-group and an Out-group treatment (together referred to as ID treatments or ID 
matchings), and two additional treatments. The RMID treatment served as a control for Stage A, and 
the Control treatment for Stage B.  
Stage A had the purpose of inducing social identity in the lab. Both in In- and Out-group treatments 
participants were assigned randomly to groups distinguished with a particular color.5,6 Group 
members had to jointly solve a simple group task (ID task) of finding hidden objects in a picture and 
enter their coordinates within a given time of 8 minutes. They were in connection via chat so that 
they could discuss solutions anonymously. Importantly, an answer was only counted as a correct if 
each group member entered the objects’ coordinates correctly, which intensified the interaction 
within the groups. Whichever group found most objects won this task. However, we communicated 
the outcome only at the end of the experiment in order to eliminate the negative consequences of 
not being in the winning group.7 To test the effectiveness of our ID task we designed the RMID 
treatment in which subjects were randomly assigned to groups. Yet, they had to solve this task 
individually. No colors were assigned and there was no possibility of communication with the group 
members. In the Control treatment, we excluded Stage A altogether (see Table 1). 
Stage B consisted of a ten-period linear public goods game combined with MP and NMP institutions 
and a stable group membership over all periods of the game.  
 
ID Task Matching Protocol PGG Matching Protocol
In-group (IN) 80 6
Picture puzzle 
jointly to solve
Random + Color 
label ing
10 periods  PGG 
with Punishment
In-group





10 periods  PGG 
with Punishment
Out-group
 Control  (CONT) 52 4 - -




Picture puzzle to 
solve individual ly
Random - -
Stage A Stage B 
Treatment n Session #
 
Table 1: Design of the Experiment 
In the In-group treatment, group composition was identical to Stage A. Thus, subjects remained in 
the groups comprised of their in-group members (of the same color) with whom they solved Stage 
A’s task. In the Out-group treatment, however, subjects were assigned to groups consisting of four 
different identities, hence of four different colors.8 The Control treatment is actually the replication 
of the BP treatment of Noussair and Tucker (2005) and comprised groups randomly assigned without 
                                                             
5 After being assigned to groups of four each group member was provided with two colors to vote for as a 
group color. The color chosen by the majority of group members won. In case of standoff a random mechanism 
determined the group color.  
6
 This task served the purpose of generating more interaction between the group members. During the 
experiment the color of the group was always signalled by a flag. 
7
 The winning group received only a congratulation message. Finishing this task, we asked four questions 
related to group attachment, which will be discussed in Section 4.1. 
8 The matching protocols for the ID treatments were only revealed at the beginning of Stage B. 
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any identification and any color-labeling (partner matching).9 At the beginning of Stage B every 
subject received an initial lump-sum payment of 100 ECUs (Experimental Currency Units) in order to 
account for possible costs incurred during the game and reducing the possibility of bankruptcy. It was 
common knowledge that group composition remained stable throughout Stage B and that the game 
consisted of 10 periods. Each of these periods comprised two decisions parts. At first, each group 
member received an endowment of 20 ECUs, which could be invested in a project (ci) benefitting 
each group member equally. Each ECU, which a subject did not invest in the project, was 
automatically deposited on his private account (20-ci). The payoff associated with this investment 
decision is given by the following function (Formula 1): 
 
 
Formula 1: Payoff Function of Part 1 
At the beginning of the second part, subjects were informed on how much each of their group 
members contributed to the project.10 Afterwards, they had the opportunity to indicate their 
disapproval of the other group members’ decision by distributing MP and/or NMP points to them. In 
each case the scale ranged from 10 points for the most to 0 points for the least disapproval.11 Each 
MP point distributed to a particular player lowered his or her payment by 10%. However, the 
punisher incurred cost for allocating MP points, as well, which is detailed in Table 2. 
Monetary points 
(P) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Cost of monetary 
points (K) 
0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30 
Table 2: Monetary Points and the Cost of these Monetary Points in ECU 
At the same time subjects could also distribute NMP points. However, in contrast to MP, NMP points 
neither affect the punisher´s earnings nor the earnings of the player receiving the NMP points. 
Subsequently, subjects were informed on the total amount of MP and NMP points they received and 
were required to indicate on a 7-points Likert-scale how intensely they felt (1-not at all, 7-very 
intensely) each of the following emotions:12 Shame, gratitude, irritation, happiness, guilt, surprise, 
disappointment and anger.13 
                                                             
9 Here we gratefully acknowledge that C. Noussair and S. Tucker provided us with their instructions. We also 
asked for their data but it seemed to be not recoverable. See Appendix 9 for the instructions used in this 
experiment. 
10 The subject´s contribution was displayed in the first column, while the contributions of the other group 
members of the period were shown in the remaining three columns. The contributions of the other group 
members were randomly listed and changed in each period. Thus, subjects were not able to track the behavior 
of one particular group member during the periods. This eliminated the possibility of direct retaliation against 
one particular group member. Also, subjects could not build a reputation in terms of their contribution during 
the periods. 
11
 We framed the 0 punishment point as least disapproval, since we were interested in the impact of a 
punishment threat and did not want subjects to perceive 0 point as a reward (see argumentation in Dugar 
2013).  
12
 Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) establish that the use of self-reports is adequate to assess emotions.  
13
 To eliminate an experimenter demand effect the list of emotions included different emotions both of 
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At the end of each period the screen displayed the income from that particular period (see Formula 
2), the total income from all periods inclusive that period and the lump-sum payment in terms of 
ECU. In order to keep each group members’ identity as determined in Stage A salient, each subjects’ 
group color was always signalled by a colored flag in the ID matchings throughout Stage B. Moreover, 
at the beginning of period 6 subjects were reminded of Stage A’s group task and were asked to guess 
how many objects they found in Stage A. In case they guessed correctly, which was communicated 
only at the end of the experiment, they earned 2 ECUs. At the end of the experiment the entire 
earnings from the experiment (including the lump-sum payment and the show-up fee) was converted 
to Euros and immediately paid to the subjects in cash. 
 
Formula 2: Income of a Particular Period 
4 Results 
The experiments were conducted during July and August of 2012 in the Göttingen Laboratory of 
Experimental Economics (GLOBE) at the University of Göttingen.14 We recruited 256 subjects through 
the ORSEE system of the University of Göttingen and at the canteens of the campus. 80 subjects 
participated in In-group, 72 in Out-Group and 52 in the Control as well as in the RMID treatment (see 
Table 1). The sessions took approximately one hour (including the final payment) and participants 
earned approximately 12 EUR including the 2.5 EUR show-up fee. 
4.1 Induction of Social Identity 
The question of what drives possible treatment effects is very important. In this section, we analyse 
whether the induction of social identity was successful and thus whether we can assume social 
identity to have causal effects. We approach it by comparing subjects´ self-reported identification 
with the particular group in Stage A between the pooled data of the ID matchings15 and the RMID 
treatment.16 In the latter we created the least possible group cohesion by assigning subjects to a 
group without any labeling and with no interactions between group members. Please note that 
subjects were asked for their feeling of identification with their group immediately after Stage A in 
order to prevent experiences of ID matchings made in Stage B to bias judgement to statements 
including: (1) “I feel attached to this group”; (2) “I am an important member of this group”. The 
answers were assessed on a 7-point Likert-scale (1-not at all, 7-very much). As the number of objects 
found in Stage A was disclosed only at the end of the experiment, we do not expect being 
unsuccessful in solving the task to influence the feelings of group attachment. Our data reveals that 
subjects of the RMID treatment felt significantly less attached to their group than in case of ID 
                                                             
14 We designed our experiments with the software Z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
15
 Both in In- and Out-group treatments the identical task was in effect and answers are statistically not 
different using Mann-Whitney Test (p=0.50). If not noted otherwise, we henceforth always use Mann-Whitney 
Test. 
16
 Please recall that subjects had the possibility to vote for a group color. To prove whether this task had a 
negative influence on group attachment, we compare the intensity of group attachment of those who were 
assigned a group color other than the one they voted for and those whose wish came true. We find no 
significant difference (p=0.84) between individual group attachments.  
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treatments (pIDvsRMID<0.001). What is more, they felt themselves to be a significantly less important 
member of the group, which is not surprising (p<0.001).  
In sum, this signals that the group task of Stage A with anonymous interactions between group 
members and a salient social identity highlighted by colored flags evokes stronger feelings of group 
attachment than in case of being simply assigned to a group in which no interactions take place. 
Since we find clear differences between reported group attachment of ID matchings and the RMID 
treatment, we consequently assume that our ID task of Stage A was successful. Thus, treatment 
effects are likely to be due to differing degrees of group attachment in our treatments. 
Result 1: The induction of social identity successfully created higher feelings of group 
attachment in ID matchings than in the RMID treatment.  
4.2 Contributions to the Public Good and the Level of Social Welfare 
At first, we analyze the evolution of contributions to the public. As Figure 1 shows, the presence of 
BP institution eliminates the often documented downward trend of contributions over time (see Fehr 
and Gächter 2000; Keser and van Winden 2000; Vyrastekova 2011; Lankau et al. 2013), independent 












































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Period
Contribution: IN Earnings: IN
Contribution: OUT Earnings: OUT
Contribution: CONT Earnings: CONT
 
Figure 1 – Average per Period Contribution and Earnings by Treatment Type 
The average contributions of the first period range between 55% and 68% of total endowment. 
Although starting contribution levels are very akin in the first two periods of all treatments, looking 
at the full time horizon, we find that out-group contributions lay above those of in-groups from 
period 3 onward till the penultimate period (p<0.1).18 Except for period 2, contributions of the 
Control treatment lay between the ID treatments in the first 6 periods. Towards period 9, they 
                                                             
17 For the evolution of each groups’ average contributions per treatment, see Table A.1. 
18 The unit of observation was average individual contributions between periods 3 to 9.   
121 
 
converge to the level of out-groups. For periods 3 to 9 contributions of out-groups are only 
marginally greater than those of random groups (p=0.1). Although contributions of the Control 
treatment are above those of in-groups for almost the entire time period, we do not find statistically 
significant differences. Lastly, since subjects were informed about the exact length of the game, not 
surprisingly, we observe a moderate end-game effect. Subjects’ lowered their contributions in the 
last period, most likely because they did not anticipate subsequent punishment. The final 
contributions are not significantly different between the treatments. 
Result 2a: In- and out-groups show different patterns of cooperation under the presence of both 
punishment institutions. Apart from the starting and last periods, out-group 
contribution levels are higher than those of in-groups. 
Although under BP threat contributions in out-groups are different from in-groups for specific 
periods, we do not find that these elevated contributions increase social welfare in these periods 
significantly (see Figure 1). In particular, we find that average per period earnings are similar in each 
treatment.19 This indicates already that out-group members’ punishment behaviour must differ from 
that of in-groups. Especially, the application of MP, which affects individual payoffs decisively, must 
be responsible for the equal welfare in both ID matchings.  
Result 2b: In- and out-group members achieve similar per period welfare under BP disregarding 
the end-game effect. 
Concluding, we have to reject our Social Welfare-Hypothesis that under the possibility of both MP 
and NMP identity-homogeneous groups reach higher social welfare than identity-heterogeneous 
groups. 
4.3 Governance via MP and NMP 
To gain evidence on how subjects in different social environments govern their groups, first of all, we 
analyze the relationship of MP and NMP assigned across treatments. In all treatments the average 
quantity of MP subjects assign is lower than of NMP (see Figure 2), and these differences are 
significant in each treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p<0.001).20 This difference is not surprising 




















































Figure 2 – Average Level of MP and NMP Points Assigned 
                                                             
19
 We find differences in per period individual earnings only in the last period: IN vs. OUT (p<0.001); IN vs. 
CONT (p<0.1); OUT vs. CONT (p<0.001).  
20 The unit of observation is the average individual MP and NMP received over the 10 periods.  
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As Figure 2 suggests, the evolution of MP and NMP is not completely correlated, which is most 
apparent in out-groups. This provides a hint that MP and NMP are rather used as substitutes than as 
complements. As a proof of this conjecture, Table 3 shows the number of instances in which subjects 
assigned a particular number of MP and NMP points per treatment.21 We find that in each treatment 
punishment occurs in very similar shares of possible punishment cases (29.2, 29.3 and 28.7 percent 
in the In-group, Out-group and Control treatment, respectively). What is more, the share of 
punishment involving both MP and NMP (BP) points at the same time only amounts to approximately 
one third of all punishment cases and is very similar in all treatments.22 Thus, if subjects choose to 
punish their peers’ (mis-) behaviour they most often prefer using either MP or NMP alone instead of 
combining them (BP). Consequently, our results oppose Noussair and Tucker (2005) who find that 
subjects who were not assigned any NMP did not receive MP either. In each of our treatments there 
are many cases in which only MP (NMP) points were distributed without assigning any NMP (MP) 
points. As Table 3 illustrates, the exclusive application of NMP is most favoured in in-groups (412 
obs.) accounting for 59 percent of all punishment cases. In out- and random groups this amounts to 
50 and 52 percent, respectively. On the contrary, the exclusive use of MP is the highest in out-groups 
representing 15 percent of punishment cases, followed by the Control treatment with 10 percent. In 
in-group only a very small proportion of punishing subjects inflict MP exclusively (4 percent). 
Accordingly, the frequency of NMP regardless whether applied alone or combined with MP is 
significantly higher in in-groups compared to out- and random groups.23 The occurrence of MP (alone 
or together with NMP) is significantly higher in out-groups as well as in random groups compared to 
in-groups.24  
[0] [1-2] [3-4] [5-6] [7-10] Total [0] [1-2] [3-4] [5-6] [7-10] Total [0] [1-2] [3-4] [5-6] [7-10] Total
[0] 1,700 16 5 3 7 1,731 1,527 55 19 11 8 1,620 1,112 23 4 5 12 1,156
[1-3] 146 25 2 0 1 174 129 24 0 0 1 154 132 29 9 0 1 171
[4-7] 104 28 6 13 6 157 58 30 3 1 0 92 40 34 6 4 4 88
[7-10] 162 133 22 15 6 338 132 89 54 17 2 294 63 50 15 5 12 145









Range of MP Range of MP Range of MP
 
Table 3 – Frequency of MP and NMP Points 
Result 3a:  NMP is more frequently used in in-groups than in out- and random groups.  
Result 3b: The frequency of MP is higher in out- and random groups compared to in-groups. 
With regard to the strength of punishment Figure 3 depicts the evolution of NMP (left panel) and MP 
(right panel) over periods and across treatments. Obviously, the application of punishment in the last 
period cannot affect group members’ behavior. Nevertheless, we observe a clear increase both in 
NMP and MP as a consequence of a drop in contributions in the last period (see Figure 1, Section 
4.2). This is in line with Noussair and Tucker (2005) and Bochet et al. (2006) who argue that sanctions 
                                                             
21
 Overall, we have 6,120 possible punishment cases: 204 subjects can punish each of their three group mates 
in each period (204x3x10).   
22
 Cases of BP over any punishment: IN=257/700=36.7%, OUT=221/663=33.3%, CONT= 169/448=37.7%. 
23
 Pearson's chi-square test, χ²(1)=41.5, pIN vs OUT<0.001;  χ²(1)=13.01, pIN vs CONT<0.001. The application of NMP in 
Control treatment is more frequent than in out-groups:  χ²(1)=5.62, pCONT vs OUT<0.05. 
24 Pearson's chi-square test, χ²(1)=9.61, pIN vs OUT<0.01;  χ²(1)=4.55, pIN vs CONT<0.05. Significant difference in the 
infliction of MP between the Control and Out-group treatment is, however, not found. 
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are mainly of non-strategic nature, since the last period´s punishment will have no possible gains to 
the punisher.  
Irrespective of the last period, NMP in in-groups follows a downward trend during almost the entire 
ten-period horizon, probably since corresponding contribution levels increase. In the first half of the 
game apart from the initially higher NMP level in out-groups, the average NMP is clearly higher in in-
group than in out-group (p<0.001) as well as in the Control treatment (p<0.1).25 What is more, due to 
a drastic drop from period 1 to period 3, NMP of the out-group is also smaller than of the Control 
treatment (p<0.1). In the second half of the game we observe a similar trend of NMP in each 
treatment. Nevertheless, as the upward trend of contributions starts to stagnate (see Figure 1), 
subjects of out-groups in order to boost cooperation tend to distribute higher NMP points than in-















































































 Figure 3 – Average NMP (left panel) and MP (right panel) Points Assigned (all subjects)27 
The quantity of MP associated with monetary costs is changing drastically over the periods (Figure 3, 
right panel). However, as with NMP, MP also reveals a clear downward trend in in-groups since 
contributions increase. Overall, the strengths of MP distributed on average is greater in out-groups 
compared to in-groups taking the average over all periods as a whole (p<0.1). This is somehow 
unexpected since contribution levels in out-groups are higher than in in-groups. It enlightens, 
however, why the welfare in out-groups does not exceed the welfare of in-groups.28 Although 
contributions do not differ between them, looking at the entire game as a whole the extent of MP of 
the Control treatment is significantly higher than of in-groups (p<0.1). Lastly, there are no significant 
differences between MP of the Control and the Out-group treatment (p=0.61).  
Result 3c: The level of NMP in in-groups is higher than in out- and random groups in the first 
half of the game. In the second half the level of NMP of out-groups exceeds in- and 
random groups.  
Result 3d: The extent of MP in in-groups is lower than in out- and control groups. 
                                                             
25
 Unit of observation is the average individual NMP point assigned over periods 1 to 5. 
26
 Unit of observation is the average individual NMP point assigned over periods 6 to 10. The hypothesis that 
the NMP level of In-group and Control treatments is equal in the second half cannot be rejected. 
27
 See also Table A.2. 
28 Although the cost function of punishment is non-linear, the average cost of punishment shows a similar 
pattern in the treatments as the level of MP suggests (see Figure A.3). 
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Summing up, our Governance-Hypothesis cannot be rejected. We find that subjects in in-group 
favour governance via NMP rather than via MP. Conversely, interaction in groups with different 
identities or with random subjects creates an environment in which subjects are prone to reveal their 
disapproval by MP with higher frequency and with greater intensity than in in-groups. In this respect 
the availability of both punishment institutions equalizes welfare in in- and out-groups, which is not 
typical for situations without any punishment mechanisms at all (see Chen and Li 2009; Lankau et al. 
2012; Eaton et al. 2011).  
4.4 The Impact of Punishment and Emotions on Contributions 
The threat of punishment per se raises contributions to common resources in one-shot interactions 
(Bicskei et al. 2013b). Nevertheless, in long term interactions the reactions to received punishment 
will determine its effectiveness in maintaining cooperation too (Hopfensitz and Reuben 2009). Thus, 
we firstly investigate how subjects actually respond to received punishment dependent on the social 
environment. In particular, we are interested in whether in-groups are more sensitive to NMP as they 
are more likely to govern their groups by such a punishment institution. Secondly, we analyse the 
relationship of punishment and emotions and the effect of their interaction on subsequent 
contributions.    
To begin with the former, we estimate the effect of received MP and NMP per se on the changes in 
contributions from period t to t+1. As previous research has evidenced, both received punishment 
and the deviations of a subject’ own contributions from the group´s average  may have an 
effect on subsequent contributions (e.g. Masclet et al. 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Noussair and 
Tucker 2005). As received punishment is also dependent on deviation from group´s average (see 
Table A. 4) they could not be included into the same equation. Therefore, we measure the effect of 
MP and NMP on contributions isolated of any effect of deviations of a subject’ own contributions 
from the group´s average (for a similar approach see Noussair and Tucker 2005). Thus, the 
independent variables of our estimation (  and in Formula 3c) represent MP and NMP points 
subject k receives in period t excluding the effect of deviations in contribution from the group's 
average on punishment (see in Formula 3a and b). Yet, as punishment is clearly equally dependent on 
the height of contributions subjects provide to public goods (e.g. Masclet et al. 2003; Fehr and 
Gächter 2000; Noussair and Tucker 2005), we conduct this regression separately for low contributors 
contributing less than the group´s average and for high contributors who contributed at least the 




Formula 3 – Estimation of the Average Change in Contribution 
Our results for the Control treatment, which is equivalent to the BP treatment of Noussair and 
Tucker (2005), do not confirm their findings on the overall positive effect of MP. Moreover, the effect 
on high contributors is significantly negative, which opposes their results, as well. Yet, the significant 
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and positive coefficient of MP reinforces their findings that low contributors increase their 
contribution upon receiving MP (Table 4, column 9).  
Dep.Var.: Average Change in Individual Contribution (t+1)-(t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ALL High Contr. Low Contr. ALL High Contr. Low Contr. ALL High Contr. Low Contr.
MP -0.245** -0.214* -0.0496 -0.147 -0.434*** 0.116 -0.0503 -0.429*** 0.667***
(0.108) (0.114) (0.180) (0.0990) (0.138) (0.173) (0.0864) (0.150) (0.131)
NMP 0.0616* -0.0663** 0.0345 0.150*** 0.0342 0.0421 0.107** 0.0569 -0.0244
(0.0342) (0.0260) (0.0444) (0.0391) (0.0266) (0.0928) (0.0425) (0.0509) (0.0576)
Constant 0.271** -0.788*** 2.940*** 0.442*** -0.628*** 3.777*** 0.645*** -0.316 3.082***
(0.107) (0.128) (0.349) (0.135) (0.173) (0.532) (0.163) (0.213) (0.341)
Observations 720 537 183 648 522 126 468 358 110
R-squared 0.017 0.070 0.002 0.036 0.045 0.010 0.020 0.100 0.160
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
IN OUT CONT
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clusered around individuals.
 
Table 4 – Change in Average Individual Contribution in Response to the Receipt of MP and NMP 
Very importantly, the results for both ID matchings as well as the Control treatment show that the 
social environment influences the effects of punishment on contributions. In particular, for identity-
homogenous groups we even identify an overall significant negative effect of MP on contributions. In 
identity-heterogeneous groups MP has no significant effect. What is more, in both ID matchings high 
contributors are likely to decrease their contribution due to received MP, which seems to be more 
severe in out- than in in-groups. The influence of MP on low contributors is ineffective in both ID 
matchings compared to randomly assigned groups. Generally, NMP has a positive effect on 
contributions when all subjects are looked at, which seems most influential in out-groups. Yet, in 
contrast to out-groups high contributors in in-groups even reduce their contributions by a very a 
small amount upon receiving NMP (see NMP, column 2). This suggests that highly cooperative 
subjects in in-groups are more sensitive to NMP than subjects in out- or control-groups. In particular, 
receiving NMP despite comparably high contributions could be perceived as unfair. This in turn could 
lead to a negative reciprocation by lowering contributions in the next period.     
Summing up, we find evidence that, overall not MP but NMP maintains contributions in the following 
period although these effects seem to be quite moderate.29 Moreover, in in-group members even 
show an overall negative reaction to MP in terms of subsequent contributions. Both MP and NMP 
induce high contributors of in-groups to lower their subsequent contributions. Concluding, our 
assumption that identity-homogenous groups tend to be more sensitive to NMP and increase their 
contributions to a public good to a higher extent, is not supported by our data. In contrast, out-group 
members tend to show a stronger reaction to NMP.  
Result 4a: Receiving NMP has an overall significant and positive influence on subsequent 
contributions. While the application of MP per se is ineffective in boosting 
cooperation in out- and randomly assigned groups, it even leads to decreasing 
contributions in in-groups.  
                                                             
29
 Please recall that these observations reflect the effect on MP and NMP that cannot be explained by 
deviations from group´s average. Nevertheless, if deviations from group´s average are also taken into 
consideration, with other words, if the effect of MP and NMP is not isolated from it, we gain similar tendencies 
(see Table A.5). 
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Result 4b: Both MP and NMP induce high contributors of in-groups to lower their subsequent 
contributions. 
Next, we will investigate to what extent emotions of guilt and anger are responsible for such 
differences in reactions to punishment. Firstly, Figure 4 illustrates how the type of punishment 
received influences subjects’ emotions, which were elicited directly after being informed about the 
total MP and NMP points subjects received.30 The fact that the average strength of anger is 
comparatively low when receiving only NMP in not surprising since NMP is not associated with costs. 
We find, however, that the intensity of anger in case of receiving BP is significantly higher in in-group 
and random matchings than in out-groups (pINvsOUT<0.001, pCONTvsOUT<0.001). Nevertheless, the feeling 
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Figure 4 – Intensity of Anger (left panel) and Guilt (right panel) dependent on Punishment 
(NoP-No punishment, NMP-NMP only, MP- MP only, BP-Both Punishments) 
With respect to the emotion of guilt, we establish that in-group subjects report a significantly higher 
level of guilt when they receive punishment than out- or control subjects (pINvsOUT<0.001 and 
pINvsCONT<0.01). No matter whether subjects receive solely NMP, solely MP or both punishments at 
the same time, being punished always triggers a higher intensity of guilt in in-group than in out-group 
matching (for NMP: pINvsOUT<0.1, MP: pINvsOUT<0.1, and BP: pINvsOUT<0.05). Guilt is also greater in in-
groups than in control groups when receiving NMP or BP (for NMP: pINvsCONT<0.1 and BP: 
pINvsCONT<0.05). This highlights that subjects in in-groups are more emotionally sensitive to NMP than 
subjects of the Out-group and the Control treatment. 
Secondly, Figure 5 illustrates how this emotional sensitivity influences the effectiveness of 
punishment in different social environments. In particular, it depicts the change in contributions 
dependent on whether subjects were punished and whether they indicated feelings of anger and 
guilt.31 To this purpose, we classify subjects as angry and feeling guilty when they indicated an 
intensity of at least two on a seven-point Likert-scale.32 Our results show that when subjects were 
punished, contribution changes of angry and non-angry subjects differ neither in identity-
homogenous nor in randomly assigned groups (pIN=0.94, pCONT=0.61). Nevertheless, in out-groups 
                                                             
30
 We find that in case subjects received punishment disregarding type and strength, they had significantly 
higher intensity of negative emotions (shame, irritation, guilt, disappointment and anger) and a significantly 
lower intensity of happiness, gratitude and surprise (p<0.001 for all treatments). 
31 For details about the effect of particular punishment types, see Table A.6 and Figure A.7. 
32 This classification yields similar results to choosing the mean of all subjects as a benchmark. 
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anger induced subjects to contribute comparatively lower amounts to the public good as opposed to 
non-angry subjects (pOUT<0.05). Consequently, the emotional reaction to receiving punishment does 
shape out-group members’ subsequent contribution. This documents that especially in this matching 
condition effects of punishment on contribution are not homogenous. In case subjects did not 
receive any punishment the feeling of anger triggered even lower level of contributions in the 
following period. In contrast to in-group matching, in the Out-group and Control treatment we even 
find that this difference between angry and non-angry subjects is significant, thus the decrease is 
more severe (pOUT<0.001, pCONT<0.05, pIN=0.15). In sum, these insights suggest that in-group members 
are less susceptible to their anger than subjects of groups comprised of heterogenous identities or 
random subjects, who tend to lower subsequent contributions when angry upon punishment. 
Consequently, our hypothesis on anger that in-group members’ emotion of anger to have less impact 
on subsequent contribution changes than those of out-group members, cannot be rejected. This 
finding is in line with Bicskei et al. (2013a), who find that a similar intensity of anger-like emotions 
influences behaviour less when individuals are matched with members of common identities than 
with members of different identities. 
Result 4c: After being punished, the presence of anger does not influence subsequent 
contributions in in-groups. In groups of different identities and in randomly assigned 
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Figure 5 – Average Change in Contribution based on Emotions and Punishment Received 
 (number above the bars indicate frequencies)33 
Regarding guilt, we demonstrate that in each treatment if subjects were punished, they were more 
likely to increase their contributions if they felt guilty than if they did not (Pearson's chi-square test 
yielding p<0.001 for each treatment).34 Moreover, these subjects increased their contribution to the 
public good to a greater extent than those who felt no guilt (pGuilty vs NonGuilty<0.001 for each 
treatment). We notice, however, that punished out-group members who felt guilty were more likely 
to increase their contributions than in-group members feeling guilty (Pearson's chi-square test, χ²(1)= 
4.7, p<0.05). In this regard, the average increase in contributions is also significantly higher in out-
groups than in in-groups (pINvsOUT<0.1).
35 Unpunished subjects in in-groups who had no feelings of 
                                                             
33
 In out-group all negative deviations from the average were punished, thus the occurrence of observations, 
when no punishment was received but guilt was felt, is not expected (we have only 3 observations). 
34 See also Table A.6 and Figure A.7 for differences between punishment types. 
35 For the robustness check, see Table A.8. 
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guilt decreased their contribution to a similar extent as subjects of randomly assigned groups 
(pINvsCONT=0.27). This decrease was, however, weaker than that of out-group (pINvsOUT<0.1, 
pOUTvsCONT<0.01). Interestingly, if subjects did not receive any punishment, although they had feelings 
of guilt, no differences can be found between in- and out-groups (pINvsOUT=0.11, pINvsCONT=0.22, 
pOUTvsCONT<0.1). Thus, we establish that the presence of guilt forces subjects to increase their 
contributions in each treatment if punishment was assigned. In particular, out-group members 
feeling guilty when punished reveal stronger increases in their contributions than in in-groups. 
Consequently, our Hypothesis on Guilt, according to which subjects in in-groups tend to contribute 
more to the public good in the next period than out-groups if they feel guilty upon punishment, is not 
supported. 
Result 4d: Although the level of guilt felt by subjects is significantly higher in in-groups as 
opposed to out-groups in case of receiving punishment of any kind, feeling guilty 
induces significantly higher positive changes in subjects’ contributions in out- than in 
in-group matching.  
Result 4e: When receiving punishment, the feeling of guilt triggers higher positive changes in 
subjects’ contributions in the control treatment than in the In-group treatment.  
5 Conclusion 
This article provides initial insights on whether subjects in different social environments govern their 
groups rather by monetary sanctions or simply by non-monetary sanctions. Our data reveals that 
under the threat of both punishments, apart from the initial periods, identity-heterogeneous groups 
tend to contribute more to a public good than identity-homogeneous groups. This could be due to an 
anticipation of more severe punishment in out-groups as opposed to in-groups. Indeed, we establish 
that out-groups subjects display their disapproval more frequently and with greater intensity by 
monetary-punishment as opposed to in-groups. On the contrary, in-group subjects rely more on non-
monetary punishment. In total, these counteracting differences in contributions and in the 
application of monetary- and non-monetary punishment bear the consequence that identity-
homogeneous and identity-heterogeneous groups reach a similar social welfare.  
In connection with the question of how subjects actually respond to these governance mechanisms, 
we demonstrate that the application of monetary-punishment alone is ineffective in boosting 
cooperation, which contradicts previous findings. Rather the amount of NMP received positively 
influences subsequent contributions. Yet, contrary to our hypothesis subjects in identity-
homogeneous groups are not outstandingly affected. Moreover, both monetary- and non-monetary 
punishment induce highly cooperative in-group members to lower their subsequent contributions, 
probably because they perceive punishment by in-group members as particularly unfair and retaliate 
by lowering contributions.  
Furthermore, we establish that the social environment alters how anger drives subjects´ behavior. 
Indeed, while after being punished the presence of anger does not influence subsequent 
contributions in in-groups, in out- and random groups it has a negative impact. Equally, the feeling of 
guilt when being punished differently affects subsequent contributions depending on the social 
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environment. Surprisingly, when interacting in identity-heterogeneous groups, guilt leads subjects to 
increase subsequent contributions to a higher extent than in identity-homogenous groups.   
From economic policy perspective our findings are of high relevance. We demonstrate that groups in 
different social environments make use of different forms and strengths of governance. Thus, the 
availability of both monetary and non-monetary punishment institutions leads identity-homogenous 
and identity-heterogeneous groups to achieve similar levels of social welfare. This is important, since 
it is typically lower in fragmented societies than in homogeneous ones. Moreover, in both social 
environments welfare is higher than typically observed without any punishment institution. All in all, 
an institutional environment, which combines both sanctioning systems, is beneficial in terms of 
social welfare in the long run. 
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6 Appendix  
Table A.1: Average Group Contribution Level over Periods 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Group Nr.
IN
1 17.5 17.5 19.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.5
2 13.8 16.3 16.0 15.5 14.0 12.5 9.3 10.0 10.0 10.0 12.7
3 13.8 20.0 15.0 16.3 19.3 17.5 16.3 17.0 15.3 8.5 15.9
4 13.3 18.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.2
5 17.5 17.5 15.0 18.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 18.9
6 18.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.9
7 17.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 15.0 19.3
8 15.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.5
9 11.3 14.5 15.3 15.8 16.5 17.3 18.8 19.8 20.0 19.3 16.8
10 14.5 18.0 18.8 19.5 19.5 19.0 18.5 19.8 20.0 19.0 18.7
11 11.0 15.0 17.0 18.8 19.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.8 18.1
12 13.8 16.0 18.8 19.8 19.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 15.0 18.3
13 10.8 13.0 14.3 14.5 14.5 14.8 15.3 15.8 16.8 18.5 14.8
14 12.5 15.0 18.8 20.0 17.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 18.4
15 16.3 18.5 18.8 18.8 19.3 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 16.3 18.8
16 8.8 12.5 13.5 14.0 16.0 17.3 17.5 18.0 18.0 19.3 15.5
17 16.3 16.3 16.3 15.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 18.4
18 12.5 16.3 15.0 15.0 16.3 17.5 16.3 20.0 20.0 20.0 16.9
19 12.5 10.0 11.3 11.8 12.0 11.8 13.5 12.5 10.5 6.3 11.2
20 5.5 8.8 4.5 3.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.3 3.4
Total 13.6 16.2 16.4 16.8 17.3 17.5 17.4 17.7 17.6 16.4 16.7
OUT
1 13.0 15.0 17.8 15.5 17.3 15.3 17.3 18.5 14.3 16.8 16.1
2 13.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.4
3 8.8 12.3 14.5 18.3 19.3 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 18.8 17.2
4 15.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 15.0 19.0
5 18.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.9
6 15.0 16.3 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 18.8 19.0
7 10.5 11.5 14.5 15.3 14.5 14.0 14.5 14.8 11.3 10.3 13.1
8 9.5 10.3 13.5 14.8 15.3 16.0 16.5 16.8 17.3 17.5 14.7
9 13.8 17.5 17.8 20.0 20.0 19.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 15.0 18.4
10 9.5 15.0 20.0 17.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.8 19.8 19.8 18.1
11 15.0 19.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.4
12 14.3 19.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 14.5 18.8
13 14.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 17.5 19.2
14 12.5 14.8 19.5 15.5 16.3 12.0 14.0 11.5 15.8 15.5 14.7
15 14.5 13.8 19.0 20.0 20.0 18.3 12.5 16.3 16.8 16.3 16.7
16 17.0 19.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 15.0 19.2
17 14.3 15.0 16.5 17.0 18.0 18.5 18.5 18.5 19.3 14.5 17.0
18 10.8 12.5 15.0 16.8 17.3 16.5 15.0 15.8 15.8 8.8 14.4
Total 13.4 16.2 18.2 18.4 18.8 18.3 18.2 18.4 18.3 16.3 17.5
CONT
1 14.3 18.3 19.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.2
2 18.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.8
3 11.3 13.3 18.0 11.3 2.5 13.0 17.3 17.5 14.5 10.0 12.9
4 12.8 13.0 13.5 12.8 12.8 12.5 13.0 12.8 11.3 9.3 12.4
5 9.8 11.3 12.8 13.5 14.5 15.8 17.0 18.5 18.8 19.5 15.1
6 9.3 14.3 16.8 19.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 17.9
7 15.0 18.3 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.3
8 15.5 18.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 18.8 18.8 20.0 18.8 17.0 18.8
9 17.8 18.0 19.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.5
10 13.3 17.5 16.3 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 18.7
11 17.3 19.0 20.0 15.0 20.0 20.0 19.8 15.0 20.0 20.0 18.6
12 13.5 16.0 17.0 17.3 18.0 18.0 18.0 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.1
13 8.3 14.8 15.3 18.0 17.5 17.8 17.8 18.8 18.8 19.5 16.6
Total 13.5 16.3 17.6 17.4 17.3 17.4 18.6 18.5 18.4 17.9 17.4
Period




Table A.2: Average Punishment Points Assigned 
Table A.2: Average Punishment Points Assigned
Treatment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average
MP 1.39 1.84 1.43 0.66 0.84 0.65 0.64 0.44 0.39 1.00 0.93
NMP 7.28 6.74 6.61 5.79 5.64 3.79 4.64 3.76 3.48 5.80 5.35
MP 1.49 1.14 0.60 1.28 1.47 1.18 0.76 0.81 0.88 1.50 1.11
NMP 9.19 6.36 2.78 3.56 2.64 4.50 4.85 3.72 4.53 7.94 5.01
MP 1.81 1.87 1.25 1.35 1.04 0.63 1.29 1.38 0.81 0.92 1.23







































Table A.4: Determinants of Punishment of Period 1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MP NMP MP NMP MP NMP
Neg. Deviation from Group Avg. Contr. 0.540*** 1.148*** 0.304*** 0.811*** 0.413*** 1.012***
 (ck - c ̅ <0) (0.149) (0.175) (0.084) (0.098) (0.130) (0.155)
Pos. Deviation from Group Avg. Contr. 0.071 -0.200 -0.305* -0.659*** -0.263 -0.388
(ck - c ̅ >0) (0.240) (0.283) (0.172) (0.175) (0.220) (0.286)
Others Average Contribution 0.082 -0.252* 0.001 -0.533*** 0.016 -0.161
(excluding subject k) (0.168) (0.145) (0.133) (0.203) (0.200) (0.187)
Constant -7.678** 0.119 -2.932 6.398** -3.747 0.960
(3.202) (2.360) (2.062) (2.733) (2.705) (2.921)
Sigma Constant 5.004*** 5.641*** 3.349*** 5.635*** 4.191*** 4.763***
(0.889) (0.544) (0.532) (0.691) (0.899) (0.481)
Observations 240 240 216 216 156 156
Log-likelihood -177.5 -365.7 -182.9 -355.2 -150.4 -255.8
Pseudo R2 0.0381 0.116 0.0788 0.131 0.0454 0.115
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; c-Contribution
Dep.Var.: Punishment assigned by subject i to subject k in Period 1
IN OUT CONT
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Tobit estimation with lower censoring.
 
 
Table A.5: Average Change in Contribution based on Punishment received 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ALL High Contr. Low Contr. ALL High Contr. Low Contr. ALL High Contr. Low Contr.
MP -0.162 -0.239** -0.0222 -0.140* -0.390*** 0.0837 -0.0542 -0.456*** 0.640***
(0.116) (0.119) (0.193) (0.0815) (0.143) (0.180) (0.117) (0.160) (0.141)
NMP 0.166*** -0.0332 0.106** 0.226*** 0.0938** 0.0552 0.248*** 0.122* 0.0763
(0.0305) (0.0256) (0.0421) (0.0475) (0.0354) (0.0883) (0.0548) (0.0674) (0.0600)
Constant -0.423*** -0.419*** 1.686*** -0.580*** -0.544*** 2.860*** -0.461** -0.274 0.948
(0.154) (0.133) (0.363) (0.175) (0.166) (0.829) (0.208) (0.182) (0.619)
Observations 720 537 183 648 522 126 468 358 110
R-squared 0.092 0.034 0.039 0.146 0.039 0.021 0.159 0.100 0.254
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered around individuals.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1







Table A.6:  Average Change in Contribution based on Emotions and Punishment received  
(Avg. Change, Standard Deviations, and Frequencies) 
NoP NMP MP BP Total NoP NMP MP BP Total NoP NMP MP BP Total
Non-Angry -0.30 0.88 0.00 1.79 0.18 -0.55 1.21 -2.62 4.48 0.34 -0.08 0.49 0.00 2.92 0.38
2.42 3.76 0.00 5.83 3.31 2.91 2.61 5.62 6.05 3.91 1.81 2.00 0.00 5.85 2.75
351 120 1 52 524 328 86 13 62 489 215 71 3 36 325
Angry -1.18 0.39 0.00 1.36 0.65 -1.06 -0.46 -2.13 1.92 0.28 -1.86 0.26 -2.5 1.8 0.75
3.35 2.81 0.00 5.51 4.61 2.36 6.09 4.28 5.3 5.32 3.7 3.17 6.22 6.65 5.92
33 51 5 107 196 17 37 30 75 159 14 31 12 86 143
Total -0.37 0.74 0.00 1.50 0.31 -0.58 0.71 -2.28 3.08 0.33 -0.19 0.42 -2.00 2.13 0.49
2.52 3.50 0.00 5.60 3.71 2.89 4.04 4.66 5.77 4.29 2.01 2.4 5.61 6.42 4.00
384 171 6 159 720 345 123 43 137 648 229 102 15 122 468
NoP NMP MP BP Total NoP NMP MP BP Total NoP NMP MP BP Total
Non-Guilty -0.33 0.38 0.00 0.76 0.00 -0.60 0.25 -2.38 2.50 -0.06 -0.09 0.02 -2.50 1.43 0.18
2.44 3.37 0.00 5.70 3.36 2.89 3.58 4.84 5.93 4.00 1.79 1.59 6.22 7.17 3.81
355 127 4 88 574 342 101 39 94 576 219 84 12 82 397
Guilty -0.93 1.77 0.00 2.42 1.53 1.67 2.82 -1.25 4.35 3.46 -2.50 2.28 0.00 3.58 2.24
3.29 3.71 0.00 5.38 4.67 2.89 5.30 2.50 5.25 5.21 4.25 4.18 0.00 4.22 4.58
29 44 2 71 146 3 22 4 43 72 10 18 3 40 71
Total -0.37 0.74 0.00 1.50 0.31 -0.58 0.71 -2.28 3.08 0.33 -0.19 0.42 -2.00 2.13 0.49
2.52 3.50 0.00 5.60 3.71 2.89 4.04 4.66 5.77 4.29 2.01 2.40 5.61 6.42 4.00































































































































































Table A.8: Average Change in Contribution based on Guilty (if Punishment received>0) 
















Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
A.9: Instructions to the Experiment (ID treatments) 
Welcome to the experiment! Thank you very much for your participation. 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you have the opportunity of winning money 
additional to the € 2.50 show-up fee, which you receive in any case. Your earnings will depend on 
your decisions and on those of the other players in your group. It is therefore very important that 
you read these instructions with care. 
The instructions we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. It is forbidden to 
speak during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. A member of our 
team will come to you and answer your question privately. 
During the experiment we will be talking about ECUs (Experimental Currency Units) rather than 
about Euros. Hence, your total earnings will be calculated in ECUs in the first instance. At the end of 
the experiment the total amount of ECUs you have earned will be converted to Euros at the following 
rate:       10 ECUs = 36 Cents 
Each participant receives a lump-sum payment of 100 ECUs at the beginning of the experiment. This 
one-off payment can be used to pay for eventual losses during the experiment. At the end of the 
experiment your entire earnings from the experiment (which you will have earned through your 
decisions), plus the lump-sum payment, will be paid to you in cash immediately. 
All participants will be divided in groups with 4 players each.  




The experiment consists of two tasks. Later, you will be informed about the first task´s procedure in 
detail. Now, we would like to introduce the second task’s basic conditions for your decisions.  
The second task consists of exactly 10 periods. The number of the period will appear in the top left 
corner of the screen. In the top right corner you will see how many more seconds remain for you to 
make your decisions. You will be in a group with 3 other participants. Please note that the same 
three people will be in your group for all periods of the second task. 
 
Each period of this task consists of two stages. In the first stage you have to decide how many of your 
ECUs you would like to contribute to a project. In the second stage you are informed on the 
contributions of the three other group members to the project. Afterwards, you can decide whether 
or not to express your approval or disapproval of each other group member’s decision by 
distributing points to them. In the followings these decisions will be described in detail. 
The first stage 
At the beginning of each period each participant receives an endowment of 20 ECUs. Your task is to 
decide how to use this endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 ECU you want to 
contribute to a project by choosing a number between 0 and 20. Each point, which you do not invest 
in a project will be automatically deposited on your private account. 
Please state also what you estimate each of the other three group members to contribute to the 
project on average (e.g: (5+15+20)/3 = 13, in this case you have to enter 13 as the average amount of 
money the others invest in the project). Once you have done this and pressed the OK button your 
decision can no longer be revised. 
After all members of your group have made their decision your screen will show you the total 
amount of ECU contributed to the project by each of the four group members (including your 
contribution). This screen shows you how many ECU you have earned.  
Your income consists of two parts: 
1) the income from the private account: the sum of ECUs you have not invested in the project  
2) the income from the project: 40 percent of the total contribution of all 4 group members to the 
project (the total includes your own contribution) 
Income from the private account (=20 - your contribution to the project) 
+ Income from the project (=0.4*(sum of all contributions to the project)) 
Total income from stage 1 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this means that 
each group member receives the same income from the project.  
For example, suppose the total of the contributions of all group members is 60 ECUs. In this case 
each member of the group receives an income from the project of 0.4*60=24 ECUs. If the total 
contribution to the project is 9 ECUs, then each member of the group receives an income of 
0.4*9=3.6 ECUs from the project. 
For each ECU that you keep for yourself (and you do not invest it in the project) you earn an income 
of 1 ECU. For every ECU you contribute to the project instead, the total project contribution rises by 
one ECU. Your income from the project would rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. However, the income of the 
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other group members would also rise by 0.4 ECU each, so that the total income of the group from 
the project would rise by 1.6 ECU. Your contribution to the project therefore also raises the income 
of the other group members. Likewise, you profit from each ECU contributed by the other members 
to the project. For each ECU contributed by any group member you earn 0.4*1=0.4 ECUs. 
The second stage 
At the beginning of the second stage, you will be informed on how much each of your group 
members contributed to the project. Your contribution is always displayed in the first column, while 
the contributions of the other group members of this period are shown in the remaining three 
columns. The contributions of the other group members will be randomly listed and changed in each 
period, so that you are unable to track the behaviour of a particular group member during the 
periods. 
In this stage you have the opportunity to express your approval or disapproval of each other group 
member’s decision by distributing monetary and/or non-monetary points. 
Allocating Non-Monetary Points 
Here, you have the opportunity to express your approval or disapproval of each other group 
member’s decision by distributing 0-10 non-monetary points. You can allocate a large number of 
points to any member of your group if you disapprove of his or her decision (10 points for the most 
disapproval, 0 points for the least disapproval). Each point you distribute to a particular player 
does not affect your earnings or the earnings of the player receiving the non-monetary points. 
You will be informed how much each of your group members contributed to the project at the first 
stage. You must decide how many non-monetary points to give to each of the other three group 
members. If you do not wish to express disapproval of the decision of a specific group member then 
you must enter 0.  You do not have any costs in terms of ECUs for distributing non-monetary points 
to other members of your group.  
The other group members can also assign points to you if they wish to do so.  
Allocating Monetary Points 
Here, you have the opportunity to reduce the income of each group member by distributing 
monetary points or to leave it equal. You can allocate a large number of points to any member of 
your group if you disapprove of his or her decision (10 points for the most disapproval, 0 points for 
the least disapproval). Each point you distribute to a particular player lowers his or her total 
income from stage 1 by 10%.  
You incur costs for allocating monetary points to other members, which is discussed in detail 
below.  
You must decide how many monetary points to give to each of the other three group members. If 
you do not wish to change the income of a specific group member then you must enter 0. If you 
distribute monetary points, you have costs in terms of ECUs, which depend on the amount of 
monetary points you distribute. You can distribute between 0 and 10 monetary points to each group 
member. The more monetary points you allocate to any group member, the higher your costs. Your 
total costs are equal to the sum of the costs of distributing monetary points to each of the other 
three group members. The following table illustrates the relation between distributed monetary 





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Cost of monetary 
points (K) 
0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30 
 
Suppose for example that you give 2 monetary points to one member. This costs you 2 ECUs. If you 
then give 9 points to another member this costs you an additional 25 ECUs; and if you give 0 points 
to the last group member this has no cost for you. In this case your total costs of distributing points 
would be 27 ECUs (2+25+0). Your total cost of distributing monetary points can be calculated and is 
displayed on the input screen. As long as you have not pressed the OK button you can revise your 
decision. 
If you choose 0 monetary points for a particular group member, you do not change his or her 
income. However, if you give 1 point (by choosing 1) to a member you reduce his or her income by 
10 percent, etc. Consequently, the amount of monetary points you distribute to each member 
determines how much you reduce their income from the first stage. 
Whether or by how much the income from the first stage is totally reduced depends on the total of 
the received monetary points from all other group members. If somebody receives a total of 3 points 
(from all other group members in this period) his or her income would be reduced by 30 percent. If 
somebody receives a total of 4 points his or her income would be reduced by 40 percent. If anybody 
receives 10 or more monetary points their income from the first stage will be reduced by 100 
percent. The income from the first stage for this member would in this case be reduced to zero. 
The other group members can also assign points to you if they wish to. 
Afterwards, please state also what you expect how many monetary and non-monetary points you 
will receive from the other group members in total. After all participants have made their decisions, 
these amounts will be displayed on your screen. 
Income 
Your total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows: 
Your total income for the particular period (in ECUs)  
If you receive less than 10 monetary points: 
= [(income from the 1st stage)*(10-received monetary points)/10]  
                  - (cost to you of monetary points you distribute) 
If you receive 10 or more monetary points: 
= - your costs of monetary points you distribute 
Please note that your income in terms of ECUs at the end of the second stage can be negative, if the 
costs of the monetary points you distribute exceed your income from the first stage. You can, 
however, avoid such losses with certainty through you own decisions. 
At the end of each period your income from the particular period and your total income from all 






To make you more familiar with the decision situation, please answer the following questions and 
enter your results in the computer. While calculating, you may use the calculator function on the 
monitor.  
1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. Nobody (including yourself) contributes any ECUs to 
the project.  
a) What is your total income (income from the private account + income from the project)? _________ 
b) What is the total income of each of the other group members for the period? _________ 
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 20 ECUs to the project. All other group 
members each contribute 20 ECUs to the project.  
a) What is your total income for the period? _________ 
b) What is the total income of each the other group members for the period? _________ 
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. The other three group members contribute together a 
total of 40 ECUs to the project. 
a) What is your total income if you, in addition to the 40 ECUs, contribute 0 ECU to the project? 
_________ 
b) What is your total income if you, in addition to the 40 ECUs, contribute 15 ECUs to the project? 
_________ 
4. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 10 ECUs to the project. 
a) What is your total income if the other group members together, in addition to your 10 ECUs, 
contribute a total of 5 ECUs to the project? _________ 
b) What is your total income if the other group members together, in addition to your 10 ECUs, 
contribute a total of 35 ECUs to the project? _______ 
5. Suppose in the second stage of this task, you distribute the following amounts of monetary 
points to the other three group members: 10, 5 and 1. What is the total cost of the monetary 
points you distribute? ________ 
6. What are your costs if you distribute a total of 0 monetary points? ________ 
7. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, if you receive a total of 0 
monetary points from the other group members? ________ 
8. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, if you receive a total of 3 
monetary points from the other group members? ________ 
9. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, if you receive a total of 9 
non-monetary points from the other group members? ________ 
10. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, if you receive a total of 
11 monetary points from the other group members? ________ 








Please note: Do not open the attached envelope before you are asked to do so! 
At the beginning of the first task, you will be arbitrarily assigned to a group of four and your group 
will be marked by a specific color. Your group has the possibility to choose its group color between 
two colors. Each group member will be provided with two colors to vote for. The color chosen by the 
majority of group members will be your group color. In case of standoff a random mechanism will 
determine the group color. 
In this task only those solutions, which are entered correctly by ALL FOUR group members will be 
considered as correct. Please take into account that every solution must be approved by clicking on 
the “Eingabe speichern” (“Save input”) button.  
During this task the group members are allowed to communicate with each other. For this, a chat 
box is positioned on the left hand side of the computer screen. Your conversation will be recorded. 
You have 8 minutes to solve the task. Only in this time you may communicate with your group 
members. Please note that you are not allowed to chat about the second stage of the experiment. 
Violations of this rule will cause to lose your earnings and to be excluded from further 
experiments. 
Please note that each group member has to enter the correct answers and approve them by 
pressing the “Eingabe speichern” (“Save input”) botton. You have to click on “Seite verlassen” 
(“Leave page”) before the 8 minutes have run out. Otherwise the results will not be saved. The time 
left will be shown to you in the upper right hand corner of your screen. 
All participants will be shown a picture and a list of objects. The task is to find the hidden objects in 
the picture. The inscriptions on the left and the upper side give the numbers of the rows (Reihe) and 
columns (Spalte), respectively. You are asked to insert this information in the boxes of the screen, 
which will be shown on the right hand side of the screen. The first box refers to the row (Reihe), the 









The group, which finds most of the objects in the 8 minutes time is the winner group. At the end of 
the experiment you will be informed how many objects each group of the experiment have found 
and whether you are belonging to winner group of this task. In this case, you will receive a 
congratulation message.  
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